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THE CONDUCT OF MIND SERIES

EDITED BY

JOSEPH JASTROW

PLEASURE AND BEHAVIOR

PLEASURE AND BEHAVIOR

BY

FREDERIC LYMAN WELLS

AUTHOR OF "MENTAL ADJUSTMENTS"

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TO MY NEAREST ASSOCIATES
IN A GREAT ORGANIZATION
FOR NOTABLE EXPERIENCES
IN THE PLEASURE VALUES
OF COMRADESHIP

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PREFACE

The pursuit of happiness was included by the founders of our nation as among man's inalienable rights; it is so because it is an ineradicable tendency. The worth-whileness of life to any one is measured by the happiness [1] he secures in living. It seemed likely that those interested in the intelligent management of their own or others' lives would find useful a rather specialized study of human behavior as it contributes to human enjoyment. As no knowledge of psychology is assumed, some basic structural principles are outlined in an opening chapter; the book then enters on its main task of discussing the various modes and channels through which humanity derives its enjoyments by liberation of its energies.

That a person may have any great joy, he must desire something with all his heart and soul, and strive for it with all his might. The basis of major enjoyment is energy in pursuit of desire, as the basis of major grief or anger is the thwart-

[1] There are a number of words connoting various orders of satisfaction, such as happiness, pleasure, luxury, contentment, enjoyment, and the like. Distinctions are often drawn between them, especially on ethical grounds. Of more importance in the present connection is the fundamental similarity of what they mean, namely, something agreeable. On this account, the book employs many such terms quite synonymously.

ing of great urges. Physical health, and youth, are important for the enjoyment of life because they furnish bodily conditions under which desires flourish. The animal urge for food develops or "sublimates" into the human enjoyments of refined living, including luxuries of all kinds, and leading to the effort and wealth that makes them possible. The mating instinct grows into the complex erotic life of man, ever finding fields further removed from its original centre. No less interest attaches to enjoyments derived through the coöperative efforts of men—the social tendencies. But, in the pursuit of one's own happiness, one may interfere with the happiness of another; the bearing of this consideration on human enjoyments requires special discussion. It requires consideration of the inner emotional life as it modifies the enjoyment of outward urges; and further consideration of the fact that many enjoyments belong to the intellectual rather than to the instinctive life of man, and are profoundly affected by the conditions governing intellectual pleasures.

As desire and energy are prime factors of enjoyment, the psychology of these processes and their functioning must be included. Enjoyment may be seriously modified through limitation of one's energies to self-interest, or by the presence of external difficulties. The urges themselves may disappear; and when desire fails, "the years draw nigh, when thou shalt say, I have no pleasure in

them." For that one may enjoy, it matters not so much *what* one wants as *how much* one wants it, and how free one is to pursue one's aims. Thus it is that enjoyments of similar order are found in many varieties of personalities and careers. Peasants and craftsmen derive as much from life as princes of wealth; the blind may be as happy as those of normal sight; one man is as happy in saving his first thousand dollars as another in making his first million; the explorer of archaic inscriptions has as rich satisfaction as the explorer of polar snows and high mountains; another lives in happy communion with ascetic ideals, in pursuit of heaven to come; and no one shall say that his reward on earth is less than is open to the physician, the artist, or the conqueror.

The present essay considers only the relative values of these types of conduct in pleasure terms, not in terms of achievement. There is, however, some relation between the direction of one's urges and their strength, between the urge's nature and the vigor of its pursuit. From this relation emerges a principle significant for the individual, and from a social standpoint portentous. Pleasure values tend to decrease as one's desires are further removed from the direction of the fundamental instinctive urges. Such removal is an inevitable effect of civilization, and this is one reason why the pleasure-value of life exhibits no general increase with civilization's advance but moves in cycles, with some tendency to become

lower, as life grows more complex. The relative joylessness of modern life is a common complaint against the industrial system, attributed with much reason to the intense mechanization of living. The cave-dwellers commanded the fundamental means for enjoyment in greater measure than the average man of to-day; the knight errant of chivalry, and the frontiersman of our own time [2] stood closer to original pleasure than the merchants and artisans that supersede them. But the great figure created by Cervantes, who tries by re-living a knightly life to regain its satisfactions, falls foul of windmills and slingstones and other inconveniences that only a Quixotic spirit suffices to endure. The solution of perplexities of behavior, distorted means of satisfaction, may well be found in a step "back to nature" by some route; but it is easy to choose one that actually leads further astray. It depends on what "nature" we started with and are attempting to get back to. One cannot prescribe ways to self-realization to fit special situations but only outline a general map of the region in which the goal may be sought; the seeker must bring his own compass, and set his course by it.

From the broader standpoint, one looks to the lessons of history. An empire that falls from

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[2] "He rides the earth with hoofs of might,
His is the song the eagle sings;
Strong as the eagle's his delight,
For like his rope, his heart hath wings."
—*Wister.*

greatness to decay, succumbs when its energies fail and its national life is in consequence no longer worth living. The normal course of great empires has been gradually or rapidly to exhaust sources of imperial satisfaction, and in turn to become exhausted, and die a natural death. Recent catastrophic events have to some extent simulated this process for European civilization. Under such conditions the Nationalist Turk, few in numbers and resources but instinctively vigorous and determined, can maintain his will against European powers possessed of many times his physical strength, but war-weary and without desire or energy to resort to effective opposition. Actions attributed to entrenched communism in Russia would have had more serious "answers back" from capitalistic society in antebellum days. Whether these and other developments represent a passing illness of European civilization, or an approaching old age is a speculative issue; some considerations are offered in the closing pages.

In presenting a phase of psychology in an elementary form, the author assumes responsibility for its scientific character; for the data he is satisfied to exercise care in selecting authorities and to present their conclusions. It is hoped that the customary standards in acknowledgment have been met without unnecessary encumbering of the text with notes. In addition to others named in the text, it is desired to record the influence of

Eliot Blackwelder, Henry Fairfield Osborn, John B. Watson, William Morton Wheeler, James G. Frazer, Walter B. Cannon, Pierre Janet, Jacques Loeb. In the literary field of psychology, the chief indebtedness is to the directness of Rudyard Kipling and to the depth of Joseph Conrad. Very special obligation exists to those who reviewed the manuscript in preparation, in particular to Dr. C. M. Campbell and to Dr. Jastrow, the editor of the Conduct of Mind Series. My colleague, Dr. Jean Walker, shared the task of proofreading.

F. L. Wells

74 Fenwood Rd.,
Boston, Mass.

INTRODUCTION

The present contribution is focused upon a field that has attracted the spot-light of psychological interest. The reconstruction of psychology as the science of behavior has brought about a renewed attention to the life of the feelings and emotions and the sources of motives for action. Man as a rational animal has by no means been dethroned, but rather has been reinstated in his estate with a fresher and a deeper understanding of the function of his rationality to give point and substance and refinement to his affective life. Happiness and success are interpreted as high-level sanctions of endeavor which has its motive source in lowly origins, where simpler pleasures rule as rewards and simpler pains are imposed as penalties. Ever subject to the same incentives for the wiser direction of his conduct, man's power to attain nobler prides and more complex shames testifies to the social evolution that has transformed his environment without turning his nature from its ordained orbit. Such loyalty to original nature is quite compatible with the highest aspirations and the wisdom to set a goal and devise the means for its attainment. Man remains the pleasure-loving creature, while enlarging the scope of his pleasures and the level of their satisfaction.

The recognition of the pleasure scale that runs

the gamut of human experience is as essential as the recognition of the intelligence scale that surveys the span of human endowment in terms of capacity for the solution of problems. One's place in the one is a most uncertain index of one's status in the other; indeed, the ignorance that is said to favor bliss, is all too readily interpreted as separating wisdom from happiness. The truth of the matter lies otherwise, and indicates that the intellectual expansion of one's total psychic endowment carries with it at once privileges and risks in the pleasure scale,—greater thrills, nobler satisfactions as well as deeper pangs and frustrations. As man becomes complex and his environment offers highly evolved orders of social satisfaction, life becomes a larger venture and successful adjustment a heavier risk. The same order of change accompanies the seven ages of man, and brings it about that satisfactions of one period pale and yield to a maturer character phase with other demands, other perspective of the compensations of living. Maturity comes to be measured far more vitally in terms of the range and level of pleasure producers than in growth in shrewdness, grasp, or even worldly wisdom. It is well to live richly, and taste deeply of the joys and sorrows of existence; for in such response personality develops and poise is secured. Therein likewise will the temperamental differences of men reveal the specific quality of their endowment, each seeking the pleasure fields of most congenial appeal. Fools and philosophers, no less than the

ordinary variations of all sorts and conditions of men, will thereby express their natures no less than their acquired set of values and outlooks. There is indeed no truer measure of the most real of the several personalities that are harbored in the same tenement of clay, than is afforded by the dominant pleasure fields in which as fads, fancies, recreations, enthusiasms, hobbies, devotions, loyalties, sacrifices, the emergent self finds its joys. Many as are the philosophies of life, ranging from asceticism to a reckless plunge into the pleasures of the day with no thought of the morrow, they all express an attitude toward the pleasure scale, conditioning what men choose to seek in fulfillment of their nature.

The purpose of the volume is primarily to set forth the foundations of the affective life, so that a comprehension of the natural setting of pleasure in its relation to behavior may lead to a truer insight into the control of conduct and the ordering of desire in the artificial setting of to-day; and no less to a sympathetic appreciation of the varieties of paths other than those of one's own preference that may lead to a common goal. In the course of such pursuit many a side-issue may be followed with profit. The pleasure-life seems most of all to require the checking and chastening effect of discipline; and psychology must come to terms with morality. This requires some frank discussion of innate human trends, not only to make clear the actual sources of the energy and the satisfactions of our pleasure-seeking behavior,

but to set in right relations the dominant orders of satisfaction which have to be reconciled in a well-integrated personality. How far repression can wisely go without dulling the edge of energy and mutilating the pattern of complete humanity is a disputed issue, in which the Freudian and the moralist disagree. Dr. Wells does justice to both, while yet championing the psychological solution through sublimation. Altruism finds its justification through like consideration of the joys of giving as well as of receiving.

The survey proceeds so directly according to its plan that comment may be confined to the indication of the larger bearings of the issues and factors presented in happy concrete illustration. The method of employing familiar situations and even homely phrases to point a lesson is in this field peculiarly apt; it brings psychological principles within the range of ordinary experience and adds a touch of conviction in what might otherwise be accepted too formally. The presentation is certain to be helpful to readers with a psychological interest, and is well designed to stimulate and direct those whose obligations involve a responsibility for the guidance of others. The editor's interest in the theme and in its prospective aid to direct the thought of the immediate future into profitable channels has induced him to propose considerable changes of phrase and emphasis, which the author has accepted with occasional reservations.

JOSEPH JASTROW

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PLEASURE AND BEHAVIOR

CHAPTER I

HOW THE MIND IS ORGANIZED

We must take the passions of men as nature has given them, and those principles as a guide, which are generally the rule of action.—WASHINGTON *at Valley Forge.*

As a tree grows, it absorbs various substances from the earth; man does similarly when he breathes, drinks, or eats. This capacity is the basic trait of living matter. When sunlight strikes the morning-glory, the flower opens; when a dog finds a bone he gnaws it; and when (to include a far more complex situation) a salesman finds a likely customer, he tries to sell his ware. Living matter has a tendency to react in definite ways. As external conditions change, the organism adjusts itself to them; such power of response is known as irritability—which means a sensitiveness to certain kinds of stimulation. The light, the bone, and (in a more artificial sense) the client

are stimuli. Psychology is concerned with the behavior of living creatures in response to stimulation. The more varied and complex the stimulations, the more intimately and minutely is psychology concerned with their study. Such responses are most complicated in man. Our deepest interest is in human psychology and in man's responses to the many varieties of stimulation that nature and the man-made world provide.

In the wide range of animal creation, from the lowly amœba, through crustacean and reptile, bird and fish and mammal to man, the whole course of mental development is open to observation. Structure and function go together. Ability to "do" implies something to "do with." The amœba with ability to do only a few things is a jelly-like substance without distinguishable organs. Man with endless capacity for response is highly complicated in structure, highly organized. Eventually the human personality is the expression of such organization. The nervous system provides the means by which an effect produced in one part of the body is transmitted to other parts of the common body. The amœba when stimulated on one side responds as a whole, but only with a slow and simple response. It presents nothing like the speed and skill with which

a spider catches a fly, or a cat escapes from a fox terrier. Such specialized and complex behavior requires (1) a receiving apparatus to "register" the fly, in this instance the spider's tactile sense acting through the feel (vibration) of the web; (2) an apparatus to carry the impression to the spider's legs and fangs; (3) an apparatus to reach the mechanism of response—the spider's muscles. The nervous system integrates, connects, organizes these three portions into one mechanism of response.

The receiving apparatus is specialized—and in adjustment to the forms of vibration that occur in the environment, such as light and heat waves, sound waves, chemical emanations, etc., such specialized organs constitute the senses. These include the familiar ones of sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste, and likewise forms of special stimulation with a specialized sense-organ. Temperature is a special sense; even the sense of heat is different from the sense of cold, and both differ from the sense of pressure. There is no danger of confusing a feeling of pressure with a feeling of warmth; each has its own system of registry. There are nerve-endings in the tongue for sweet, salt, bitter, and sour; each registers only its own kind of sensation.

Another order of sensation includes such feelings as hunger, nausea, fatigue, sleepiness, which gives information, not about the external world, but about the state of the body itself and its needs. An important organic sense of this type is that which regulates the position of the body, the sense of equilibrium or balance. Its organ, the semicircular canals, is by structure part of the inner ear; but its function maintains the body posture.

As development proceeds, the sense-discrimination becomes more refined. The eye first appears as a mere spot, somewhat more sensitive than the adjacent tissue; higher in the scale the eye becomes an image-forming apparatus, and further refinements—such as the use of the two eyes as one organ—develop before so complex a sense-apparatus as the human eye emerges. The several senses play a variable part in the behavior of the organism. Smell is more important and responds to finer distinctions in the dog than in man; it is not the sense-capacity alone but the use made of it that is significant. The difference between the sense-capacity of civilized and primitive peoples is more in use than in endowment.

Sight is presumably the sense of greatest value to human behavior. A blind man needs more aid from his fellows than one bereft of any other

sense. Hearing and the muscular sense (in terms of which we register the feel and set of our muscles, guide our movements, and develop the varied skill of body and hand and voice) are highly and variedly significant for behavior as well as for pleasure. Smell and taste, regulating the food acceptances and reporting agreeable as well as noxious odors, are of limited consequence, yet not negligible; touch occupies an intermediate position and reports the realities of experience convincingly. The total range of sense-response is most important for the complete variety of behavior which depends directly upon the recognition of the external world with its wealth of stimulation. The function of the senses is to discriminate one stimulus from another, to appreciate all manner of differences and with these differences to associate meanings out of which the world of things and reactions is built. The educative value of the senses and of powers of observation is clear; their contribution to the life of pleasure no less so; both condition behavior.

Yet no less important is the function of these sense-organs as bearers of agreeable feelings; these merge with the distinctions and meanings which are built upon the senses as organs of discrimination. The two can hardly be separated;

yet the pleasure-values of the several senses may be indicated. That of hearing is represented by music, a direct pleasurable stimulation to the sense-organ, but combined with meaning values in terms of the emotions aroused. The agreeableness of color-sensations, and the development of the sense of form lie at the basis of the many arts that appeal to the eye, but always in connection with meanings direct or remote, from fireworks to old masters. Through them the usual stimulations arouse agreeable thoughts and impulses. Stimulations of the muscle sense, as in exercise, arouse distinct pleasure, though this in turn is complicated with the sense of performance. In the swinging games of children, the "scenic railways" for the amusement of adults, the sense of movement provides an agreeable feeling. The aviator knows this glow of pleasure in intense form. The further consequences and developments of the sensory aspects of pleasure will be considered in a later connection.

If we turn to the structure that provides the mechanism for the pleasure-behavior and the sense-reactions of organisms, we find some useful suggestions in the operations of the nervous system. Man has a much more elaborate nervous system than any other animal. It is made up of

units called nerve-cells or neurones. These are of microscopic size and of many shapes. The type is a cell-body from which branches radiate. One branch (called the axis-cylinder or axone) carries impulses away from the cell-body. The rest (called dendrites) carry impulses toward the cell-body. Together they conduct an impulse through or past the cell-body and pass it on to the next nerve-cell. Where the axone of one nerve-cell meets the dendrites of another, there is said to be a synapse. Axones and dendrites are gathered together in bundles of fibers, like wires in an electric cable. The color of the nervous substance is gray; hence the term "gray matter." Generally the fibers have a white sheathing, like insulation; hence the term "white matter." Nearly all the cell-bodies, and a great part of the fibers, are assembled in the brain and spinal cord. The nerves connecting brain and spinal cord with various parts of the body are bundles of nerve-fibers. The brain and spinal cord comprise the *central* nervous system. The fibers that go out from them to muscles and sense-organs are called the *peripheral* nervous system. Certain other groupings of nerve-cells, outside the cerebrospinal system, are called the vegetative (sympathetic or autonomic) nervous system. This

is connected with the cerebrospinal system. Impulses through the vegetative system serve to regulate various internal organs such as heart, intestines, and glands. The senses and the voluntary (striped) muscles are served by the cerebrospinal system. If the finger is pricked with a pin, the impression is taken up by organs in the skin and given over to fibers of nerve-cells. Groups of these cells carry the impulse to the brain. The impulse is there distributed to fibers leading towards muscles of the arm and hand; when it reaches them, the finger is withdrawn. In its course, the impulse passes through several sets of nerve-cells. In man there are never less than three such sets, and there may be more. In time the whole process seldom takes less than a tenth of a second.

The nervous impulse is regarded as a rapidly traveling wave of chemical change, traversing the nerve-fiber. A burning fuse, or train of gunpowder, likewise illustrates a rapidly traveling chemical change. The nerve is not destroyed by its change, but in a fraction of a second is ready to transmit another impulse. Just as some fuses are rapid and others slow, so some nerves conduct more rapidly than others. All sorts of conditions may influence this "speed of thought." Some

nerves conduct as slowly as a few inches per second; the cerebrospinal nerve-trunks of man may conduct at the rate of nearly 400 feet per second. Responses or "reactions" to stimuli take longer than the time required for traversing the nerve-trunks. There is a latent or "dead" time of the sense-organ and of the muscle. There may also be delays in relaying the impulse from one nerve-cell to another across the synapses.

The central function of the nervous system is to bring each part of the body into prompt communication with other parts. The closest mechanical analogy is a great electrical switchboard. Every impulse for the control of one's voluntary conduct must pass through it. The brain is the High Command and the office of The Adjutant General combined. It reviews, confirms, or cancels demands from other parts of the body.

To illustrate: When the Hudson Bay packer is urged by his aching muscles to drop his load, his knowledge that he must bring it into camp keeps him moving beneath it. He continues because he cannot camp where he is, but he remembers a good place half a mile ahead. The experience of that good place, stored up in his brain, helps to sustain his effort. Without these stored-up experiences, or *memories,* the man would drop his load,

lose his way, and perish from exposure if not rescued. The brain keeps these memories intact and serviceable.

In addition to supervising the connections of the different parts of the body, the brain stores up past experiences, and constantly improves, revises, expands, and refines the connections that are established. Man grows mentally, so long as this process continues. The impulses directed by the central nervous system pass on to muscles and glands. These are called effector organs of the body, just as sense-organs are called receptors. The human body has two kinds of muscles —smooth and striped. The intestines and arteries are the location of the principal smooth muscles. Striped muscles serve the arms, legs, back, and other parts of the body that are movable at will. Two important muscles, the heart and the diaphragm, are not quite one or the other. The psychological difference between smooth and striped muscle lies in that the latter contracts and relaxes promptly on receipt and cessation of its impulse; while smooth muscle is very much slower to act. The striped muscles serve actions directed to and in the world—muscles of purposive and skilled behavior. The smooth muscles serve activities that go on within the body, such as cir-

culation and digestion. The will to activate a striped muscle-group activates it; smooth muscle is not under such voluntary control. The mind is thus relieved of the routine detail of the body's internal affairs. It is free for the task of providing the food, shelter, and other means of living, and eventually of developing the more elaborate and artificial life.

The smooth muscles and the glands are acted upon largely through the vegetative (autonomic) nervous system. The glands produce necessary chemical substances in the form of secretions like the saliva. Some glands, such as the salivary, have canals or ducts through which the secretions are delivered to their destination. Others (the ductless glands) have none, but pour their secretions directly into the blood stream; and these have proved to be of marked psychological interest. They may produce too much, too little, or an abnormal kind of secretion; such excess, deficiency, or alteration affects profoundly and in each case characteristically the physical and mental life of the organism. While partly speculative, our knowledge of these glands indicates their close conditioning of the types of behavior. Their discussion will be resumed in the consideration of the emotions.

The behavior that psychology particularly considers is behavior of the organism as a whole, rather than partial behavior operations taking place in specialized parts of the body. Most such behavior concerns the comfort of the body, the avoidance or minimizing of pain, the expansion of experience. The total action may be negatively conditioned; when the amœba literally wraps itself around the food, it acts as a whole for the reason that it has no parts; but the specifically directed activity of an organism that can act both as a whole and in part in the same service is a very different matter. When a dog chases a cat, both are active all over. When you consult your watch you do it as "you," as a whole, though only the arm and head are active. The total behavior enters more constructively in psychology.

One of the broadest and deepest distinctions in behavior is that between original and learned or acquired behavior. Man is considered the most highly organized animal because he has the largest capacity to learn. Though even the lowest forms of life presumably learn something by experience and modify reactions accordingly, the amount of their learning is decidedly limited. For most purposes they do not learn; they react on the basis of what is born in them. The simplest of such un-

learned reactions is a tropism, such as the response by which plants turn toward the light. Some plants, like the vine, and some animals, like the barnacle, seek a solid body for support. Such seeking movements are called positive tropisms. Paramecium turns away from a drop of salt in the fluid in which it swims. Such reactions are least modifiable by experience; they occur characteristically in the simpler forms of life. They are not unlike the digestive processes in the human body, which are likewise automatic though not wholly unchanged by experience.

Of similar status are the reflexes, such as the patellar reflex, or knee-jerk; if the kneecap is slightly struck, the lower part of the leg moves forward reflexly. The term is applied also to movements of a similar type but partly acquired; such as putting out one's hand to break a fall. To add to the illustration: if one happens to be carrying a precious parcel one may control the tendency to save oneself and save the parcel. Such responses indicate how strongly behavior is modified and controlled by acquisition, though the response pattern may show an original basis. The behavior equipment of an organism is represented by its original endowment and subsequent acquisitions.

The chief characteristic of the reflexes is that they are not learned and not easily lost; they are strong and persistent. Next is the fact that reflexes may be grouped in a series and provide a pattern of performance. Such is walking, which is not learned like a lesson, but appears when the child's nerves and muscles become mature; it is aroused by instinct stimulated by trial and error. It consists of several distinct reflex movements, each of which provides a stimulus or signal to set off the next. Such organized groups of reflexes are also in a sense instinctive. Man has relatively few of such reflex patterns; certain insects have almost their entire behavior regulated by them. They have little power to learn and need learn little or nothing. The highly organized life of ants, bees, and wasps is largely an instinctive life in which little need be learned. By contrast, man must learn most of what he does, and has the largest power of learning. A common and apt reproach is that one "hasn't the sense he was born with." It is a modest equipment indeed—not much more than sucking, howling, grasping, and a few similar responses. Yet to get a fair sense of man's instinctive nature, one must include not alone those later capacities like walking—which is learned by effort upon an instinctive basis, so

that the trend to walk is native and the skill and direction in doing it is acquired—but also still later maturing tendencies such as the mating instincts: the complex erotic attractions between the sexes, which show all manners of trends before they reach their full-fledged expression. The division between native and acquired factors in the sex attraction is not always clear; also how far they operate to make each susceptible to the charm of the other or of a particular other, which limits the range of such attraction.

The instinct refers to a need and the means of meeting it, a desire and a means of realizing it. The needs are basic; the means of meeting them may alter radically or moderately. Fundamentally, the impulse to react persists; ways of reacting change. The food need and the sex need are persistent and must ever find ultimate satisfaction in eating and mating. But manner and incident in the course of meeting such needs constantly vary, and their subjection to change is their redemption. A great psychologist has spoken of life as a masquerade of the instincts. So the great instincts represent the great needs of life. It may still be said to be true that love makes the world go round; yet it may be not love alone in the ordinary sense, but love of money, or love of coun-

try. Attention must be focused upon the three great trends: namely, self-maintenance, the love-life, and the companionship of one's fellows. These form the subject matter of the chapters that follow, while later will be considered the general failure of these trends in the abnormal liabilities.

Following upon the instincts and closely associated with them as motive forces or urges toward response are the emotions. Fear and anger represent great primitive emotions, and somewhat different are the complex emotions, such as pride and shame, which are products of emotion through reflection. The emotions involve processes going on within the body; they may be considered according to the stimulations that arouse them or according to the actions which they stimulate. Also associated with the emotions, and often the chief clue to their specific nature, are the expressions by which they are registered; and this registration is also a good example of instinctive or reflex processes. For expressions need not be learned; they arise by native instinct. As such expressions are observed in dogs and cats and other animals, these creatures are inferred to have emotions. The most direct knowledge of emotion depends upon reflection and analysis of our own emotional states. Of the intimate brain-

processes accompanying emotion little is known. Psychology emphasizes the importance of emotion in behavior and pleasure, making this phase of conduct an emotional psychology. What causes an emotion; what effects emotions produce; how experience modifies them; how they can be directed and controlled: these are important problems to be considered in later chapters.

It is plain that man could not begin to meet his needs if he could not learn by experience. The faculty through which it is possible to learn by experience is called intelligence.[1] A creature has intelligence in proportion to its ability to learn by experience. Of all creatures, man has the most highly organized intelligence, and the least adequate instincts. Bees and ants have superb instincts, and little or no intelligence. Lower mammals, such as cattle, have a limited intelligence, and their instincts are much less developed than those of bees and ants. There are two general ways in which behavior is changed by experience. One is the method of practice, which involves repetition, elimination of unnecessary or awkward steps, and gradual confinement to essential ones, each more and more directly and quickly performed—the method of trial and error.

[1] The word is also used in more limited ways. *Cf.* Chapter VIII.

By such direction of effort, either spontaneously by the animals, such as the prompter finding of its way through a maze by a rat, or by human direction and training, such as is involved in the trick performances of trained animals, quite elaborate systems of behavior are acquired. Yet these do not reach either in type or in complexity the systems of acquired reactions involved in the use of a piano or a typewriter; that type of learning is (in part) a different matter. But the same process of improvement by practice applies to both: the rat runs through the maze in shorter time and with fewer errors; and so does the human learner play the piano and use the typewriter with greater efficiency. It is possible in some simple combinations of response, such as finding one's way in a maze or solving the "opening" of a box, to compare learning by different organisms. It was found for a simple combination that the average adult required nine trials, a child eleven trials, and a rat seventeen trials or more to establish the proper reaction without error. More difficult combinations would reveal larger differences, while tasks would soon be reached far beyond the animal grade of performance (Hicks and Carr; Woodworth).

The second mode of modifying behavior through

experience is by thought or reflection. The analysis of what is involved in this type of behavior requires the consideration of many details which will be the subject matter of later chapters. What is meant by thought is familiar through the power of observing one's own thought processes and others' descriptions of theirs. We act reflectively, that is by taking thought, in terms of the several experiences that have furnished our ideas; this stock of ideas is constantly being modified and added to; and such stored ideas or memories determine conduct. Intelligent thinking involves more than the recall of memories; it involves their combination and application to situations not as yet experienced, but similar to former situations. Such is reasoning.

To illustrate: A man is walking along an open road, which is quite unfamiliar to him. He knows that the rule of traffic is to travel on the right-hand side. He may accordingly decide to walk on the left side of the road so as to see the approaching vehicles on his side. This is reasoning, each step of which may be considered related to total behavior. He sees a truck approaching him on "his" side of the road. Instinct might lead to nothing better than a rapid flight in any direction away from the approaching monster. It might

conceivably direct him to lie down and "play dead." By aid of reasoned memories he takes a quick glance to the other side of the road. As nothing approaches he crosses to it; the vehicle passes and he resumes his way.

A reasoning animal, like the man, can meet a special situation, like the truck, better than an animal which depends on the perfection of instincts. In turn, variety of new experiences helps to develop reasoning powers. "The more you do, the more you can do"; the better you know, the better you can know. The variety and processes of intelligent thinking and their application must be considered in detail as factors of behavior.

The sum of a man's "knowledge" is the sum of the ideas he can bring to mind when required. What he is thinking of at any given moment is but a small part of his knowledge. A person knows what he remembers. A man's knowledge is of use to him in so far as his ideas come to mind when wanted and stay out when not. A person who cannot command his ideas as they are wanted, is said to have a bad memory. The memory has been compared to a file of records. The usefulness of a file depends on two things: what it will hold, and how well it is indexed. The memory might be improved either by increasing

the filing space, or by an improved system of indexing. It is doubtful whether one's mental filing space can be increased. Memory "systems" are in the main endeavors to improve the indexing.

In a large office file, items frequently used have special markers for prompt location. Other papers may be filed in a "miscellaneous" folder, from which the one wanted is selected. Similarly in the files of memory, your name, age, address, and other familiar facts, your mental file clerk will locate instantly. What the weather was on the day before yesterday would take longer to find. What it was two weeks ago could probably not be found at all. The files of memory are being cleaned out all the time. Much experience never gets its record into the active files. Some of it is weeded out after a few hours or days. Sometimes records are lost that should have been specially marked for prompt attention. Disagreeable records are more easily lost than pleasant ones. Memory systems aim to do for the mind's records what guides and indexes do for the office.

Behavior is a response to stimuli actually present and operative. But equally the response proceeds upon the revival of past memories; and behavior may be directed to the immediate and even the remote future. So while in a given situation

some of the data or records come to mind from the files of past experience, others are thrust there by the obtrusive messengers of the senses. By either route they are said to come to consciousness or be attended to. Consequently the mode of functioning of the attention is important. Such attention may be concentrated, that is focused sharply upon a single point; or it may be diffuse and include quite a range of observation. The technic of attracting attention is part of the mechanism by which behavior is to be regulated; it is as essential to learning as to immediate response. The art of advertising is an application of the principles of attention; by constant change and bright stimulating impressions the flashing electric street signs compel attention. How to control attention for useful behavior and thought is a complex problem.

In addition to the attention factor in arousing and directing response, there is the mechanism by which the present and the past are linked; the memory is in reality a memory image; ideas or thoughts are in large part, if not wholly present as "mental images" of sense experience. These may be visual images of faces, scenes or printed words; there may be auditory images of voices or heard words, of sounds and cries and musical

tones. There may be active motor images of the movements in speaking, or acting, or playing, etc. Some persons are predominantly visual in type and think mostly in terms of visual images; others quite predominantly in images of sounds; many are mixed in type, and doubtless all persons avail themselves somewhat of all the several types of imagery. Whether imageless thought exists is doubtful, though there is evidence that with the growth of experience and the tendency to think in verbal and abstract terms, the vividness of imagery dies away considerably. As a factor in memory and thus in the guidance of response, the nature and vividness of the imagery, as well as its preferred type are matters of interest. The vividness and fullness of imagery play a considerable part in the ability to direct behavior through past experience. Vivid and rich imagery serves to reinstate sensory and other experience.

Since so much of the available reasoning of mental behavior depends upon the stored images of the past, further inquiry into what happens to all that vast contact with experience, which is life, is pertinent. In the business-office records no longer "active" are moved over to "transfer cases." Similarly records that disappear from the files of conscious memory may be said to go to

the dead files of the unconscious or subconscious.

This consists of ideas to which the ordinary waking memory has only occasional, irregular, and uncertain access. Dreams seem to stand closer to this material and are said to draw upon it; also in dissociated states such as hypnosis, it is possible to tap the unconscious, and bring out in the hypnotized subject memories that are inaccessible to the ordinary waking memory. The nature and degree of organization of this unconscious material is a matter of controversy. Extreme views in which the unconscious is set forth as an independent mechanism are not to be accepted. As an introductory survey this volume will make sparing use of the concept of the unconscious, though recognizing its significance alike in the direction of behavior and the stimulation of pleasure. The unconscious contains much material that is really "dead," and would clutter the active files of the memory. There seems also to be stored there material that has been censored out of the conscious, because its presence there would be disagreeable—which is the doctrine of repression. All minds are full of masses of ideas that are confused, unregulated, and possibly directed by wish and desire. These may appear in dreams, and doubtless have an effect

upon the course and the undercurrents of ordinary thinking. Day-dreaming may indulge in the same order of thinking. The ordering of the mind's stores for useful thinking requires the discarding of much of these accumulations. The disordered behavior of mental disease results in large part from conduct governed by such records. The procedure called psychoanalysis tries to dig up such records so that they may be corrected by the active consciousness, when it is believed that such resurrection will clear the mind of troubling unconscious memories.

Intelligence may be compared to the paddle that steers a canoe borne on the swift-moving river of the instincts. It is useless, perhaps dangerous, to strive against the current. The task is to make the most of the current, and keep the canoe off the rocks. The real "drive" comes from the instincts. Failures and anomalies of the instinctive life are like the eddies and "back-sets" of a real stream. Normal life is a continual striving for the realization of major instincts. The kinds and degrees of such realization enter into one's "success." The task of analyzing these factors of success forms a proper culmination of the topic to which this volume is devoted.

CHAPTER II

THE SOURCES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN

Take care to get what you like, or you will end by liking what you get.—BERNARD SHAW.

A DISTINGUISHED political leader stood at the bar of the investigating committee. "I am working for my pocket all the time," he told his questioner, "just the same as you are." To work for one's pocket is to work for things that give pleasure, comfort, satisfaction, and avoid discomfort and pain. Some things, like food and drink, are necessary to every one's comfort. Other things, like golf, motion pictures or philosophy, may be important sources of comfort to some people, and slight or dispensable for others. Everyone seeks in his own way to get the most out of life, and along these ways lie the sources of life's value to him, whether mainly in terms of comfort and pleasure or of higher mental delights. In these terms the ditch digger, the artist, the psychologist, the religious ascetic, the moving-picture comedian—each is working for his pocket all the time—"just the same [gentle reader] as you are."

Common speech gives to sources of pleasure the status of pleasure itself. For most men it is a pleasure to read a good book, to eat a good dinner, to kiss a pretty woman. Yet these occupations have little in common except their pleasureableness; nor do they yield similar kinds of pleasure. The delight of a good book is mental, the pleasure of the dinner sensuous, the enjoyment of the flirtation presumably both. These are experiences which *give* pleasure rather than which *are* pleasure. Nothing outside oneself *is* a pleasure; it is only something that may *give* pleasure.

Whether or not it will do so depends upon personality and disposition, on mood and condition. Eating, or even the sight of food, is a pleasure when one is hungry, but may be distasteful when one is replete. To penetrate behind the experience and determine the essence of pleasure would involve recourse to theories not as yet adequately supported. Pleasures must be accepted in terms of their sources, as stimulations that afford pleasure and as types of satisfaction. The term is used popularly both for the source and the satisfaction, for the pleasurable experience as a whole. The most general sources of comfort and pleasure are the stimulations resulting from material possessions and the love-life; likewise the satisfactions

gained from associating with one's fellows. The three great joys of life are friends, wealth, and love. So much for pleasures in general; the consideration of their detailed relations will follow.

The chief pleasures arise from the operation of the major instincts. Such instincts serve a special end or goal, and primarily meet a bodily need. Eating is such a goal in the instinct for food. Such goals are termed the "primary" elements or components of the instincts involved. Eating is a primary element in the instincts for obtaining food. The actual attainment of this goal is regularly an important part of the pleasure-value of the instinct; but it is not the only part. That any such goal may be reached, other processes have to be gone through; cooking the meal, setting the table, for example, are incidental and associated with the satisfaction which supports them. Before a marriage is accomplished, there is a period of courtship. Activities which are thus preliminary to a final instinctive goal have been given the name of "preparatory" reactions. Partial reactions is also a good name for them, as they often do not, and may not be intended to reach the final stage (flirtation). These preparatory or partial reactions are capable of becoming accessory sources of pleasure, and when established

operate much in the same way as the final goal itself. The properly equipped housewife will take pleasure in preparing and serving good food as truly as in eating it. The angler finds sport in casting his line and playing his fish no less than in landing him. In love it is often asserted that the joys of pursuit are greater than those of capture; "one has an ideal only so long as one does not have it." One may note that the pleasure-value of the reaction seems to depend on its "preparatory" character; washing dishes and cleaning fish, being activities after the main event, lose the stimulus of pleasant anticipation. The general principle is that enjoyment of an incident carries with it a pleasure in activities leading to and associated with it. Such associated factors may at times become sources of greater enjoyment than are the final goals.

A general distinction may be drawn between two orders of pleasure. Voltaire hinted at it in ascribing to the English thirty religions and only one sauce. The one is a sensory bodily pleasure aroused directly by sense stimulation, such as the pleasant taste of food, the perfume of the rose, and, in some part, the exhilaration of a good swim. The pleasure in a good book or in the face of a friend, extends to far more than the mere sense-

impression. Such pleasures are rather of the mind, reflective in terms of meaning and associations. The pleasures of imagination and hope can be described in mental terms alone. Pleasures must not be thought of as exclusively bodily or exclusively mental, each making its contribution to the composite; there is generally a blending of both factors, with one order of pleasure dominating and setting the tone for the whole. The standard pleasures of the body, sensuous pleasures, are enjoyable by every normal person. As the mind develops, one becomes more and more capable of the higher pleasures with large mental components. A result generally ascribed to cultural education is the access to sources of mental pleasure that would otherwise remain latent. Greater appreciations of music, art, and literature are examples.

The question is often raised of the comparative values of bodily and mental pleasures for life. It is generally answered in favor of the latter; but it is those most affected by mental pleasures who occupy themselves most with the question. There is not a universal answer. The saint who lived thirty years on a pillar derived mental comfort from conditions that would be, on physical grounds, highly disagreeable to most persons. In

general, some bodily comfort is a necessary foundation for the enjoyment of mental pleasures. The amounts of pleasure that people get from different bodily and mental sources are as variable as human nature itself, are, indeed, an expression of human nature. The simpler, more animal-like nature gets relatively more from creature comforts. The complex nature gets less from sensuous sources, and is more dependent on his mental processes, his psychic values. Between the gross amounts of pleasure derivable from sensuous and mental sources it is impossible to make a serviceable comparison. The material cost of some sensuous pleasures is more, in other cases less, than that of mental ones. Bodily and mental elements are inextricably blended in the major pleasures.

Along other lines, comparative study is more practicable. Sensuous pleasures depend on the ability of the sense-organ to take up the sensations that give them. This is often limited. Marked pleasures that are purely and clearly sensory are of momentary duration. Pleasant smells, tastes, or skin stimulations, as such, lose their value quickly through fatigue or refractoriness of the sense-organs. A single musical chord if repeated, however pleasing in the begin-

ning, soon becomes disagreeably monotonous. Musical compositions, on the other hand, furnish perhaps the most durable source of sensuous pleasures. They are apt to arouse agreeable images in thought, and so have a marked mental component. As a sense, sound has in general more pleasure value than sight. "Symphonies in color" are not so well organized as in sound. The pleasure value of mere color schemes as such is generally meager and evanescent. There are complicated visual impressions, such as pictures or natural scenery, which have high and lasting pleasure value for many people. Special enjoyment of these implies some degree of mental organization. It is a complex process, often involved with emotions of a quasi-religious nature. Such orders of enjoyment extend far beyond the elementary liking for an agreeable odor, in which the sensory element dominates.

In general the more lasting forms of enjoyment having a sensuous basis are those capable of assimilating mental components, as is peculiarly true of the pleasures of art based upon sense-qualities of vision and hearing. Vision is peculiarly important for the development of the intellectual processes, and, by this route, becomes the vehicle for an indefinite variety of mental en-

joyments. Yet it is not the sensation that gives the principal pleasure, but rather the ideas which the sensation arouses. The interest of a painting extends far beyond the effects of color to form, and to meaning. The interest of a good novel is wholly in its meaning, the letter-press as the sensory content being almost negligible. It may well be that the mental pleasures for the average person are not so intense as the sensuous ones. On the other hand, they are generally more lasting. They depend less on the stimulation of a refractory or fatigable sense-organ. A bodily craving, like hunger, is satisfied with pleasure, but once satisfied, further food is indifferent or unpleasant. Such a craving returns periodically, whether means of satisfying it are at hand or not. One's mental interests are in a more or less continuous state of mild activity, ready to respond pleasurably whenever the appropriate stimulus, such as a good story, can be utilized. They are generally more stable sources of enjoyment. Loss of bodily appetites or vigor does not so seriously affect them. Their value thus greatly increases with the diminishing physical powers of old age.

Various illustrations of mental pleasures have been given; their general classification may be brief. The elements of mental pleasure in funda-

mental trends, such as self-preservation and eroticism, are further dealt with in special chapters. The æsthetic enjoyment of music and other arts is a compound of sensory and mental pleasures. The "sense" of humor is a specific type of mental pleasure. An important source of mental pleasure is imagination. The mind can picture to itself with pleasure, interesting scenes and events. The chief pleasure value of literature, especially fiction, arises from the pleasure function of the imagination. Literature furnishes to the mind interesting images that the mind would not supply of itself. Memories as well as anticipations of pleasures are often themselves pleasurable. Other imaginative sources of pleasure may be classified as "mental attitudes." Here one meets with various fancies, sometimes fairly justified, sometimes illusory, about one's accomplisments and relation to surroundings. I, thinks one, am the best bridge player in my circle; I, thinks another, can cook the best dinner; I, thinks another, am an unappreciated literary genius. Most people derive some comfort, some people derive their main comfort, from such fancies.

Summary illustrations of various types of pleasure, in these cases mostly deriving their

pleasure values from relations to eroticism, are as follows:

Simple sensuous pleasure	Thumb-sucking, nail-biting
Preparatory or partial reactions, sensuous, usually some mental component	Dancing, kisses, caresses, the "petting party"
Preparatory or partial reactions, essentially mental, subordinate sensuous component	Platonic love, erotic conversations
Final goal or "primary" phase, sensuous, variable mental component	The mating acts
Mental pleasure, humorous appeal	The "smoking-room" story
Imaginative pleasures, self-derived	Day-dreams, ruminations, reveries
Imaginative pleasures, stimulated	Erotic literature, especially fiction
Imaginative pleasures, attitude type	Fancies of "vamp" or "caveman" prowess

The various types of pleasure have been illustrated, and one conspicuous general source has been named—relation to some major instinctive urge. This relation may be in the final realizing of desire, or it may be through indirect manner, as in the case of preparatory or partial actions. The question arises whether all enjoyments derive their pleasure value through association with some major instinct. Some make this claim and name the instinct of sex. This is a far cry, which

the reader cannot be asked to follow here. It is easy to name pleasures whose relation to major instincts is not directly intelligible. The general liking for sweets is an example. Sugar is a good food, but its purpose is served by other foods distinctly less pleasure-giving. The common use of sugar in our society is not universal, and only about two centuries old. Color preferences are further instances. One will not readily find a basis in the major instincts for the fact that some people prefer blue colors, and others red or green ones. It is especially difficult to trace instinctive sources for certain pleasures that are essentially harmful, such as alcohol or drugs. Various pleasures, not clearly reducible to major instincts, have been distinguished. To deny the existence of such irreducible pleasures is an extreme position. Their number is, however, likely to diminish. Apparently there may be irreducible pleasures whose real connection with instinctive cravings is not sufficiently understood.

There are forms of sensation, generally summed up as tickling, that exemplify these points. In the common expressions "tickled to death," "tickled to pieces," the term serves as a symbol for special pleasure. As a skin sensation, the tickle is normally agreeable when mild, disagree-

able when intense. The word is also applied to deep-seated sensations aroused by poking the ribs, etc.; these are generally disagreeable. The pleasure-value of the sensation is probably affected by its known source—the crawling of an insect as compared with the lover's touch.

In these instances there are two sources of ticklish sensation; one apt to be harmful, the other beneficial. This accounts for the dual pleasure-value of tickling, which is either positive or negative. In its unpleasant rôle it goes back to contact with insect and other enemies. These latter are also apt to give more intense stimulation than is the case with caresses. In its pleasant rôle, tickling is descended from various erotic processes. In line with this origin, the sense-pleasure-value of "tender" erotic caresses is more important to women than to men. It is women's rôle to receive them rather than men's, and they therefore develop more satisfaction in them.[1]

As to why the sources of pleasure are such, two explanations are available: the first, and greater, is association with major instincts. The second, and lesser, is an inherent pleasurable quality, generally sensory, and hardly further reducible. A series of pleasures to be discussed in these re-

[1] Compare the studies of Sadger.

lations comprises the recreations, the play-life of humanity.

The "pleasure-seeker" of common speech is the seeker of recreations. These comprise varied sources of human enjoyment, only indirectly connected with the instinctive mainsprings of life, and far less simple than the primary pleasures of sense.

Recreations are easily classifiable according as they are social or solitary, competitive or non-competitive, physical or mental, governed by chance or aptitudes. Track athletics, for example, is a recreation, social, competitive, physical, governed chiefly by one's aptitude. Such descriptive classifications have but elementary significance from the standpoint of pleasure-values. One naturally inquires what are the deeper sources of the pleasure for which the recreation is an instrument. Of these deeper sources two general kinds are now familiar; those with instinctive associations, and others not readily reducible to instinct.

Competitions, whether in sport or business, hark back to a so-called instinct of pugnacity. Part of this trend in turn goes back to the elemental need for food. Much food must be fought for, either against the quarry itself, against

competitors or in attempts to take it from its possessors. Pugnacity also serves one's own protection against enemies. On these levels fighting is a useful accomplishment. Those enjoying and excelling in it are likely to crowd out their less aggressive neighbors. Another great source of pugnacity, for the male, is fighting with other males for the female; the better fighter generally obtains the female and transmits his qualities. For the female, an important source of pugnacity is fighting to protect the young. These antecedents contribute something to the pleasure-value of every competitive activity. In boxing and wrestling they seem to be the main source. In card games their contribution is smaller, yet is present as rivalry.

The urge of pugnacity is largely realized in fighting, not in winning or losing. There is an urge that does not crave to win, but only to fight with all its powers. Thus, in daily life, the good fighter can also be a good loser. The psychology of the poor loser is a little more complicated. It is related to the inability to "take a joke." The reaction of the poor loser in games springs from what is sometimes called an "inferiority complex" or feeling of inferiority. This itself is in part an expression of undeveloped pugnacity. In these

cases, the contest itself offers little satisfaction.[2] The main motive is that victory may enable him to shout down his inferiority. This motive does not crave to fight with all strength, but rather to win by all means. The mental pain of "poor losing" comes from the thwarting of this motive in defeat.

With regard to athletic sports in general, a primary source of pleasure seems to lie in the exercise of large muscle groups. To many persons there seems to be a specific sensuous pleasure in such exercises. It is specially marked in the play of children. Great muscular effort is a necessary accompaniment of primitive hunts and combats. Some of the pleasure-value in all athletics is traceable to this instinctive source.

The pleasure-value of competitive activities in general is referable to the old instinct of pugnacity. There is another great source of pleasure in creative activity, in production. Unfortunate indeed is he who never knows the satisfaction of contemplating some useful or beautiful thing with the thought: "I made it." This satisfaction is referable to two groups of instincts. Nearly every one must produce creatures of hand or brain in order to live. On this side, creative sources of pleasure are descended from the instincts of self-

[2] *Cf.* Chapter IX, opening paragraphs.

maintenance, to be discussed in the next chapter. The most specific act of creation of which one is capable is closely associated with eroticism. On this side, the pleasures of creative activity are descended from the pleasures that invest the erotic instincts. An important medical application of these facts is found in "occupational therapy."

These creative pleasures are predominantly mental. Outside of athletics and music, it is hard to name an aspect of the human play-life in which physical pleasures have an important part. In athletics itself, the competitive satisfaction is a mental one. The satisfactions of intellectual pastimes are, by definition, mental. Simpler minds derive as much pleasure from a game of "hearts" or "casino," as more complex ones from "auction" or chess.

Besides such instincts as are concerned with pugnacity, self-maintenance and eroticism, there are important tendencies called the social instincts—the tendency to act in coöperation with, in response to, similar action in one's kind. Its essential properties are discussed in subsequent chapters. It also makes a contribution to the pleasure-values of recreations. The "team play" of athletics, and to a less extent of intellectual competitions, takes its pleasure-value from this

source. In football there is coöperation with one's team mates against the opponents. In some pastimes the competitive element is quite replaced by the social one—in a group of excursionists for example.

Another underlying source of pleasure-values is the so-called gambling instinct. The tendency to take chances is an important part of man's heritage. The urge of strong desires, driving one against adverse chances, is the chief form of courage. The world to-day belongs to the descendants of those who took chances and won.

> The others they dursn't do it; they said they valued their life
> (They've served me since as skippers). *I* went, and I took my wife.—*Kipling.*

It is thus natural that human pastimes are pervaded with chance-taking. Money stakes, added to certain games of chance, give them special pleasure-value, by increasing the hazard. "Poker" and dice are outstanding examples. Games like these are attractive to many energetic personalities, as ready to gamble with their lives as with their money.

> The loving are the daring.

The instinctive sources of satisfaction hitherto described have been stated as *activity* of some

sort, physical or mental. A slang expression for getting enjoyment out of something is getting a "kick" out of it. Many people play harder than they work, or if they work the harder, it is because their work is play. Others, however, find an important source of comfort in doing nothing, or at least in a considerable reduction of their activity. "Sometimes we sets and thinks, sometimes we just sets," expresses the sentiment of *Dolce far niente.* It seems to be a rule with highly organized creatures, including man, that during working hours, energy is spent faster than it is restored. Rest periods become necessary in the life of such a creature. "Six days shalt thou labor." Rest is agreeable in conformity with the general rule that the meeting of bodily needs is agreeable. Practically, however, pleasure may be derived not only from rest after labor, but also from inactivity as such, or "laziness." Comfort is found in passive rather than energetic forms of behavior. Distinctly passive forms of recreation are reading for amusement, watching a play, listening to music. If such passive tendencies keep within the bounds of recreation, they at most do not interfere with normal life. Sometimes they get much out of bounds.[3]

[3] Chapter IX is concerned with the consequences.

Most play life can be understood as the expression, often indirect, of various instinctive trends. The chief of these have been enumerated. It is clear that different people get satisfaction in different ways, from different things. The same person, moreover, does not have the same sources of pleasure throughout life. The adult enjoys things very different from those that please the child. Few sources of satisfaction are stable. Many gradually lose their value and are replaced by new ones. This tendency to dispense with old and develop new sources of pleasure is one of the mind's most characteristic traits.

Some simple pleasures seem to develop in and for themselves. Few people like olives or oysters at the first taste, but most people, with opportunity, learn to like them. In these cases, a merely greater familiarity of the experience seems to invest it with pleasure-value. Again, some development of new sources of pleasure accompanies easily observed bodily changes. Puberty and the erotic life furnish the chief example. More generally, it may be asked in what way do instinctive trends derive the pleasure-values that attach to them. Primarily such trends are towards acts useful to the creature or its species, that is, they have a "survival value." If an action gives pleas-

ure, it will be sought more effectively. Thus those creatures that took greater pleasure in acts with survival value performed them more effectively. They survived at the expense of other creatures, and transmitted their useful desires to their descendants. The inhabitants of the world to-day have inherited such a general tendency to take pleasure in acts with survival value.

At the outset of this chapter the point was made that pleasure is not a part of pleasurable sensations or ideas. It is an unknown mental process that may be aroused by those experiences or ideas. When an experience arouses this process, it becomes a source of pleasure. The question arises how far it is possible to create, artificially, new sources of pleasure for an individual. This is the central factor in all attempts to guide human conduct. It is said that one man can lead a horse to water, but ten cannot make him drink. Yet, deprive him of water for a long period and ten men will not keep him from drinking. The way to get any person to do his best, is to make it a source of pleasure to do the task in question. The practical problem of making something a source of pleasure is the essence of all salesmanship. Thus, a typically hard thing to make a source of pleasure is the purchase of life insurance. Very

few buy it of their own initiative; nearly every one has to be "sold." The best appeal in salesmanship is the one which invests the act of purchase with the most satisfaction. The principle of doing this is to take some known source of pleasure, and link the purchase with it. Thus, the purchase of life insurance is an act of affection for loved ones. It "creates an estate." It improves one's business standing. These three chief forms of appeal are linked with the powerful trends of family, and with similarly powerful ones of self-seeking.

It is also possible to reverse the appeal, and make it a source of discomfort not to take action. One recalls insurance advertisements representing a widow working in a sweat-shop. Such appeals do not represent typical human psychology, and are not in common use. By the same token, no collection department will scare a customer into paying a bill, if it can flatter him into doing so.

The ground principle involved is that an act can be made a source of pleasure through being associated, even artificially, as part of some process that is already pleasurable. It has been seen how a great many recreative pleasures are derived through a natural relation to important in-

stincts. In a sense, one can say that all later pleasures are so "derived" from the crude and primitive means of pleasure which the child has at birth. From a practical standpoint it is important that this principle applies not only in the natural development of likes and dislikes, but also incidentally and artificially. Anyone who analyzes his experience can recall instances. A group of "jazzy" tunes acquires high and lasting pleasure-value through repetition in agreeable surroundings. Facial resemblance to a valued friend predisposes to liking the owner of the new face. A "dinner with friendliness" is enjoyed more than the same meal with indifferent society. A trade-mark associated with long-tried goods creates confidence for new goods that bear it.

Correctional or disciplinary measures attempt to transfer the pleasure-value of undesirable conduct to some related, but useful, behavior. Normal energies of youth, often finding outlet in mischief, are turned into the making of "good scouts." A student reports the case of a boy with an alarming tendency to set fires, who was put on the straight path by giving him charge of the household heating plant.

Many industries depend on the devising of new sources of enjoyment. The bathtub gained its

introduction as such. The automobile developed as the means to a good time (joy riding); commercial uses came later. The moving picture industry is essentially one of producing pleasure. There is no quicker road to fame and fortune than to capitalize a new and great source of pleasure. New sources, some great, many small, are continually added to the world's stock.

The psychology of pain is not precisely the opposite of pleasure. Pain in one aspect is a sensation comparable to smell or hearing; by changing the nature of the stimulus along the skin, one may at one point arouse a sensation of warmth, at another of cold, at a third of pressure, at a fourth of pain. But pains retain something of the character of the sensory stimulus. A heat pain differs from a pricking pain. Most characteristic are the pains of injury to tissue; the survival value of pain lies largely in its power thus to warn and protect. Over-stimulation also threatens injury to tissue, and in this sense a glaring light or a deafening sound is painful. Stimulation unsuitable to the natural working of a sense-organ is a slighter irritation of like order. A flickering light is as unpleasant as a glaring one, or a too dim light, as all involve strain and maladjustment. Organic maladjustment gives rise to

pains of great variety, often difficult to describe. Pain thus refers to the normally unpleasant factor alike in sense-stimulation and in organic adjustment. According to some authorities definite routes and pain nerves have been established, though not so clearly as for other types of sensation; according to others the physiology of pain paths and conduction is more complex and remains to be determined. That the ordinary pain aspects of sense-experience may be markedly altered, in abnormal conditions particularly, is shown in the history of religion in the beatific state in which martyrdom was endured. It appears again in the peculiar state known as masochism.[4] The inhibition of pain, or indifference to it, has a variable mechanism. Normally pain is so uniformly and may be so intensely unpleasant, that every extreme form of unpleasantness is commonly known as pain. It will be so termed here.

In this broader and more generally understood usage, one may speak of physical and mental pains, as of like pleasures. As a motive to influence conduct, the avoidance of pain is roughly equivalent to the seeking of a pleasure. In attempting to control its members, society utilizes

[4] See Chapter IV.

pain much more than pleasure. Society punishes infractions of codes rather than rewards conformity to them. In human relations, it is certain that much more systematic use has been made of torture than of temptation. One cannot infer that the former is as such the stronger motive; it is so much easier to invoke. Where there is no regard for the individual's interest, the pain motive is likely to be used. But where the opposite is the case, as in the education of children, or the management of delinquents, the punishment motive is being put more and more into the background and utilized with great reserve.

The pain of punishment is supposed to deter the wrongdoer from repetition of the evil, and to deter others to whom the example is given. Punishment has a further significance, as a social reaction against the offender. A group that is outraged by a criminal act is in a state of tension that "somebody has got to hang" for it. This is in large part the psychology of the lynching mob. If such a mob should lynch an innocent person, and then discover the guilty one, the mob would not be likely to proceed against him with its original energy.

Punishments are certain and severe where the social reaction is pronounced, and moderate or

uncertain where it is slight. This is the essential determiner of punishment for crime. This is most clearly illustrated in the case of capital punishment. Its reputation for ineffectiveness as a deterrent is complicated by the readiness with which it is avoided. It is sometimes thought advisable to remove it from the statute books because juries are reluctant to convict where this sentence may be given. Such an attitude manifests a moderate degree of reaction against infringement of the social codes. Americans are thought to be relatively tolerant of each other's conduct, even in anti-social forms. In part, at least, this may be looked on as the obverse of that energy, initiative, and resourcefulness which are more valued elements of the American national character.

Pleasure has been seen to consist mainly in the realization of desires. Conversely, mental and physical discomforts result from the thwarting of desires. Common forms of mental pain are those of bereavement and disappointed love. In these cases an object of affection is removed beyond its reach, so that the affection is thwarted of an outlet. Wounded self-love is a similar cause of mental pain. To be imprisoned is disagreeable, and serves as punishment, because it thwarts normal

desires very generally. Very acute mental pain, obscurely caused, is seen in mental disease. Among the acutest pains, mental or physical, is the contemplation of suffering in a love-object. A person moved by great affection would probably choose any physical suffering before the helpless contemplation of that suffering in the object of affection.

Mental pain is to be understood as generally resulting from the thwarting of impulses. Practically speaking, however, the thwarting of impulses does not result wholly or chiefly in mental pain. If the energy of a thwarted impulse finds another outlet, mental pain will not ensue. An insult is a wounding or thwarting of one's self-regarding impulses. If an insult is pocketed, there will be mental pain. If, however, the thwarted impulse swings freely over into anger, pugnacity and attack, there is no mental pain, but rather the "fierce joy" of combat. The ability of a thwarted impulse to swing its energy over into another is an important protective device against mental pain. Where there is an object of resentment, free play of pugnacity accomplishes the result. Unsuccessful love forms new attachments "on the rebound." Mental pain results especially where the object of one's impulses is difficult to replace,

as is usual in bereavements, or the disappointed "one-girl man." Only so much of one's energy as is definitely thwarted, not simply turned aside, results in mental pain.

A cynic once put these words into the mouth of a famous philosopher: "A railroad train takes you from one place to another. But, in taking you to another place, it takes you away from the place where you were before. So that really nothing is gained by it." In new sources of pleasure something is gained, because old sources dry up, and new ones must be found. When a new source is found, it often deprives old ones of what value they had. Many wheels of industry are kept moving by this fact. For the pleasure of being in fashion, one must be continually reëquipped with clothing of new designs. The fashions represent the artificial destruction and renewal of pleasure values as a deliberate plan.

Infinitely more sources of pleasure are open to the world to-day than in medieval or ancient times. It is a fair question whether the gross amount of pleasure has increased. For new sources that are gained old ones are lost, and the sources of pain have perhaps also become more numerous. At the present time, it seems that the happiness of the world is at a rather low level,

owing to the destruction of its normal sources by war. The amount of pleasure derived is always limited by the capacity of the individual to enjoy. Great enjoyments come only to those with great desires. So far as human psychology is known, the essential source of great pleasure is free pursuit of strong desire. The tendency of civilization has been quite as much to limit this process as to further it.

Maximal pleasures and pains often dominate religious conceptions of life after death, heaven and hell. Heaven is an environment of extreme pleasure, hell one of torment. Various forces combine to make these conceptions significant sources of comfort to mankind at large. Some conceptions are of the "all or none" type; one is wholly saved or damned. Others provide gradations of reward and punishment according to degree of merit. The various conceptions of these states are of concern as reflections of how their originators conceived maximal pleasures and pains. The classic Elysium is somewhat vague, but appears as a meeting place of distinguished rather than especially moral spirits, who derive pleasure from intellectual communion as well as from agreeable "physical" surroundings. The Mohammedan heaven, the "Prophet's Paradise,"

is based on extreme pleasures of a self-centered, sensuous order, chiefly erotic and gastronomic. It probably has a significant relation to the battle fanaticism of Mohammedan warriors. The Valhalla of Norse mythology keeps its inmates eternally in combat all day and in liquor all night. The Christian heaven embodies pleasure of an essentially mental type, an ecstasy of worship. The Buddhist Nirvana is based on the conception that all activity is painful and finds the ultimate bliss in complete loss of self in the infinite. "The object of life is death."

The Christian "hell" has given the English language a common metaphor of infinite heat. The word itself is related to *hole* and *hollow.* Their common ancestor in language denotes something *hidden.* There is an Old English verb *helan* meaning to hide. The original *Hel* of Norse mythology was an abode of unblessed spirits, a place of bitter and eternal cold. They also had a fire world, called Muspell, but it was not a place of punishment. It may be noted that there has been a conception of a portion of the Christian hell as cold. The general difference may have arisen because cold was naturally the cause of greater suffering to the northerly Germanic stocks, heat to their southerly neighbors.

In Brahmanistic conceptions lower types of existence, as animal ones, may be the consequence of misspent higher ones. The Mohammedan hell essentially resembles the early Christian. The punishments of the classical Tartarus were varied, and make notable use of mental pain, as with Tantalus (tantalize) and Sisyphus. Penetrating minds in all ages have found difficulties in conceiving but two general states representing bliss and torment for every one. Many minds of to-day find the inherited conceptions of celestial bliss somewhat out of key with what they most enjoy. On this basis, a modern conception would make the pleasures of effort the dominant note. Browning expresses it in the Epilogue to *Asolando*. A height surmounted is worth reaching only to reveal greater heights beyond.

CHAPTER III

SELF-MAINTENANCE

There is nothing better for a man than that he should eat and drink, and make his soul enjoy good in his labor. Ecclesiastes, ii : 24.

The normality of the human adult may be considered in terms of three achievements: he is self-supporting; he organizes a household and through marriage has a share in continuing the race; he lives as one among his fellows. The markedly abnormal lack these traits; hence their segregation in institutions. Of the three qualities, the last two are essentially concerned with relations to other persons, while the first, as the name indicates, centers upon the self. In this aspect self comes first.

At the base of the instincts of self-maintenance, or self-preservation, lies the need for food. A sufficient supply of the right kind of food (including air and water) is the first need of life. Food needs differ; they are biologically determined. Some lowly creatures live on mineral substances alone, on matter not part of another living creature; such must have been the first creatures that

lived on this planet, whose direct descendants may still exist. Plants make much use of material derived from other living things; animals are most dependent on such material. Only plant life can live on the soil directly; all animal life feeds on plant life or other animal life. There can thus be no development of animal life without plant life.

Plant-feeding (herbivorous) animals, like cattle, meat-eating (carnivorous) animals, like cats and dogs, specialized feeding animals (insectivorous) like birds, have their psychology strongly shaped by their food habits and needs. Modification of food habits is possible; the food habits may be flexible or fairly rigid. There is a wasp that by instinct feeds its young on a certain species of spider, while the spider is reputed to eat any living creature that falls into its clutches. The liberal feeding habits of the domestic pig are well known; grown cats and dogs will drink milk which they could not obtain under natural conditions. Man has a more varied and flexible diet than any other creature. He has controlled, developed, enriched, and modified (by cookery) an enormous range and supply of foodstuffs. The satisfactions of this developed food-need affects human psy-

chology and conditions a large share of human industry.

Flesh-eating and plant-eating habits affect a creature's general psychology. Plants are passive before the devourer. Animals make more or less active objection to being eaten. To overcome this, requires superior fleetness, alertness, fighting power. It requires higher mental organization to capture prey than to feed on vegetation. The animal food supply is more limited, and there is eager competition for it. With the one, but important, exception of the wolf, the great flesh-eaters are solitary animals, that do not share their prey; the herds of herbivorous animals, feeding in common, are familiar.

By far the greater part of even higher animals' energies is spent in getting food. With plant-eaters the process is merely a search. The flesh-eaters' task is more difficult and varied. Some spiders snare in a web, others hunt. Some snakes kill by poison, others by squeezing or "constriction." Cats will hunt or lie in wait for prey. Wolves run their quarry down. A victim can sometimes escape by "playing dead." It appears in such cases that the prey must be killed by the very animal that is to eat it.

Against the flesh-eaters, various defenses are

adopted by the creatures on whom they feed. Many insects, and some relatively higher animals, as among the birds, feign death or "play 'possum." Protective coverings serve the turtle and the armadillo. The cuttlefish uses a smoke screen. Gas warfare is practiced by the stinkbug and the skunk. Buffalo and rhinoceros are in brute strength a fair match for any single creature likely to attack them. The protection of monkeys is intelligence combined sometimes with agility, sometimes with great strength (the gorilla). Man relies essentially on intelligence.

In the race for intelligence, the flesh-eater has disadvantages that seem to have outweighed the advantages just noted. As a solitary animal, like the tiger, he misses a mental development that is encouraged by coöperation. As a partly social animal, like the wolf, coöperation extends only to running down prey, and is replaced by savage rivalry once this is done. The insecurity of the food supply bends all energies in direct food pursuit and gives little scope for breadth of mental development.

The relations of food control to psychology are better illustrated in man than in lower animals. In man is found a control of the food supply that is approached elsewhere only in the ant and bee

families. Man accomplishes this through tilling the soil and the domestication of animals. These advances appeared a relatively short time before the dawn of "history." In many human stocks they are still rudimentary. It is the bedrock of advanced mental development. Agriculture—production of the food supply—is Atlas sustaining an ever-growing world of "street-bred people."

Primitive tribes have either agricultural-pastoral habits, or nomadic-predatory ones. The former correspond, psychologically, to herbivorous, the latter to carnivorous, lower animals. Pastoral peoples may also have to fight, to get new lands for their flocks. Predatory tribes develop a fierce fighting spirit, but it is bought at a price. Fuzzy-Wuzzy, the "first-class fightin' man," goes down before the Martini rifles of his more intelligent enemies. So did Don Quixote fall before the slings of the sheep-herders. A roving tribe of marauders has less control of its food supply. Such a life makes it difficult to develop stable institutions; family life, the rearing of the young, is at a disadvantage. Relations with groups in trade or industry are limited. Mental development is restricted in all things that involve much planning for the future. Vigorous nations quite generally begin with a wandering

predatory habit. Pastoral, agricultural, commercial and industrial institutions are stages of later development. In man the controlled food supply makes higher and wider demands on intelligence than does the marauding habit. Once fairly accomplished, it releases intelligence to other uses of civilization. From settled institutions based on controlled (and much increased) food supply, grows the complexity of modern society.

It has been thousands of years since a human individual or family has been normally called on to produce the "necessaries of life" for itself. A person can obviously learn to produce some one thing better than he could produce all the things he needs. Better products will be made in a group in which there is a skilled craftsman for each need than in a group of Jacks-of-All-Trades. A civilized citizen obtains his food and other necessaries in exchange for doing rather definite, special tasks. "Every man to his trade."

What was at first the direct search for food, next became the production of goods to exchange for food (barter). Next it became what it is now, a search for money to purchase goods. The feeding instincts, at first the most important, are now in the background of most individuals' psychology. Few men in civilized communities are in

doubt as to where the next meals are coming from. Indeed, some advanced communities do not allow their members to perish from want, and provide special care for those who cannot care for themselves. The feeding instincts now belong to the class happily designated as "necessary but not important." The most necessary form of all feeding—breathing—has but a slight place in conscious psychology.

Physiologists regard satisfying hunger as essentially a relief from unpleasantness. The desire whose realization in eating brings pleasure, they term "appetite." The satisfaction of hunger may be called a *primary* component—meeting the biological need. This may also yield decided pleasure. For the average man, relief of hunger has no longer the pleasure-value that it has for wild animals. But eating and drinking have taken on other, not less important, pleasure-values. The simplest of these is a pleasure dependent not on relief of hunger, but on various, in themselves, agreeable sensations of sight, smell, taste, touch. This can be called the sensuous component in the eating—and drinking—habits of civilized man.

Vast amounts of effort, money and skill are spent in advancing the pleasure-giving qualities of food and drink. In the case of drink there is

a plentiful though neutral substance—water—that quite meets the biological need. "But who wants to be a camel!" One need but mention the refinements of cuisine, soda fountain, and decanter. They have developed not in response to bodily *needs,* but as sources of pleasure over and above such needs. Much of the cost of food is determined by this sensuous element of luxury and æsthetic gratification. Many prized edibles—such as strawberries or mushrooms—are scarcely foods at all. They are eagerly sought for the special pleasures of the palate which they afford. Indeed, one prefers to eat the more delicious foods not when one is ravenously hungry, but rather when the "edge" has been taken off one's appetite. Then the sense-pleasure qualities stand out more clearly. To test whether food which tempted the appetite was as such, better digested, two men were given the same food differently served. For the one test the service was in accord with the best standards; for the other test the actual food was the same but was stirred together in an uninviting mess, in dirty-looking dishes, and with a nauseous odor pervading the room. The effect was such that one man vomited his unsavory meal. Generally, however, the food

seems to have been digested equally well under both conditions.

The kind of satisfaction that people get out of eating shows marked differences. The French use the word *gourmand* to describe a person who enjoys eating overmuch, without special reference to its delicacy. They use the word *gourmet* to describe a person to whom varied and delicate foods are a most valuable feature of life. The first of these words refers to the primary component, the second to the sensuous, including the luxurious, or æsthetic. Most persons are capable of receiving considerable sensuous pleasure in their food. "The way to a man's heart is through his stomach." It is also a way out. That poor cooking and capricious tastes in eating play their part in disorganizing and even disrupting households is well known. Skill in homely arts does much to balance accounts with failure of erotic charm.

Most people have favorite dishes and pet abominations among foods, which are peculiar to them. One person greatly dislikes fowl, and will go far after olives or the humble carrot. Violent dislikes for generally accepted foods usually originate in unpleasant experiences connected with them. Ofter this is an indigestion. The reason for

extreme likings is less easy to trace. It may have a similar origin in forgotten pleasures somehow connected with the things that now arouse them. Such preferences are easily developed by training. A child whose food whims are indulged becomes specially dependent for his satisfactions on having his special kind of food. As an adult he may become an epicure who derives unusual pleasures when his special food demands are met. He is correspondingly disturbed when it is impossible to meet them.

From a practical standpoint, it is advantageous that people should eat in groups. Whether or not as an outcome of this factor most persons derive not a little satisfaction in eating, from eating together. This might be called a social or altruistic component in the feeding instincts—"a dinner with friendliness." Especially do persons have more pleasure from drinking in company than from drinking alone. The former practice is looked on indulgently, the latter rather askance. The solitary drinker, to whom company is not a factor in his pleasure, has a simpler source of satisfaction, and one more difficult to break up. A common meal is the focus of many forms of entertainment. Days of celebration are "feast" days. One great group of instincts—for food—

is here blended with another great group—the social instincts. The central fact is that a thing eaten is enjoyed more when eaten with others enjoying themselves in the same manner, by satisfaction of a common nature. This important development in modern life is possible only where the food supply is reasonably plentiful and secure. Wolves fight for each others' food, and there are limits to civilized man's willingness to share his.

A distinctive part in the pleasure-value of feeding instincts is played by alcohol and drugs. The pleasures they give are partly those of sense, such as the bouquet of an exquisite vintage. Their more particular value, however, lies in their mental effects. This is principally one of loosening touch with the external world. A mental state is produced in which the demands of outside affairs are less insistent or cease altogether. Practically all communities make use of some form of intoxicant (alcohol, opium, hashish) which accomplishes this. That these effects are extremely valued is evident on every hand. Governments have found them important sources of revenue, and difficult to control. Many persons sacrifice family, fortune, and health to them. Others get along easily without them, so that there are

marked differences in the strength of these pleasure values. When well developed, they are as strong as those of normal needs of the body.

To illustrate the strength of normal bodily cravings, it is sufficient to cite that a person could not, if he would, kill himself by holding his breath. He might become unconscious, but then the involuntary nerve connections for breathing would take up their accustomed tasks. It is improbable that a person could kill himself by thirst, with water at hand. That a person suitably constituted can kill himself by starvation has been shown. With both hunger and thirst, resolution would be likely to break down in delirium. Food and drink would then be taken, if at hand. Death might still ensue unless food were taken moderately and carefully.

Similarly, there is but remote possibility that a person habituated to morphine or cocaine can, of his own accord, give up the comfort or rather the relief from discomfort, that they afford. By comparison, there is less discomfort from the giving up of alcohol, yet spontaneous cessation of the confirmed habit is not a common thing. These are examples of artifically induced sources of pleasure, which govern conduct as decidedly as the strongest instinctive cravings. As such, they

break down more or less completely the normal tendencies of life, on which genuine self-maintenance depends.

An interesting place belongs to smoking and chewing (tobacco). So far as concerns general biological needs, they are rather indifferent. But they are extremely important sources of pleasure. They are quite the most important of cravings which are at all removed from biological needs. There seem to be several factors that contribute to make them pleasurable. Some like to "see the smoke." With some, the direct effect of the drug, e.g., nicotine, may be important. What all smoking and chewing habits have in common, whether of tobacco, gum, or what not else, is a group of agreeable bodily sensations centered about the mouth. There are doubtless other pleasure-values in these sensations whose source is not clear; in part it may be a survival from the infantile satisfactions of nursing.

Other factors in man's self-maintenance, beside food, are shelter and clothing. Apart from human constructions, the most perfect shelters are constructed by insects; these are the work of instinct rather than intelligence. At the dawn of history, art in achitecture had already reached a fairly high level. Science has added number-

less devices for increasing comfort and the ease of household operations. As in the case of food, there has been infinite development beyond the primary need of protection from the elements. There is a sensuous component in the use of comfortable furniture, and also a mental satisfaction in labor-saving appliances.

Psychology has paid relatively little attention to clothing habits. By what mental process clothing was originated, and what needs it satisfied is not altogether clear; doubtless several factors entered, affording various satisfactions. Protection from weather was probably one, defense against enemies another. To attract attention was very likely another. An impulse to conceal is prominent now, but is not always so important in primitive life. There is a definite tendency to cover the genitals rather than other portions of the body. But opinions differ as to the psychological origin of this tendency.

In the psychology of clothing, the covering of the body may be considered the primary component, representing the biological need of protection from the weather. A sensuous element may enter later alike in terms of comfort or of display. Display is allied to the further dictates of fashion and convention, all of which play upon the inter-

ests of the self, the social self and its varied expression. The satisfactions of such feelings may quite outweigh the considerations of comfort and protection, and indeed oppose them, so that it becomes a question how far the clothing conventions of civilized man are tolerated despite their discomfort, rather than that they serve the original purpose.

In the satisfactions from clothing and shelter there is a distinct mental element, that of self-display. In a splendid house, a sumptuous gown, or a fine suit of clothes, the "pride of ownership" plays no small part. The satisfaction extends beyond the crude demands of covering; nor is it the same as a sensuous gratification. The main pleasures derivable from clothing and shelter belong to this mental type. The access of self-confidence that comes to the well-groomed salesman, the superbly gowned woman's pride in her appearance, the boy's consciousness of his first long trousers are so many different phases of this mental satisfaction. As has been seen, mental pleasures play a great part in the more advanced types of human personality. The altruistic element in the pleasure of eating and drinking, as the hostess' pleasure in the perfectly appointed table for

her guests, is a mental pleasure, ministering to self-esteem.

In modern life there is a common standard by which the effectiveness of self-maintenance is measured. This standard is money. In a highly organized community the necessities of life, food, shelter, clothing, and still more, its luxuries, cannot be obtained without money. The desire for money is the direct descendant of the lower creature's need for food and is as such an equally natural desire. There is this difference. The animal's desire for food is "self-limiting." Its satisfaction is one of the body. The taking of a definite amount of food meets it and it disappears. The gaining of money, on the other hand, is a mental pleasure and generally results in a desire for more money. "He that loveth silver shall not be satisfied with silver." The possession of more things which money will buy creates a desire for still more things which it will buy. As society becomes more complicated, the power of money increases. It will bring more pleasures, and there are more and more pleasures that cannot be had without it. Its workings extend far beyond self-support or creature comfort. It is, in modern conditions, an essential means for the realization of family life and for many kinds of social ex-

perience. To gain it is thus a most powerful motive, because it serves nearly all other motives. It is a universal lever to move men's conduct. "I can enter any city that an ass laden with gold can enter," remarked a famous conqueror. The common disparagement of the value of money is an illusion whose source will be further dealt with in Chapter IX. The truer observation is that not the love of money, but the lack of it, is the root of all evil (Cattell).

In medieval times, a skilled craftsman could gain, mostly with his own tools and labor, enough money for all needs and many wants of life. The profound change in this situation concerns psychology as well as economics. To gain a living, it is now much more necessary for a man to be able to work with others, and under direction. The average man's own powers become less and less sufficient for self-maintenance. They become more and more dependent on being exercised over, with, or under the work of others. The "independence" which Thoreau craved could not be had in his day and can still less be had now, save at the price Thoreau paid—self-ostracism. Man becomes less and less a complete individual; more and more in the old sense a "member" in the social body. H. G. Wells has forecast ultimate re-

sults of such tendencies in "The Time Machine" and "The First Men in the Moon" and transition stages in "When the Sleeper Wakes" and "A Story of the Days to Come." The present time is one of rather sudden increase in the interdependence of man. In the face of it, man's impulse to independent self-maintenance, the heritage of a hundred million years, has not wholly given way. The self-assertive energy that was formerly absorbed in genuinely "making his own living" is now balked of this expression and turned to other channels. Some of these are quite direct endeavors to restore something of the lost independence. Socialistic and communistic doctrines, "the desire for a greater share in the management," get their main drive from this desire. Sometimes a less direct relief is sought, such as through the use of alcohol and other "stimulants." The natural desire to reduce the worker's use of alcohol is complicated by the question of what made him seek it; true relief is concerned with the cause rather than the means.

The "production" of wealth is a special concern of the economist. It has mainly to do with the conversion of natural resources into goods, and is as such a matter of physical rather than psychological principles. The consumption of

wealth, what people spend money for, is of greater psychological interest. People spend for their desires, ("thank Gawd, I can pay for my fancies!") and the amount of money spent measures the amount of those desires. A book of which a million copies are sold, obviously meets a general desire. When a man spends a hundred thousand dollars for a painting, it means that he has a special desire to possess that particular work of art.

The distribution of wealth is an economic fact, with psychological causes and effects. It is a dominant factor in determining the sort of conduct that is possible. In America most persons control a little more money than suffices for the needs of existence, but not a great deal more. Greater and greater fortunes are controlled by fewer and fewer people. Annual incomes clearly in excess of normal requirements are centered on perhaps one tenth of the American population, reaching in the case of some thirty individuals an extreme—million-dollar incomes.

It follows that large shares of these amounts are available and will be utilized to purchase additional means of pleasure. They cannot be spent for bodily needs, as these have long been left behind.

Money is spent for pleasures as such, more freely than for bodily needs. By far the greater amount spent for bodily needs is spent by those who must count the cost. The bulk of what is spent for pleasure is spent by those whose bodily needs are already well met. A household that mortgages its home to keep an expensive motor car values pleasure even above its needs.

Many needs represent not bodily requirements or desires, but mental ones, directed to ends which are found "necessary" to a reasonable degree of contentment or self-respect. "Standards of living" represent such mental necessities. To many men, the daily bath and shave are not less necessary than one's breakfast.

To furnish pleasure in this sense (psychic value or mental pleasure) is normally worth more money than to furnish necessities. This is in part because those who can seek the most pleasures are those with the most means to pay for them. It is also because ability to give such orders of pleasure is not so common as ability to produce the more fundamental necessaries. Most normal persons can learn the essentials of farming or the ordinary trades. Few persons, on the other hand, can learn to make a living as a baseball player, a great portrait painter, a great moving-picture

actor. The demand of bodily needs is great, but so is the supply. Of pleasure the demand is equal, and the supply much less. It attracts the surplus wealth of those ready to pay extravagantly. The same is true of relief from discomfort. The rare skill of the great physician or lawyer is thus highly rewarded. When a common necessity like coal is controlled and limited, its money value becomes similar to that of the great pleasures.

In primitive times and races, individuals or small groups literally "made" their own living. They themselves produced all they needed. Mention has been made of the forces that make people concentrate on doing something special for a living. To get a living now means to get money which will buy a living. It sounds trite to say that what a person does for a living is a most important part of life itself. It is of concern to each person and to the group in which he lives that he be suitably adapted to the work on which his self-maintenance depends; for on such adaptation depends the pleasure-value, the contentedness and satisfaction of occupation.

Psychology and allied sciences have lately directed considerable study to increase our knowledge of such adjustment, alike as a problem in

efficiency and in economic and psychological adaptation (educational therapy). The one problem is to direct individuals toward the pursuit and selection of the most suitable occupation; such is the purpose of *vocational guidance.* The converse problem is to select for a given occupation the candidates best suited; this is the problem of *vocational selection* as practiced by employment managers. Fitting the man to the job and the job to the man are alike important because upon them depends so much of the pleasure of living.

For these reasons some account of the problems concerned in this phase of applied psychology may be pertinent. The problem of vocational selection is the more definite; it asks: How well can the candidate learn to do the given job, and will it pay to train him? Inquiry into the candidate's previous experience and education is simple and of aid; educational standards (such as that of at least "eighth-grade" for bricklayers, marble-setters, stonemasons) are likewise easily prescribed. Yet such information may not be adequate and may be misleading. The recourse to proper psychological tests is helpful.

These are of two types. The first is to determine by actual test who has and who has not the accomplishment sought. This is done by setting

sample tasks of the kinds of problems that arise in the occupation and noting how well they can be done. Such problems must be carefully, which means scientifically, selected; by actual trial the tests that give the most reliable indices of performance may be determined. The United States Army developed such "trade-tests" for many forms of occupation, such as horseshoer, boilermaker, pipefitter. Such tests usually involve the use of an expert who is familiar with the occupation concerned.

When a long and expensive training is involved, those interested are naturally anxious to determine the chances of success by all possible means. Such would be the case in a musical career, in a medical education, and in war-time, aviation. Highly specialized tests are then devised; and in the case of aviation it was found, when later performance was compared with standing by the tests, that a few well-selected tests were adequate to select those candidates most worth while. For musical ability each special facility is tested, such as musical pitch, sense of rhythm, etc.; and from the composite standing highly probable estimates may be formed of future success. Something similar has been accomplished for many specialized trades. To determine such results

accurately requires familiarity with the mathematical processes involved, as well as with the temptations of candidates to circumvent the tests.

The problem of vocational guidance is far more complex; it attempts to determine not merely whether the candidate can do the particular job well enough, but whether it is the occupation best suited to him. Selection may be helpful even if only negatively. It is sometimes evident from a test that certain candidates are unpromising and may be eliminated. It is for example improbable that a college education will prove a good investment for an eighteen-year-old boy with an "intelligence quotient" of less than 100.[1]

But to determine whether a given candidate will find his best adjustment in law, engineering, medicine, letters, or art is far too complex a problem for psychology to undertake. It is not helpless in the matter, but must use the special gifts of the counselor in addition to the scientific instruments of selection which it aims to develop and test. *The Compleat Angler* offered all his tackle to his novice friend, with no result: "I lent you my fiddle but not my fiddle-stick."

Most important to remember is that many factors are involved in a vocational problem which

[1] See Chapter VIII for meaning of this term.

cannot be measured by tests and remain in the region of "imponderables." Quite other factors than intelligence or skill have to be reckoned with. Very different demands are made upon the personality of the foreman of a gang of ditch-diggers from those made upon a fashionable tailor. It is sufficient to specify such traits as appearance, physical health, voice, poise. The demands in terms of mental, moral, physical, and social traits of a trial lawyer are still more complex and exacting. In regard to artists one may be disposed to be lenient and make allowances in view of the quality of the performance. Owing to the complexity of the factors involved, it is often desirable even in cases of vocational selection to consider the fitness of the man for the job as well as of the job for the man; it may be good policy to employ those who will grow beyond the job and become dissatisfied, thus showing ambition and power of development. In other cases the problem will be better faced as that of finding enduring employment in which contentment may be found. The range of problems in vocational psychology is large and at every point touches the vital issue of pleasure-adjustment. A further factor is that of independence. To many a person the keystone of adjustment is to be master of

self; and it becomes more or less irksome to work under the direction of another. The frontier's test is centered upon self-dependence. Under primitive conditions of life it was almost the universal test.

CHAPTER IV

EROTICISM

Give us the luxuries of life and we will dispense with its necessities.—*Epicurean Saying.*

When Paris, son of Priam, King of Troy, sat in judgment at the first beauty contest, and Minerva sought to bribe him with military glory, while Juno offered him power and riches, Venus promised him the most beautiful woman for his bride. A sophisticated Paris might have reflected that with the first he could secure the second, and with both bid fair to capture the third. An experienced Paris might have objected that beauty was offered but not love. Doubtless the shepherd prince decided the case according to its merits; the usual conclusion is that Venus offered the highest bid. The myth expresses the strength of the erotic motive. Though conventionally neglected, the sex factor has always been recognized as fundamental in understanding human conduct; in recent discussion its importance is amply recognized, if not at times overstated. The urges of self-maintenance and eroticism proceed for a

measure in parallel direction. The basis of self-maintenance is by definition the preservation of the individual. At the base of the erotic urge is an impulse indispensable to the continuance of the race; this is the goal whatever the many lures by the way.

In the simplest forms of life reproduction proceeds by "fission," each organism dividing into two parts, each of which in turn forms a new individual. Such creatures are immortal, as there is never a "natural" death. They perish in great numbers from starvation, disease, and natural enemies. Unless thus exterminated, all familiar organisms die naturally from old age. This is the price paid for a higher and more varied natural life.

In reproduction by mating the male and female each produces elements which unite to form a new organism. These elements are called gametes; the male element is the sperm, the female element the egg; and the organs producing them are called the gonads. In self-maintenance, a primary component is the stilling of hunger by eating. In eroticism, the primary component is the mating act. It has been natural to think that the meeting of male and female elements was essential to reproduction. This is not quite the case. In some

animals, of which the frog is a notable example, eggs have been made to develop into new though short-lived organisms without "fertilization" by sperm. But such individuals are regularly males. A species could not continue in this way, because when the females died, the source of eggs would cease. The continuance of the race requires the meeting of egg and sperm.

No matter how brought about, this process is central in the erotic motive in all animals including man. In animals it occupies much the larger share of the field. In the henyard, the forms of courtship are simple. Those of the spider are more complicated. Those of the bees have received a fanciful description at Maeterlinck's hands. Those of birds furnish convenient symbols for human affection. In all animals save man, it is abnormal for these processes to occur except as part of the reproductive function. Animals eat and mate that they and their kind may live. It was seen that in man the eating process had developed beyond the need for food, into an independent source of pleasure. Such a development proceeds even farther in the erotic motive. Only a small part of man's erotic behavior is associated with, or intended to be associated with, reproduction. It is commonly associated with the

extremes of longing and enjoyment of which the personality is capable.

This is because the erotic motive in man is a much more complicated affair than in animals. In animals, the primary function is the only important source of erotic satisfaction. In man there are several such sources, analogous to the different elements or components in the satisfactions of self-maintenance. The primary component has already been defined. It is sometimes the sole, always an essential, element in the erotic life of animals and of most men. Probably it has a necessary part in the most complete self-realization of which the average human being is capable. "I was born for this hour." But in some persons, particularly those of more complicated mental make-up, this primary factor becomes relatively less important. Satisfactions of comparable value are derived through other components, still to be considered.

An important place among these belongs to the sensuous component, which includes derivative, associated physical satisfactions other than the primary. The kiss is the type of these. To the sensory erotic gratification the skin senses contribute most intimately; the eye is erotically captivated; the ear is charmed by the voice of the

male; the parts played by smell and taste are in human kind slight but still to be considered. To establish the mating attraction the "distance receptors," sight and hearing, are the most important in approach; other senses enter only when closer intimacy is established. For most persons, the sensuous pleasure-values are probably second to the primary. But these sensuous, as well as some of the remaining elements, may displace the primary process as the final goal.

Next may be mentioned an "active" component. This is what essentially distinguishes erotic reactions of men from those of women. Man depends largely for his satisfaction on taking initiative —actively and physically masterful part in such relationships. Sometimes this goes to an extreme, demanding the infliction of genuine pain, even death on the love-object. The pain inflicted may be physical or mental. This is a perversion called sadism. In the lines of Oscar Wilde,

> The man had killed the thing he loved
> And so he had to die.

The correlate of this active component is a passive one, which derives satisfaction from being the object of the various endearments above mentioned. The normal reactions of women, in

the erotic sphere, are a relative passivity towards the activity of their lovers. The extreme of this reaction type is called masochism. Masochism occurs in both men and women, but is more striking in men, because of their normally active tendency. The extreme pains and penalties which some such persons procure to be inflicted on them belong to the abnormal sex life, indicating the perversions of eroticism.

An *altruistic* component may next be distinguished. The pleasure-value of one's advances depends on their being similarly agreeable to their object. It is at this point that the question of affection for the love-object enters. The previous components concern the love-object, man or woman, simply as an instrument for certain actions. Affection in lower animals is observed only by inference, as the billing and cooing of doves, the signs of languishing at the loss of a mate. These may or may not carry something like the affection supposed to exist between human partners in love. In general, as humanity has advanced in mental organization, the importance of the altruistic component has increased (chivalry, romance).

In the animal world, coercion of either partner is practically absent. In some early period of

human evolution, this seems to have been somewhat modified. This change was generally in the direction of the subjugation of women. Of late years, the popular mind has accepted the notion of a primitive "caveman" who subjugates woman by physical force, without reference to desires other than his own. The main evidence for such a practice is psychological rather than historical. While women have commonly had little control over their own persons, they were disposed of by their kinsfolk, rather than by the passionate suitor. Violation was an offense not so much against the woman as against her family. At the same time, the general erotic passivity of women is something very like what it would be if their mothers had been selected for many centuries by the conventional caveman process. Typically, woman's desire is *not* man, but to be desired *by* man. "I do not wish to please him; I wish that he should wish to please me." The love triumph of woman is to arouse resistless passion in a man with whom it can be lived out. It is noteworthy that highly imaginative caveman fancies which occasionally find their way into literature are the work of women rather than of men. The coercive tendencies of men have considerably subsided and been replaced by an altruistic component depend-

ent on response in the partner. The flower of chivalry seeks to win his lady by serving her; it is the caitiff who carries her off. The lady no longer regards crude compulsion as a matrimonial prerequisite. Women have, however, remained psychologically closer to the early level. Typically they are not equipped to respond to wholly or mainly unselfish wooing.

The general trend is towards a leveling out of these differences in activity and passivity. It is towards erotic attachments in which the woman's feeling is not a mere reflex of the man's advances. The attraction, while mutual, is independent, as is that of social friendships.

There are erotic pleasures in which bodily factors are quite slight, and mental ones in the foreground. One's enjoyment of the mental reactions of the love-object is such a mental pleasure. It seems exceptional for such mental qualities as these dissociated from physical attractions to give men and women pleasure in each other's society. Of mental qualities, courage and masterfulness in men are usually regarded as the chief source of satisfaction to women. Vivacity tempered with coyness is the mental quality of women with the most erotic appeal to men. "Platonic love" is a name used to denote attachment be-

tween a man and a woman based supposedly on mental pleasures alone. In a previous chapter, attention was directed to the generally more stable quality of mental pleasures. This applies greatly in the erotic sphere. Organic pleasures are needed to establish love. Mental ones are equally needed to sustain it.

Previous life-history has some bearing on the mental satisfaction that one is able to offer in love. In most communities, a normal man will not knowingly marry a woman in whom erotic relationships of the primary order have occurred outside of marriage. Faith in the absence of such an occurrence is requisite to an attachment of the marriage level. The same may hold for past episodes of a more superficial level. "Have you ever told any man that you loved him?" But in less conventional relations than marriage, or even under liberal attitudes toward marriage, the reverse may hold. Women, in general, find more pleasure in the courtship of men who have passed through a baptism of love. The man of more attractive and aggressive erotic nature is indeed the more likely to have passed through such episodes. These episodes, in turn, invest one's later advances with greater freedom and aptitude.

Related to this is the usually greater age of the

man in mature erotic attachments. Earlier attachments of men tend to be towards older women, and otherwise to reverse the natural order, in demanding more leadership from the woman.

> Older than me, but my first one
> More like a mother she were. . . . —KIPLING.

The usual course of such attachments is transitory. Normal individuals undertake a special risk in making them the basis of a long-time adjustment in marriage.

As in other pleasures, many sources of erotic pleasure can be traced to something with "survival value." Strength and courage in man are obviously such. Physical proportions generally prized in woman are those that go with better capacity for motherhood. Along with these, individuals have certain particular likes or aversions not clearly related to survival value. Preference for blondes or brunettes is an illustration. This tendency may be classified as a "special" component. So long as the preference is for some definite type, as for short or tall, light or dark persons, and not too uncompromising, it offers little obstacle to realization. In extreme cases, the love object must be peculiarly equipped, wear a certain shoe, use some particular perfume, act in

some unusual fashion. Otherwise there is no pleasure-value and no response. This is abnormal, and is called fetishism. As with special components in eating, the direction it takes, the object is fixes upon, can often be traced to some particular experience in the person's previous life. It represents a capricious element in appetite or passion.

Erotic satisfactions arise normally in the relationships of two individuals—a man and a woman. To a certain extent, one person can carry out these processes within himself. This is known as the auto-erotic component (literally "self-love") in the erotic life. Both bodily and mental processes are represented. A considerable number of bodily pleasures are sometimes classified as auto-erotic. Thumb-sucking and nail-biting belong to this wider class. The typical bodily process is masturbation. In men this is apparently a normal stage in the earlier development of the erotic trends. It is normally a passing phase, persisting a few months or years during adolescence, and disappearing as maturity is reached. In adult life it is a symptom rather than a cause of distorted instinctive development. Its effects depend entirely on individual constitution. In high-strung, excitable individuals it is attended with special risk. Many disturbing effects that

might be ascribed to it are traceable rather to mental processes with which it is commonly associated.

Erotic imagination, fancy and rumination, undertaken for one's own immediate pleasure, is called "psychic masturbation." It is a regular accompaniment of the bodily process, but like it, also occurs alone. It is generally regarded, for various reasons, as the more dangerous of the two, both to normal development of the erotic life and to one's adjustments in general.

Offspring are another important source of pleasure associated with the erotic trends. This source may be classified as the reproductive component. It has been seen that reproduction holds the origin of the erotic life. Among certain peoples it may be the most important phase of the love-life. Chinese and Japanese folkways are prominent examples. It is not uncommon for an unfertile marriage to be held as no marriage at all. Such attitudes bear witness to essential satisfactions not to be had save in the presence of offspring. The growth of civilization has tended to center the satisfactions of partners more in each other and less upon offspring. It is well known that as one ascends the social scale, households average fewer children. Those at the upper so-

cial levels are in a good position to regulate the size of the family, if they will, and the general tendency to keep it down is testimony to a moderate pleasure-value assigned thereto. A reason for the diminishing pleasure-value of offspring is to be sought in the complication of life that modern society both offers and imposes. This is so marked as to convince one of the wisest observers of modern life that only the association of children with the other erotic pleasures sustains the race. On the other hand, children need not interfere seriously with the outward life-habits of well-to-do parents; yet the size of the family seems progressively to decrease as the social status becomes higher. In other words, the more external pleasures are open to individuals, the less value is generally assigned to children. Households in moderate circumstances are limited in their external enjoyments. Among these, one finds that a greater pleasure-value generally attaches to children.

It is possible that these satisfactions are to those who can utilize them, greater than those derived by other persons in other ways. The maintenance of large families is sometimes urged upon those of "superior" personal endowments. The superiority of such individuals may be directly

connected with the fact of limited offspring. They have utilized in external pursuits energies otherwise absorbed by domestic requirements. There are persons with capacity for much satisfaction in external pursuits, and for correspondingly little satisfaction in a large household. One's natural energies may be strongly turned either towards domestic interests or towards external pursuits like industry, science or art. To disturb their established direction so fundamentally is attended with difficulty and risk that is great in proportion to the probable gain.

The more life is complicated, the further is the pleasure-value of offspring diminished. Obviously, there is a stage when this process limits the existence of family or nation. Stocks which lose their satisfaction in reproducing must disappear and be replaced by more fertile ones.

The normal growth of erotic trends in the individual requires consideration. The early pleasures which infant and child take in various bodily sensations are sometimes classified as erotic. These are often not specific in character; and this period of the erotic life, if one recognizes it as erotic, may be known as the period of diffusion. The affection for the parents, the first important source of the child's pleasure outside itself, is

sometimes also classified as erotic. The erotic life as commonly conceived begins with puberty and adolescence. This is the time when the reproductive system takes on its special properties of pleasure-value. It is the period when auto-eroticism is about to yield to more powerful attractions from external sources. The attachments of young men and women for each other supervene. These impulses may seek a crude organic expression ("wild oats"), or be sustained at a level of companionship in normal work and play. Grave risks, medical rather than psychological, are bound up with irregular relationships of the organic level. Nor is the period wanting in the mental stresses that necessarily accompany marked cravings without acceptable realization. Final solution in marriage is not generally attempted until long after these cravings are well developed. According to figures collated by Holmes, the average ages of marriage for men vary according to nationality and social status, from 24 to 30. The ages given for women are from two to five years younger. In the usual household the erotic life is then more absorbed in the union and such children as may spring from it. Because some persons are not adjustable to marriage, or because a mistaken choice of part-

ners has been made, a considerable proportion of marriages do not absorb the energies centered upon them. Relief is sought in various ways, according to circumstance, and individual standards of conduct. With advancing age, the organic factors in eroticism diminish in pleasure-value, and their demands, except in some diseased conditions, are less insistent. Sometimes, in advanced age, there is seen a return to the more diffuse sources of pleasure present in early life, love's "second childhood."

Such are the various elementary sources of pleasure associated with erotic trends, primary, sensuous, mental, etc. The manner in which these sources are utilized includes the customs of courtship and mating. These are most diverse, and often assume forms quite different from those familiar to the modern civilized man. A brief discussion of developments in current life is attempted here. The most obvious feature is the increasing extent to which certain types of erotic pleasure are now being utilized. This may be compared with the situation of thirty years to a century ago, and again with the preceding period. Women are now more liberal in display of the person. The erotic motive in literature is more free and vivid. The ordinary social contacts of

men and women are probably freer than at any time in civilized history. While precise information is unavailable, presumably a similar development extends also to deeper levels. Along with this is the growth of the altruistic component before mentioned—the tendency for one's self-realization to depend more on reciprocal feelings.

Erotic relationships are the agency through which new members are introduced into society. It is natural for society to take some supervisory interest in such relationships. Marriage as a social institution is an outcome of this fact. Where the child-rearing motive is paramount, society through church and state concerns itself directly with safeguarding this institution. At present, the erotic motive is shifting away from the child, and centering more on the mutual feeling of the partners. Under such circumstances, society tends to look on erotic relationships as the rather special concern of those who undertake them. A degree of toleration comparable to that in religion has not been and probably cannot be reached, but the tendency is in this direction.

Society has always recognized a "double standard" in which much greater conservatism is ascribed to women than to men. In some communities this is a very potent factor in social life, in

others it has more the status of a convention. There is a tendency to determine standards according to social and occupational status. Thus considerable discretion is expected in a minister of religion or education, while a more liberal attitude is assumed towards followers of artistic pursuits. A more conservative attitude exists among the middle classes than among the rich or poor. These group standards may be quite as clearly marked as those by which men and women have so long been separated.

The "double standard" has been sustained by three factors: (1) the greater physical and economic strength of men; (2) the more serious consequences for women in relation to the child; (3) men's and women's differences in erotic nature—activity in the one, passivity in the other. Response in women is far more selective. Few, if any, women respond to man as readily as normal man responds to any woman not positively ill-favored. The first of these factors—now essentially economic—is being leveled out in all advanced communities. The safeguards against the second are growing in effectiveness. Already the double standard rests heavily on the more conservative erotic nature of women. The tendency is away from limitations externally imposed,

towards those which may be fixed by women's own natures.

These developments are unfavorable to anything which commercializes erotic satisfactions. Commercial degradation tends to be marked where the sanctioned contacts of men and women are specially restricted. There is general agreement that the brothel is in a phase of decline. No doubt its waning has been much furthered by the restrictions on the use of alcohol. The Romans had a saying that Venus freezes without Ceres and Bacchus. This is exactly true of the Venus of the brothel. It is not improbable, on the other hand, that "prohibition" has favored the development of more refined erotic pleasures. Poesy has proclaimed that if a kiss be left within the cup one will not ask for wine. If then, the cup be taken away, nothing more natural than to return to the solace of the lips.

In the increasing liberality of erotic trends, a growing degree of self-realization becomes possible outside the limitations imposed by marriage. Two consequences might ensue; a lessening tendency to marry, or a relaxation of marriage ties themselves. The former is not clear; the latter is quite probable. The increase of divorce is a commonplace. This is not in itself conclusive.

Relaxing marriage obligations might conceivably decrease divorce, in that former causes ceased to be regarded as such. But the restrictions hardly separable from marriage are such that uncongenial partners are not likely to continue if the way out is easy. It is difficult to interpret the growth of divorce otherwise than as expressing a general decrease in the stability of the marriage tie. This does not imply a general decrease in erotic happiness, but rather that its realization is being sought in different ways.

The freer tendency of modern eroticism has, then, a twofold result. It operates against commercialism. Whatever conduct embodies mutual affection offers greater self-realization than anything of the crude organic level that is bought with a price. Second, it is unfavorable to the former stability of marriage relations. It offers realizations of a similar order, with comparatively slight limitations of personal freedom.

From this second consideration arises a third. Whatever may be the pleasure-value of the marriage relation, it is the only one that safeguards the continuity of the stock. As an instrument for rearing the next generation, there is no substitute that responsible thinkers entertain. Marriage is no failure, though some failures marry. Hand in

hand with decreased stability of marriages goes decreased fertility of stock. Irresponsible procreation is common only in the feeble-minded, and on them the future of society does not rely. It has been further well noted, that, when elaborate standards of living come into competition with simpler ones, holders of the former will not breed. Thus, indeed, "the meek shall inherit the earth." Modern society embodies the growth of erotic altruism, increased centering of lovers on each other, growth of external attractions, decreased holding power of marriage. These interlocking factors converge unfavorably on the birth-rate of superior offspring.

At one extreme, therefore, are rigid marriage institutions whose observance is favorable to the rearing of normal stock in numbers adequate to conserve and increase the group. The offset of this system is the license of those to whom the restrictions are intolerable. At the other extreme, the obligations of erotic relationship are governed by the mutual affection of those who enter upon it. Such relationships are relatively accessible, and loss of individual freedom in them is much less. The offset of such a system is the dwindling numbers of those who are left to continue it. The first is common in the earlier development of a

human stock. The second is more characteristic of its maturity and old age. Together, these alternatives are a dilemma from which no human society or being has ever quite escaped.

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL IMPULSES

"Ask him *why* he saved me." "He says one man'd always do that much for another at sea."—M. L. C. PICKTHALL, *Century Magazine.*

THE strength of social impulses under special human traditions is exemplified in episodes like the following:

In August, 1908, three lumberjacks inexperienced in mountaineering climbed Mount St. Helens (a 10,000-foot height in the Cascade Range) from the north side. Descending on the south side, near the summit, the man in the rear suddenly perceived a large rock bounding down the side of the mountain. He paused to warn his companions, and the rock struck him and broke his leg. His two companions brought him down to timber line, about five thousand feet, late in the afternoon. They knew that the mountaineering society of the "Mazamas" were in camp on the opposite side of the mountain. After building a fire, one of the two men went for help, and reached the Mazamas' camp about nine

o'clock in the evening, so exhausted that it was some time before he could be restored to tell his story. A rescue party was at once formed and traversing cañons, dense undergrowth, lava dikes, "crag and torrent" through the night reached the injured man about dawn, guided by a signal fire. The ten persons, a one-armed man among them, undertook to get the injured man to camp over the summit of the mountain. There was no physician in the rescue party. They made a litter with alpenstocks and sleeping bags, and after tremendous exertions reached the summit at about four o'clock in the afternoon. Four strong men could not carry the injured man longer than five minutes. They had had little food and no sleep save as they fell, as they frequently did, unconscious in the snow. Descending without rest, to the north, over ice cliffs, crevasses and lava ridges, they reached timber about nightfall. Here they were lost, having made a wrong descent into the maze of cañons. About three o'clock the next morning, they were found by a relief party and were brought the remaining five miles to the camp. Here a physician and nurse were available. A wagon had also been brought to within a few miles of the camp. Up to this time the injured man had borne his indescribable sufferings un-

flinching. Under the pitying faces and the overflowing sympathy that now surrounded him, his emotions gave way. "I don't see why you all so kind to me," he said, "just poor lumberjack. All I know how to say is just T'ank you, t'ank you, t'ank you!" With eyes full of tears he struggled to a sitting posture, and looked long at those about him. "Ay want to see how all of you look—you who have done all this yust for me."[1]

It may be doubted whether he received a satisfactory explanation of his rescue. There is no "reason" why men do such things except that their natures are tuned in such a key that they cannot help doing them. It is the same force that makes a team stronger than eleven men; men standing together stronger than men standing alone. Men loyal to each other survive at the expense of men who take advantage of each other. The men who made the rescue were descendants of stocks that survived in virtue of this fact.

The motive which dominated the conduct of these men represents an important development

[1] The author was first informed of these happenings by Mr. Perceval Sayward of Boston. Most of the items of the account came through Mr John A. Lee of Portland, Oregon, who took an active part in the rescue. Some details are derived from a contemporary press account (by Mr. F. B. Riley), the more general facts from the official magazine *Mazama*, 1910, Vol. 4, pp. 39-43.

of our *social* instincts or tendencies. Conduct of this level is a distinct though not an exclusive mark of mankind. It appears that even these strong men at times required heartening from their leader. "Nonsense, boys, we'd do this for a Siwash." From these extremes of comradeship, man's social tendencies grade through ordinary good fellowship, through indifferent and selfish acts, through crime, to the extreme of anti-social conduct in premeditated murder. Pack-hunting animals are more apt to kill an injured associate than to lick his wounds.

In a more general way actions directed toward, or conditioned by, members of one's own species or group are considered as expressions of the social instinct or tendency. The one and obvious exception is conduct of the erotic motive; apart from this man's social tendencies refer to his conduct with reference to his fellow-man.

An essential factor in modern society is the growing interdependence of mankind. Every action in the life of the average American reflects some activity of his fellow-men. His suit of clothes came from Australia *via* Rochester, his collar from Troy; he boards a train drawn by a locomotive whose parts came from the ends of the earth, and were put together in Philadelphia or Sche-

nectady; he works in an office using furniture from Grand Rapids. Thousands of people share in the activities by which he completes a single hour of his waking life. His relation to his fellows suggests the geological view that every square mile of the earth contains dust brought to it from every other square mile.

During the past few generations men have become much more closely bound together, and man's social behavior has become far more highly organized. Another and more liberal tendency is a greater concern for various kinds of personal freedom or individuality, which compensates for the growing community interdependence. As one is increasingly dependent on the coal dealer, the grocer, the plumber, and the janitor, one may set greater store upon being independent of one's family, the day's work, the church; yet this relation is not simple, as will duly appear.

As was seen in earlier chapters, social tendencies are not confined to man, but are observed in all kinds of creatures, high and low. Along some lines they are not even most developed in man, but rather in bees and ants. The simplest kind of social life is a tendency merely to assemble in groups. This is the limit of social life in the bacteria, such as disease germs.

It shows some simple variations. Some bacteria gather in pairs; these are known as diplococci. Others are found in chains; these are known as streptococci. This gathering is, however, all they do about each other. There is a degree of social life that is called gregariousness. This specially denotes a tendency to "get together" among somewhat better organized creatures like spiders, but with little or no tendency to coöperate. As Roosevelt said of the social spiders he saw on his South American journey, each individual is in the colony for his own ends alone. The swarms of "army bugs" often seen on the surface of fresh waters present such a spectacle of massing without organization. Massing with relatively simple organization, mainly for protection, may be seen in the way cattle protect themselves from cold, or the behavior of penguins as described by explorers.

From here one follows the development of social life along two divergent paths. One has its end in the bees and ants; this represents extreme coöperation. It is proverbial that the bee never eats the honey it takes to the comb. Trotter notes that a hive of bees is like a single coarsely made individual. It has workers, just as man has blood and limbs; it has a queen-bee and

drones, as man has gonads. The independence of the single worker-bee is but a degree greater than that of a white corpuscle swimming in man's bloodstream. Coöperation in the hive is at least as well ordered as in the automatic workings of the body, like swallowing or digestion. The hive, like digestion, operates by principles fixed before its members were born. Experience will not greatly change them. It is on an instinctive basis. Admirable in its regular surroundings, it cannot meet changes in those surroundings in any manner comparably to the power of adaptation developed by the intelligence of man.

The beehive has, in metaphor, its limbs, gonads and reflex centers; but it has no brain for intelligent direction. There is no authority in the hive; everything runs itself. The "queen" bee is indeed the most important member; but from the executive standpoint she is more of a prisoner and slave. Human society, on the other hand, will "run itself" only within narrow limits. It depends less on instinct, and more on intelligent direction. Human society is the end of the second of the two lines of social development; the first, instinctive, the second, directive. To a limited extent, direction of group activity appears in some of the lower animals. A "leader" of a pack of

wolves or of a herd of elephants might influence the conduct of the group in simple ways. Any complexity of such behavior depends on greater intelligence, and better means of imparting ideas than are available below the human level. The importance of language in this respect is fundamental; it makes direction possible. The building of the tower of Babel ceased when the builders were bereft of common speech.

The family is the unit of civilized society. But it is not held that human social life originated in families as they exist now. The more accepted notion is of small groups of men and women as in higher gregarious animals. As these have leaders, leadership similarly develops in the human group on the basis of strength or cunning. It is a natural consequence for the leader to be the father of the most and the best children of the group. Thus the notion of the patriarch. In modern civilization the inheritance of name, property, etc., is regularly "in the male line," that is, from father to son. This cannot be unless there is knowledge that births are a consequence of mating acts. Such knowledge is taken for granted to-day, but savages have been observed among whom it does not exist. There may have been a long period when there was no idea of such a

thing as fatherhood. Under those conditions, the natural path of inheritance is through the "female line," from mother to child. This has been observed in some communities. While woman appeared the sole source of offspring, she probably had a more important position in the group than later. That this took the form of domestic and political *authority,* however (matriarchate) is hardly to be accepted.[2] In these relations, leadership in its outward and visible signs, at least, has uniformly rested with men.

From the headman, the war chief or hunting chief, of such a primitive group, spring the germs of political authority. This rests upon superior strength, skill, wisdom, cunning, in many combinations. The headman becomes a directing intelligence of the group. Influence so exercised is named social control. The earliest evidences of social control are insignia of rank from Cro-Magnon times, of the old stone age, perhaps 20,000 years ago.

Beside this type of social control, often interwoven with it, is another. Primitive groups have not only war chiefs, but medicine men. These are possessors of special and secret knowledge, or the ministers of supernatural powers whose

2 Giddings.

favor must be gained. These are a second means of social control, which develops into religion. These two controls are mechanisms by which the more forceful and intelligent members of a group are able to direct its policies. There is nothing inherently opposed in them. It was Napoleon who remarked the tendency of the powers above to be allied with the heaviest artillery. Church and State have been one in many lasting social orders.

In advanced social orders of ancient times, like Egypt and Persia, the king was a representative of the gods or regarded as divine himself. A social order of this kind is called a theocracy. Until very recent times some Christian monarchs were regarded, or regarded themselves, as responsible directly to God; as having the "divine right of kings." Such realms are called theocratic Christian monarchies. The Russian Empire was among the latest examples. The general tendency has been for religious and political controls to separate, and at times to come into serious opposition. Study of these developments is the task of history.

Animals like sheep or elephants lack the degree of instinctive development of the bee or ant. They are also of limited intelligence. Therefore their

social organization has only simple possibilities. Man's superior intelligence enables him to carry the most complex social organization of the earth, the modern civilized state. The limit of intelligence, however, sets a limit to the degree of social organization that is practicable. It is thought that some of the present social unrest results from pushing the complications of life beyond what the mass of minds are fitted to carry. Civilization has reached a "saturation-point." Between different existing peoples different levels of intelligence are easily distinguished. The advance of intelligence, however, is so slow as to be scarcely perceptible in the span of historic time.

Besides native intelligence, another factor that determines the advance of society is the ease with which people can get into touch with one another. A common and adequate language is the first requirement. Also important are the physical surroundings in which peoples live. Peoples that develop in regions difficult to penetrate have a backward civilization. Central Africa is an example. Ready communications are favorable; modern civilization was cradled in the Mediterranean Sea. In the early though slow-growing civilization of China, its waterways no doubt played some part. Intercommunication of peo-

ples develops intelligence and so has a double effect on their capacity for organizing. Ease of communication alone does not go so far, or higher civilization would have developed among the magnificent waterways of South America. Intelligence must supply the other wheel of the chariot. Intelligence has developed better where life is not at its easiest, as it is in the tropics, where life makes fewer demands on intelligence. It also develops better where life is not at its hardest, as in the Arctic, where the whole struggle for existence is absorbed in immediate necessities. The happy medium, where nature gives the most reward for the most exertion, is in the temperate regions, where have arisen the dominant peoples of the world.

The primal motive of an individual's life is to go on living—self-preservation. In a group also, the primal motive is to maintain itself in the presence of forces tending to injure or destroy it. The supreme test of any group has always been its ability to resist the aggression of other groups. A fair measure of social efficiency in ancient Egypt, Greece, Persia, Rome, Carthage is the degree of effort that could be enlisted in war. The life of the State depended on the ability to resist warlike aggression. It is worthy of note

that in these periods great armies were maintained and maneuvered with the most primitive transport and communications. The military exploits of Alexander, Julius Cæsar, and Hannibal do not suffer in comparison with any achievement in organization of modern times.

Lack of intelligence sets early limits to the civilization of backward peoples. Similarly there are difficulties of communication beyond the scope of administrative genius. A factor in the fall of Rome was that the empire was too large an administrative unit to hold together without railways and telegraphs. Napoleon's invasion of Russia failed for similar reasons. When new devices like the telephone or radio arise, civilization puts them to immediate use in making easier human communications. "To save time is to lengthen life." The more of this interaction there is between human beings, the more full and complicated life becomes.

There is in nature no universal tendency towards increasingly complicated society. Indeed, up to man, the balance of intelligence is often in favor of solitary animals. It is probable that if man, like the gorilla, had been able to take care of himself alone, he would not have developed so marked a social habit. The development of his

social intelligence resulted from (1) the demands of protection that led to a gregarious habit, and (2) from the intelligence which led him to use his gregariousness in superior ways.

The greatest and most efficient action is always secured through directed coöperation. This is activity of a social type. Anarchy could not operate an army in battle or a ship at sea. It is hard for pure democracy to manage a large ship of state. Such tasks demand responsibility of leading and capacity to follow. For both leader and follower it demands the sacrifice of many personal desires. It is not less disastrous for the general to sleep at his post than for the private. No modern social order has found how to have the cake of effectiveness and eat that of freedom. To balance these factors is the whole problem of civilized government.

Intelligent leadership or administration is necessary to the complicated modern life. A few competent persons may have sufficient satisfaction in leadership to undertake it for its own sake. They are not a sufficient number. Leaders will not lead unless there are incentives which balance the personal freedom that leaders must give up. As in Kipling's lines:

His will can loose ten thousand
To seek their loves again—
But not Diego Valdez,
High Admiral of Spain.

Large rewards stimulate large enterprises. Given the human nature expressed in the American economic system, it follows that if the automobile is to be in the reach of all, the man whose genius puts it there must be a king in motordom. If any great business is to run, the men who give themselves to running it must have incentives of great appeal to fundamental instincts. Certainly the removal of such motive operates disastrously. When the peasant's harvest is requisitioned, he stops planting. There is much in socialistic and communistic doctrine that is thus inconsistent with human nature as now constituted. Such principles work well for creatures like bees and ants. They have no conflicting personal aspirations, any more than has a corpuscle of the blood. But before each man will give according to his ability to each according to his need, human nature must be greatly revised antward. The competent man responds little to demands that are without special incentives to personal aspiration. The social consequences of withdrawing such incentives are illustrated in contemporary Russia.

The individual has important sources of pleasure in social activity, which it is the purpose of this chapter to examine. Personal types of pleasure have already been discussed. Often the two trends come into definite opposition. To Peter, alcohol is a detriment, to Paul it is not. Will Paul give it up so that Peter may be beyond the reach of this temptation? Social trends answer "yes," personal ones answer "no." A man is social to the extent that he can realize himself through acting in concert with fellow-men—either as leader or follower. He is individual to the extent that self-realization demands setting himself apart—"maintaining the integrity of his personality."

A man has as good friends as he is. Pleasures growing out of man's social tendencies have in common certain factors that distinguish them from personal enjoyments; they are essentially psychic, intellectual, moral, emotional. They are not realized through specific bodily processes. There are no crises of desire comparable to those in hunger or love. The capacity for enjoyment in social relations is much less dependent on specific bodily states. It might be thought that under these conditions social motives have notably less strength than individual ones. One cannot make a general comparison of the two types of motive.

When the two orders come into conflict, each case is decided on its merits. The men who carried the lumberjack over Mt. St. Helens did not as social beings have it in them to do otherwise. The action of the automobilist who abandons an injured victim on a lonely road at night is not far from the opposite extreme. Human capacity for self-seeking needs hardly to be established. At least equal satisfaction is derived by some from action in behalf of others. Douglas Mawson halted vital hours beside his dying comrade in the Antarctic. The well men of Scott's last expedition paid their lives to stand by the disabled ones. One of the latter deliberately walked to death in a blizzard, to give his comrades a better chance. "I am just going outside, and may be some time." The main motive of patriotism is a satisfaction in merging self with group. It is, for the patriot, not only honorable but also sweet to die for one's country.

The "gentlemen's agreement" is a motive in appeal not incomparable with the marriage vow. Note that the term is gentlemen's agreement. Personal loyalties as such, without erotic components, are more usual between persons of the same sex than between men and women. The world looks askance at platonic love as apt to be insincere or perverted. To keep a secret is

said to be something that two men can do quite easily, a man and a woman only with great difficulty, and two women not at all. Deep loyalties and friendships have always been common among men. If they have been less so among women it is in part because seclusion made the opportunities less. As between men and women, the anthropologist knows much that tends to distrust and hostility, where eroticism does not enter. Save as love-objects, men and women do not understand one another so readily as they do those of their own kind. A special understanding of the other sex is most easily bought with a good deal of that other sex in one's own mental make-up. In a former connection a gradual leveling out of mental differences between men and women was indicated. In conformity with this, the trend is towards a better comradeship of men and women apart from eroticism. One can reinforce the other. "We're something more than just husband and wife, we're pals." Impulses of comradeship do not carry so much emotion as do those of eroticism. As much effort may be spent in the name of comradeship, but the sentiment preserves a more matter-of-fact level.

Some writers try to identify the impulses of comradeship and eroticism. Associations between

men and men, or women and women, are called homosexual. This word is commonly understood to denote organic relationships between persons of the same sex. This makes the principal distinction between comradeship and eroticism. One is based on organic relations, the other on mental ones. This difference and the minor ones already mentioned maintain the distinction psychologically. The social attitude towards the two is contrasting. To be called a man's man has been well observed to be a compliment, to be called homosexual quite the opposite. They are not different names for the same thing, but for clearly different ones. Even a perceptible blending of them is unusual.

Every normal person desires to be self-maintaining. Every normal person desires a love-object. These desires are under normal circumstances strong enough to put themselves through. Persons or communities in which these desires are not strong enough, perish from the earth. The amount of satisfaction from social contacts is far more variable. Some persons get much enjoyment from many kinds of social relations with their fellows. Some get so little in this way that they prefer to be alone. The parallels in the animal world are the dog, "the friend of man," and

the cat, "that walked by himself." The formal dinner which is a genuine pleasure to one guest is a disagreeable duty to another. Man is clearly an eating and a mating animal but he is only partly a social animal. That is to say, wide variations in social satisfactions are the rule among men. The successful politician or salesman has these sources of satisfaction in full measure. He enjoys the game for its own sake. The recluse has but the minimum that is necessary to get along.

When one names the personal sources of pleasure in eating or mating, one names something fairly universal. Under social pleasures one discusses the types of conduct the enjoyment of which denotes a social habit of mind. Prominent in these are the satisfactions of forming social organizations of all kinds. The "Man without a Country" typified the misery of an ordinary human being when cut off from the most fundamental of these. Most people cannot satisfy this demand by citizenship alone. They must identify themselves with other organizations as well. The political party is the next of these. In America, government weighs more lightly on the average citizen than in other countries of similar development, and absorbs much less of his social energies.

The binding force of religion perhaps also is less. This may be why fraternal orders play so large a part in American life. They meet a group-craving that under other circumstances is met by a more intimate acceptance of government and religion. These social satisfactions are more widely developed in America than anywhere else. Common speech has recognized a type of man who depends on new and perhaps shallow satisfactions of this kind—the "joiner." Definite sources of satisfaction are inherent in this type of conduct apart from mental benefits. A special degree of comradeship is established between persons who pass through impressive experiences shared by them alone. Secret ceremonial, even when essentially formal, is always invested with this value. Avenues are offered for executive and forensic capacities to which circumstances may close the way in the world at large. The sense of solidarity with an important group contributes to the estimate of self.

More loosely knit types of organization exist without number. The administration of such bodies requires not a little effort. Yet it is uniformly undertaken without material reward, or for one with only nominal relation to the work. There may be a definite sacrifice of economic interest.

This could not occur unless such activities in behalf of others had definite pleasure-value as such.

A good deal of the passion for organization and institutions of a somewhat formal character goes back to a crude form of "will to power." Formal titles and authorities take the place of, and give some part of the satisfaction in, those of the external world. They do not carry the latter's burden of responsibility. Human nature can support them to a greater degree than in political or industrial life.

It was seen in a previous chapter that industrial organization supplies a vast background of pleasures in modern society. One may again mention travel, the theater, luxuries of all sorts, not to speak of production and transportation of more elemental necessities like food and fuel. Organized technical resources have also become the price of military security. These factors make important contributions to sustaining organized industry. Industry has, however, more specific pleasure-values. Loyalties to industrial causes for their own sake are a distinct feature of modern life. Tim Linkinwater, the clerk of Cheeryble Brothers in "Nicholas Nickleby," is a literary example, somewhat caricatured. There are great business organizations the loyalty of whose mem-

bers is among their most important assets. Human nature is not such as to achieve these results throughout the industrial world. In response to this fact arise the trades unions. These take up social energies that might otherwise be absorbed in the industry itself, or in political or religious life. An important self-expression of the modern union, the strike, carries the specific pleasure-value that goes with any great contest, and the will to prevail. Emulation in the character of work performed is another source of satisfaction dependent on social industry. It was perhaps more utilized in the medieval craft guilds than it is at present. Rivalry is a stimulus to effort and is a common industrial device, posting the comparative selling records reached by different members of a sales-force for example. Successful contenders are offered the pleasure of contemplating a public attest of their success.

Nowhere do variations between social and individual habits of mind stand out more clearly than in the field of higher salesmanship. In the jargon of business, to be "sold" on any proposition means to be persuaded of its value. The essence of salesmanship is persuasion. To like selling one must be able to persuade others. The salesman must perforce be much concerned with others. He

must often put aside his personal reactions to play up to those of the "prospect." Satisfaction in work of this type is a touchstone of personality. Whoever depends much on his self-regard, tolerates with difficulty the rebuffs incidental to a "selling" profession. Distasteful is often the shadow of self-depreciation that may be the key to success with a conceited "prospect."

The salesman must uniformly get his results by persuasion; whether by a reasoned or emotional appeal is at present secondary. If he does not like the art and practice of persuading, he has little chance to like selling that is more than "order-taking." The executive, on the other hand, has a part of this and partly another source of pleasure in his work. In the maintenance of personal contacts, of good morale, his sources of pleasure are allied to those already mentioned. Further, responsibility and authority serve the "integrity of the personality," maintaining good standards of esteem and respect for self. Most persons come into contact with authority vested in personalities who show these two satisfactions very distinctly. Either may be competent in administration. The difference is generally reflected in the attitude and regard of their subordinates.

These inner and outer types of satisfaction dis-

tinguish leaders of men in general. Serviceable illustrations of the two types of leadership are found in outstanding figures of history. Outward characteristics dominated the superb patriotism of Lincoln, Lee, Roosevelt. Reactions of a more inward type are reflected in the egoism of Napoleon and Alexander the Great.

In this dual aspect, the satisfactions of teaching are not unallied to those of administration. On the one hand, satisfaction is derived from being the instrument through which growing lives may be coördinated for happiness and service. There is satisfaction in contact with pupils not simply as school learners but as personalities also. The more inward type of satisfaction is in the uniform contact with less developed minds. The work is a daily reassurance of one's own "superiority." The pupils are instruments of egoism. As with the executive, both natures furnish excellent teachers of formal subjects. Popularity outside the classroom is in this respect more revealing. A teacher's main interest is in his pupils, his subject or himself. In the first case the response of young people is eager, in the second, variable, in the third, grudging.

Religion was mentioned as a great factor in social control. It derives its force from the cir-

cumstance that it is a belief and an attitude held in common. A religion which is "private," with each person directly responsible to God, has little meaning for social control. The question might indeed arise whether this "inner" aspect of spiritual life could be properly called religion. Only a small part of mankind tries to meet spiritual needs in this individual way. Man has been called a "religious animal." In history, common religious beliefs have been an essential part in the lives of nearly all mankind. This "outer" aspect of spiritual life, as represented in the functions of the organized church, includes the social sources of religious comfort. Comfort is reached through a religious expression of social instincts. Religions may be compared on the bases of the types of comfort which they offer; from this follows the types of mind that will respond to them. History indicates that the dominant peoples of the world have been those that responded to Christianity. This is also the religion with the most forcible emphasis on human comradeship. The Japanese and their code of Bushido are alone comparable. The response to early Christianity among these dominant peoples is one aspect of the same social effectiveness that made them dominant peoples.

Birds have been reported which, being deprived

of their own nests, will try to feed the young of others and even provoke the proper parents to driving the intruders away. On the human level, the impossibility of meeting every personal aspiration may result in similarly seeking satisfactions from altruistic conduct. The readiest outlets for otherwise blocked energy are activities of a quasi-charitable nature. It is a question whether such motives are altruistic in a strict sense. The satisfaction lies in the expenditures of energy on others rather than in the satisfaction others derive. Benevolence gives the sanction for spending it on them. The objects of this benevolence are rather instruments of self-satisfaction. The amount of pleasure thus added to their lives varies largely. It is comfortable to ride, but there is more pleasure in walking where you want to go than in being carried where you do not.

A brief review of the classes into which social pleasures have been grouped may be helpful. Apart from social recreations, as indicated in Chapter II, the present consideration applies to membership in various social groups; country, political party, secret order, or more specialized groups, such as scientific societies. Next, the satisfactions derived through the industrial relations; the satisfaction in the work of the sales-

man, the executive, the crafts and their organizations; next, those of the teacher, using this term in a wide sense; next, those of religion, in so far as religion binds people together, and is not simply a bridge thrown from one's individual self to the Infinite; last, a secondary interest in others, which may get its drive from more personal impulses whose outlets are blocked—as in the love-life, for example.

In the foregoing, a distinction has developed between *outer* and *inner* types of satisfaction in social contacts. The former is inherent in nearly all social relations for those normally endowed to utilize it. A person who derives his main satisfactions directly from contact with his fellow-men may be termed an outward personality. This is a type of personality that is adapted to "selling"—and being "sold"—in persuading and being persuaded, in leading and following, in the broadest meanings of the word. An inward type is one whose main satisfactions are in setting one's self apart—"maintaining the integrity of the personality."

Between these two extremes lie basic differences in the mental life of mankind. The differences between outward and inward traits is hardly less significant than the differences be-

tween men and women. Men and women, however, are two distinct types in a sense not applicable to inward and outward personalities. There are extreme outward and inward personalities, as there are very short and tall people; but the mass of people are somewhere between these and in the wide or narrow limits assigned to the self—in the degree and measure and manner of outwardness and inwardness. The self of the outward personality extends to persons at large. The self of inward personality extends but sparingly to human minds other than his own.

The average person utilizes many types of enjoyment—some outward, some inward. The outward are those that emphasize oneness with the group; the inward are those that set him apart. The average personality is a blending of some outward sources of pleasure and some inward ones. On ordinary levels, outward sources of pleasure are the traits of the man about town or man of the world. Inward satisfactions, as such, tend towards more distinctive, sometimes eccentric traits. In certain details, contrasts have been drawn in the superficial behavior of outward and inward personalities. The following enumerates some of these incidental types of inward and outward enjoyments (after Freyd).

Inward	*Outward*
Prefers to work by himself.	Prefers to work with other people.
Knows few people.	Has a wide acquaintance.
Not talkative, especially in public.	Talkative, also in public.
Religion a private matter.	Religion expressed through the church.
Less conventional.	More conventional.
More methodical.	Less methodical.
Poorer loser.	Better loser.
More steadfast.	More fickle.
Writes better than he talks.	Talks better than he writes.
Writes about himself (diaries).	Does not write about himself.
Liking for delicate, intricate work.	Less patient with delicate intricate work.

According to the general distinction drawn by this investigator, outward personalities by definition find their main satisfactions in dealing with other *persons*. Inward personalities typically derive their main satisfactions from dealing with *things*. The latter is a natural consequence when inward traits prevent satisfaction in social contacts. One's energy turns naturally to inanimate, or at least subhuman, objects, which do not have this disturbing effect. It is not interest in *things* that makes an inward personality. It is inward personality that turns interest towards the more manageable world, that of *things*.

Furthermore, a personality is seldom committed for life to inward or outward satisfactions. The wheel of fortune may give a man many outward satisfactions in one year, and the next year force him to take his main comfort from inward ones. Napoleon was swayed by inward traits at all stages of his career. But these were much more marked during his difficult school days, and later at St. Helena than in his years of power. Mental hygiene includes some endeavor to change a person's sources of satisfaction from inward to outward types.

The inward personality (more specifically called *introvert*) has been thought of in two ways. The later view is of a person deriving most comfort from "maintaining integrity of the personality." This is the view represented here. In an earlier definition it meant rather a person who withdrew from "reality" and made himself a mental hermit if he could not be an actual one. This phase of the idea was the first to be recognized, because those who originated it were physicians and recognized its extremes in certain mental troubles. Some inward personalities cannot "live with" the world. They must overcome it or flee from it. He who quite overcomes it is a hero of history, like Napoleon or Alexander or

the great prophets of religion. Others make a working compromise with what they do not overcome. A life somewhat aloof from human conflicts and centered on interests in nature is a type of such adjustment. Among its most favorable examples is Henry David Thoreau. Contentiousness or rebellion against what one does not overcome may produce the type popularly called the "crank." Dickens contributes an unfavorable portrait of this kind in the character of Gabriel Grub. Some throw down their cards and create from their own minds a world in which life is more tolerable. It was these last named who gave the nucleus of these ideas to the physicians interested in psychoanalysis.

At the outset of this chapter the motives of eroticism were separated from those of comradeship and other social tendencies. Both, however, represent reactions of human beings towards each other, and the most intimate of these reactions are concerned with eroticism. In no other common circumstances do persons become so bound up with each other as in civilized marriage. It follows that the main satisfaction in such a union is satisfaction of an outward type. Few persons can meet the normal demands of one's partner and maintain a large share of "personal liberty."

Successful marriage is the portion of those who are not only capable of, but take pleasure in, merging one's desires with those of the partner. Inward traits of personality are rather unfavorable to unions so close as marriage. Because marriage is at once so close and so common a union, it is also one in which inward traits show to the most disadvantage. Every dissatisfaction in marriage reduces to the formula of a demand by one nature of something which the other has not the power to give. The marriage difficulties of distinguished persons are a common theme. Inward personalities furnish a large share of distinguished persons, and their inward traits make them less adaptable to close ties. The "problem novel" portrays the reaction of inward personalities. There are seemingly satisfactory marriages in which "inward" mates with "inward," and each personality goes pretty much its own way. Needless to say, such matings do not tend to propagate. The matings most generally satisfactory from the standpoint of society are those of persons who share capacity for enjoyment in the domestic circle. But few marriages can embody a perfect balance of personality traits. Probably not one in a hundred does so as well as that whose survivor penned the "American

Idyll." Almost always the one must want something the other cannot give. It may be so little that it is unperceived, it may be so much that it is intolerable. On an average, the balance of inward and outward traits in marriage is such that the result, as compared with the value of life previously, is not greatly more or less. Unsatisfactory mental adjustments under the freedom of the single person, are not likely to be made more satisfactory through close association, intimately and permanently, with those of another individual.

While an inward disposition is thus unfavorable to close associations like marriage, it also embodies certain factors to sustain them. One writer on ethics has gone so far as to speak of confessed failure in marriage as the ultimate in confession of failure. Probably he is not alone in this view. For many people the "integrity of the personality" is not well maintained by failure to live up to a solemn commitment. By such persons, the sense of failure in such a relation is regarded as most seriously impairing the value of life.

The question arises whether a new factor is here introduced into the sources of pleasure and pain. Up to this point, pleasure has appeared chiefly as the living out of certain impulses or

urges, economic, erotic, social. Is there in addition to these an impulse that normally makes for pleasure when a right action is done and for a stricken conscience over a wrong doing? Sir John Falstaff answered with an absolute negative. Honor has no value to him that "died o' Wednesday." When his companion says "the world's mine oyster" he means that there are no rights or demands outside his own person that he is bound to respect. This does not express a general sentiment; society could not exist if such tendency were widespread. The inward sense of honor is an indispensable satisfaction to some persons, an important one to many. It may be an independent impulse as distinct as those of eroticism or comradeship; or it may be better understood as a factor that modifies and limits the pleasure-values of love, work, and friendship. How far it modifies them is a relative and variable matter, depending on the religion, customs, and conscience into which one is born and bred. The answer must be sought in observing more precisely how actions become invested with moral "right" or "wrong,"—an important and independent problem next to be considered.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOURCES OF RIGHT AND WRONG

"What sort of characters have these boys?" he asked of the Regimental Sergeant Major. "Accordin' to the Bandmaster, sir . . . they do everything *but* lie, sir."—RUDYARD KIPLING, *The Drums of the Fore and Aft.*

THE writer was asked to advise in a not uncommon situation, of which the following is a fair account. B, a man of good reputation, had been interested in, and had assisted a neighbor through, a long struggle with poverty and ill-health. He thus learned of an incident involving a son of the household in a matter of petty larceny. Some months later, the son, having completed his education, had the offer of a confidenital position with a business firm. The applicant referred his prospective employer to B. The employment manager, relying upon B's good repute, asked whether he knew of any reason why the young man should not be employed. How was B to reply?

Such a situation is typical of moral conflicts. In this specific case, two persons, both presumably of normal moral perceptions, disagreed en-

tirely as to the proper action; yet both were acquainted with the details. The adviser in a moral issue cannot keep another's conscience; his function is to appreciate the factors of which moral issues are made—and such is the purpose of the present chapter—and how the facts presented are affected by them. The course of action that will give B the greatest moral satisfaction depends upon the workings of his own mind, and upon his moral attitude, or conscience.

In general it is held to be wrong to speak with intent to deceive. Yet the question may be raised, familiar to military situations, "By what authority, sir?" What makes it wrong to lie? There are three kinds of answers that the average person may reasonably give: (1) because it is against his religious principles; (2) because he might be sued for it; (3) because his name is Bill Jones, and Bill Jones does not lie. These three answers represent three different "authorities" for rightness and wrongness; they may be summed up as religion, law, attitude towards self. Religion and law were considered in the last chapter as types of social control. They have some power to prevent and punish actions which are wrong to their outlook. The last is a matter of individual nature and experience.

The authority of religion is the will of supernatural powers that it should be so. Actions in accord with this will are good actions. Actions opposed to it are regarded as bad actions or sins. There is not a little disagreement among religions in what they regard as right or wrong. Mohammedanism favors polygamy and forbids alcohol. Christianity forbids polygamy and is not intolerant of "a little wine for the stomach's sake." The things which are enjoined and prohibited in primitive religions seem strange to the modern moral sense. Human sacrifice and the *thuggee* of British India make a ritual of murder. Those who interpret the will of supernatural powers do so in widely divergent and often in what look like unreasoned ways. To a great extent this is an expression of an undeveloped mind. Members of a priestly caste are also subject to temptation to use their special powers for private advancement. Both of these factors tend to produce differences in what religion deems right or wrong under times, places and circumstances.

The lie itself is not invested with immorality until we reach fairly high levels of civilization. At early levels the premium is placed upon craft and cunning. "Most people are bad," remarked a savage chief to an explorer; "if they are strong

they take from the weak. The good are all weak; they are good because they are not strong enough to be bad." The language in which this sentiment was uttered probably had no words that meant precisely what good and bad mean for us; but the morals expressed are hardly compatible with an advanced grade of society. The progress of civilization depends upon people's ability to trust each other.

Morality as a private and individual matter is all but synonymous with anarchy; it might lead to as many religions as there are persons concerned. Most persons prefer to follow leadership in moral affairs as well as in industrial or military ones. A person answerable only to himself has a very different code of morals according to the state of his business, to what he ate for dinner, to the condition of his endocrine glands. It has been said that the most elastic of substances are helium, hydrogen, and the human conscience. All human societies have needed a morality made uniform by law and religion—by religion with authority ascribed to the supernatural, by law with authority derived from the worldly custom of the group. Any study of primitive customs reveals that in early times there is no clear separation of the two.

Laws differ from one State to another. Religions differ from one Church to another. Consciences differ from one person to another. The factor that is most common to all is this: A thing is right when it benefits and wrong when it injures the group of which the person concerned, the agent, is a member. Benefit may be understood as increasing the pleasure-value of existence. Whether a thing is thus beneficial or injurious is a question, not of morals but what lawyers call "of fact." Many of these facts are not known. Mankind is still trying to settle how best to regulate the consumption of alcohol. On the other hand, the injurious character of murder, stealing, and perjury is not regarded as an open question. Advanced consciences reject them, religions condemn them, laws punish them.

But they are so condemned and rejected and punished only within certain limits. In war it is a duty to destroy the enemy's soldiers, to capture his military property, to deceive him about one's intentions. The enemy does not belong to the same group as ourselves. In injuring him we preserve ourselves from destruction. In failing to do so we jeopardize our own existence. All the law and the prophets of morality hang upon what is regarded as belonging to the "in-group." In

this distinction, those outside the moral law are called the "out-group."

This relation may be clearer in the light of further illustration of the effect in practice. As regards the "right to live," the killing of strangers by savages is an example of restricted group-feeling. The average American's "in-group" includes mankind generally. He will not think it right to kill a man except to defend himself or others who mean much to him. Towards foreign and primitive peoples this sentiment gradually weakens. "The only good Indian is a dead Indian." In a somewhat transferred sense a similar sentiment extends in some degree towards higher animals like the horse and dog, and toward some birds. It is less marked toward a cat, and nearly always absent toward animals available for food. An annoying creature, like the mosquito, or a dangerous one, like the rattlesnake, most men will destroy at every opportunity. In this respect a much wider "in-group" exists among peoples of British India, whose reactions toward animal enemies are affected by their beliefs. Though venomous snakes destroy thousands of lives yearly, they are protected by religion. Some individuals of this region cherish the very vermin that infest their bodies.

Stealing, by definition, implies a moral offense. It assumes someone to whom a thing can "belong." All human beings may be regarded as capable of owning property in the sense that taking it from them would be stealing. Undoubtedly the average person respects property rights in his neighbor more than in strangers, and much more than in peoples regarded as inferior. Many persons are also sensitive to property rights in animals, and would protest against wantonly robbing a creature of its food, or a bird's nest of its eggs.

"Telling the truth" is perhaps the action in which the group definition of morality stands out most clearly. Pilate's famous question is still unanswered, or rather, has a thousand answers. When the lie is quoted as the chief exemplar of moral offense, the meaning is that it is wrong to lie to those who have a right to know the truth. That is, to those of one's "in-group." In war every confidence given to the enemy is a lie to one's comrades. No normal conscience rebels at "getting away with" misinformation to the enemy. The enemy is regarded as having no right to confidence; the poker-player who asks on what hand his "enemy" won the jack-pot is assigned about the same right. The same applies to the

teacher who expects a boy to tell on his comrades, and emphatically to a gentleman questioned about a lady's indiscretions. In all these cases to speak the truth at one level means to be false at another. It is a question of keeping comradeship in one's own camp.

Accordingly, the highest common factor in the actions condemned by law, religion and conscience is injury to some member of the group to which one belongs; one name includes them all—disloyalty. As offenses, killing, adultery, stealing, bearing false witness are simply types of actions disloyal to the "in-group." A creature outside this group cannot be an object of such disloyalty. In theory, says moral authority, "the brutes are made for man, who has the same right over them which he has over plants and stones . . . it must also be lawful for him to put them to death or to inflict pain on them—even for the purposes of recreation." As is at once pointed out, in cruelty to animals "man degrades . . . his own nature," and it is wrong on these grounds. Questions are thus raised in regard to the sport of hunting as well as some other passages of life. Increased sensibility makes these things revolting, and invests them with immorality. Modern society generally upholds vivisection for science. It allows

hunting within liberal limits and these not governed by sentiment. It has less tolerance for the pigeon-shoot or the bullfight.

Maritime savages are reported who, overtaken by storm, throw overboard their women for their own greater safety. The opposite is the practice of the most advanced peoples. It is not a question of whether the women's and children's lives are more valuable than the men's. When the Union monitor *Tecumseh* was torpedoed in Mobile Harbor, the commander, Tunis A. Craven, was in the wheelhouse with the pilot. Both seeking safety, the commander stepped aside and bade the pilot go first. The pilot escaped; Craven went down with his ship. Yet the commander's life might as such be presumed more valuable than his subordinate's. Indeed, it is customary that on a sinking vessel the presumptively most valuable life on board, the captain's, shall be the last to seek safety. The value of such usages is clearly not in the preservation of the fittest. It is a sacrifice of the fittest that others may be more fit. It is in what is added to the lives of the survivors by the seeming sacrifice. It is only a seeming sacrifice, for the hero counts his life worth nothing if saved at the cost of honor. The real sacrifice of Thermopylæ was not that of Leonidas and his

three hundred, but of the survivor who brought the message of their deaths. The most advanced peoples are those to whom such actions are of the highest value, among whom they are the most customary. This fact makes the Cross symbolic of one of the chief moral-emotional values in civilization

In general, then, the actions that moral codes join in condemning as wrong are those which do damage to some greater or lesser group. Such actions are temptations because the impulse to do them is for some personal advantage—as in stealing. What things shall be regarded as right or wrong is an unsettled issue. Different codes answer it in different ways. As William Graham Sumner put it, the customs of a people can make anything right. Their power to make anything *good* is more limited.

In the frame of these principles, the case cited at the opening of this chapter would be thus considered: Does B belong with the "in-group" of the boy or with that of his prospective employer? His relations towards the boy might be of so confidential a nature as to justify his concealing the truth from an "outsider." A similar position has been set forth by a well-known judge of a juvenile court. Only court order will justify

the physician in disclosing the confidences of his patient. The juvenile delinquent and the judge, the doctor and his patient, are placed in the same "in-group." Similar factors operate with B. On the other hand, a good citizen does not betray the trust of those who are themselves intrusted with maintaining the integrity of a business or social institution. A case of scarlet fever or diphtheria is not allowed to be concealed from those whom it may endanger. From this standpoint B is ranged with the man who is responsible for employing only persons of unquestioned moral habits.

Another question is, this: Which course holds the prospect of most benefit, or least harm, to society? If the boy is refused this chance, owing to this one delinquency, what is the probable effect on his future? Will it be a lesson to him or the opposite? If he makes good on this chance, very well; but suppose he abuses his trust? From this standpoint the right course would be that which seemed to offer the best chance for society to benefit from the boy's presence in it. "What would Sancho Panza do?"

Up to this point actions have been considered right or wrong according to moral codes, or according to intrinsic benefit or harm. But it may be held that the rightness or wrongness of an ac-

tion lies quite outside the action itself, that is in the motive that prompts the action. For example, a man's clothing caught fire in a garage. A friend threw over him the contents of a nearby can, which chanced to contain gasoline. Obviously this action was very serious, from the standpoint of injury. On the other hand, it was done with the best of motives. How far one weighs the motive in deciding the moral value of an act plays an essential part in the fixing of moral responsibility.

The custom of enforcing responsibility is something like that of enforcing property rights. The economist teaches that private property has no justification other than its social utility. That is, without it society goes to pieces. It is similar with responsibility. For all that science knows to the contrary, human beings may be irresponsible machines like locomotives or linotypes, only more complicated, moved by inexorable laws on foreordained paths. The difficulty with such an idea, is the difficulty which makes many other ideas unacceptable—they will not work. Suspend law and order, relieve men of accountability for their actions, and the social fabric goes straight to ruin. A man must be held to some answer for his acts, if society is to endure. Sometimes a man's kindred are held responsible for his acts.

Feudal Japan set great store by this "vicarious responsibility." A herald is punished for bringing bad news, or a messenger of the enemy for offering impossible terms. Here the idea of wrong results from confusion concerning causes and effects. Under such conditions results are looked at rather than motives. Failure is a crime; the best intentions and efforts count for nothing. When the wholly competent General Nogi failed to take Port Arthur as quickly as was expected, it was irresponsibly suggested that he commit suicide. Among western peoples, the tendency has been to restrict responsibility far more. A man is responsible only for what he does himself or directly causes to be done. Motive plays a much larger part. There must be intent to do a wrong action before there is full responsibility. But since thought cannot be read, intent is impossible to prove. A person is therefore presumed to intend "the natural consequences of his acts."

A man rose from his bed in the delirium of fever and got hold of a revolver. His family fled. The nurse, though "an hireling," did not flee but struggled with the patient and was fatally shot. The consequences were disastrous, but as in the instance of the gasoline above cited, the evil mo-

tive is absent in the wrongdoer. Codes have no doubt existed that would have assigned penalties other than remorse for these acts. Modern usage does not do this. It requires that the nature of the act be understood to a degree not present in either of these cases. The question is more difficult when a murderer, let us say, knows perfectly well what he is doing and is aware that his act is punishable by the laws of the state. But he has delusions that he is the victim of persecution for which the law refuses him redress. The degree of responsibility that exists in such a case, or indeed in any case, no one knows. Science can cope with the question of what it is expedient to exact; the degree of responsibility that will be exacted is a question of custom, of law, and the temper of the court.

In modern usage, responsibility is for what one does only, not for what one thinks. Responsibility has also been enforced for thoughts. There is a story of a king who punished a subject for having dreamed an attempt on the king's life. Such responsibility is generally associated with religious beliefs, as in the punishment of heresy in Christianity. This idea of guilt in ideas seems to have been an inheritance from early Jewish faith. It is not prominent in other principal re-

ligions. The "dog of a Christian" is not blameworthy, only unfortunate. Responsibility to law is now confined to mankind. But among less developed minds, occasionally animals and even inanimate objects were formally prosecuted and punished for offenses ascribed to them.

According to these views, as actions depend upon the presence of a bad motive to be bad, so they depend upon a good motive to be good. "Nothing is fundamentally good but the good will." It follows that acts have no merit in themselves. It is the person acting who is meritorious or not, according to his motives. Motives are so difficult to determine that this standpoint meets not a little criticism on practical grounds. The hell of the eighteenth century was said to be "paved with good intentions," a proper flooring for a bottomless pit. In later days to "mean well" has become synonymous with incompetence. A good man is one who *makes* good rather than *is* good. The cover for hypocrisy in motive is limitless;

> It matters not what you do
> If only your heart be true
> And his *heart* was true to Poll.

Strong moral natures may have built the motive theory, but it is a ready refuge for weak ones.

It is a safeguard against treating certain types of accidents as crimes. Social expediency considers both the results of one's actions and their motives. If an illegally driven motor-car kills a man, the act is manslaughter. The motive is the same if it kills a dog, but it is less likely to appear in the criminal courts.

Within the historical period, human life in its artificial setting has been very complex, and it never was more so than to-day. Parallel with this complication of human relations is a similar complication of the factors giving to behavior the aspect of good or bad. Hence the difficulty in laying down specific rules for the conduct of life; the rules will interfere with one another, and the adjustment of rule to circumstance is uncertain. A person may commit a wrong act and justify it by some rule of conduct that seems to fit the case. The same acts become right or wrong according to their circumstances and the sentiment entertained toward them. Just what will be the right course under different circumstances, the student of ethics does not attempt to say. The nearest approach to such an attempt was the casuistry of the medieval church which established regulations in the conduct of quite minute passages in life;

the service of such regulations is highly questionable.

Speaking historically, the efforts of religious systems to determine right and wrong are derived from their concepts of the ruling divinities. Several religions regard the dominion of the universe as concentrated in a single Godhead. Christianity, Judaism, and Mohammedanism accept this principle. Such religions are called *monotheistic* (one-god). Other religions assign to various supernatural beings dominion over various aspects of the universe. Thus, in classical times, Apollo was the god of the sun, Mars was the god of war, Cupid the god of love. Such religions are called *polytheistic* (many-god). In such religions the gods interfere with the affairs of men for their own particular ends. As each god is responsible only to himself, they are often at cross purposes. Consider, for example, the Olympian squabbles over the siege of Troy. The moral level ascribed to these classical deities seems to be no higher than that of their votaries. The distinguished Alaskan missionary, the late Hudson Stuck, finds that a notable effect of Christian teaching on the natives is one of tremendous relief. Formerly each Alaskan native and his dearest ones were at the mercy of every evil spirit

which a rich enemy might engage a medicine-man to invoke. He found one great value of Christianity to be in teaching that there are no such irresponsible powers abroad in the world. On the contrary, the universe is governed by unchanging laws, of which God is the personified authority. There is no need to fear the "sympathetic magic" of the enemy, the invocation of the shaman's guardian spirit, or the thunderbolts of Jupiter, for these are not a part of the order governing the world.

Also, historically speaking, it may be urged that moral precepts have not progressed far beyond those delivered to Moses on Sinai; of these ten commandments, the first four inculcate duty towards God, and the remaining six duty towards one's fellow men. It is perhaps not so clear that the first four commandments may be interpreted as precepts in personal mental hygiene. Under this view, the substance of the first Commandment, stating the dominance and immutability of the one God, is the injunction to take things as they are and recognize natural law. Apollo could have two and two make six; Jupiter could have them make eight; Siva could have them make nothing at all. The teaching of the Decalogue is never to regard them as making anything but four. There

are more difficult problems in the world than two plus two; there are many to which no satisfactory answer is known. But there are always correct answers, and there never were or will be any other answers which are correct. The business of science as of practical wisdom is to get as near the correct answers as it can. In this sense the rest of the Decalogue is really an amplification of its opening declaration. Similarly for the second Commandment prohibiting the use of images: it is much easier for the human mind to grasp ideas represented by something that speaks directly and concretely to the senses. An idol may be seen and touched. It is easier for the mind to worship in the presence of an idol to represent the supernatural power that is invoked. It takes a much more developed mind to worship something seen with the eye of faith alone. The religions of primitive minds are uniformly idolatrous, in the sense thus indicated. The idols are symbols of some divinity, just as a signature on an agreement is a symbol of the signer as thus agreeing. As aids to devotion, Christianity uses symbols, such as the crucifix, widely and effectively. The danger lies in the treatment of the symbol as though it were the thing or act symbolized. So the savage might think to injure you by

burning the paper that had your name on it. To go to church is a symbol of an upright life; few claim that the act constitutes such living. The commandment applies not against observance of forms, which may be most serviceable, but against the ready confusion of form with substance.

The third Commandment, prohibiting the taking of the name of the Lord in vain, may be generalized as a warning against the wanton indulgence in wrong emotion. Modern knowledge confirms the injunction through the study of the bodily processes accompanying emotional excitement. In some of these, such as weeping or wringing the hands, it is difficult to trace a "survival value" beyond that of serving as a motor outlet or drainage. Others are more specifically useful, in that substances are added to the blood which enable one to fight harder or run faster. But if one neither fights nor runs, all this energy is wasted. Indeed, the unused substances may act as poisons in the blood. It is thus a disorganizing experience for one to have a strong emotion "in vain." It becomes likely that on other occasions of strong emotion, when action is urgently demanded, one will similarly confine himself to gnashing of teeth and secretion of adrenin. A great man of the present time put the same idea into homely

phrase. To strike or to contain one's self may be justified; the unpardonable thing is to "hit softly."

The fourth Commandment prescribes the Sabbath as a day of rest, and thus directs attention to the important problem of work and play. Apart from the physiological self-regulating processes, such as breathing and the heart-beat, which go on unremittingly though now rapidly and now slowly in adjustment to need, all processes at all complicated show loss of efficiency after a time. This loss is called *fatigue;* and it is removed by *rest.* Rest may be a cessation of activity or a change. The normal human being requires sleep at night to restore the mind and body from the fatigue of the day. That is a relative cessation of activity. It is also found that the day's work cannot be well carried on day after day without interruption. "All work and no play," induces other ill effects beside dullness. The mind is kept more healthy by introducing days when work as such ceases, and energy is spent in freer ways. The Mosaic injunction provides one day in seven for such a purpose, and this has become the usage of the Christian world as well. Sundays are also supplemented by holidays of various kinds. As life has become more complicated, the effective-

ness of these single "rest days" has diminished. For many persons, Sunday and the "afternoon off" are merely changes from office or factory routine to duties of household administration. Even persons of greater leisure find it hard to detach themselves from work for one-day periods. Hence the provision of longer vacations which offers one the opportunity to detach himself more completely from his accustomed duties. Yet there are persons who must spend this period also in other gainful work or in household tasks. Lack of recreation becomes a distinct factor in personal difficulties of mental adjustment. Men who retire from business after a life of single devotion to it often learn this to their cost. A road lined with fragments of the fourth Commandment may be for some the only one to follow. It need not be a disagreeable road. But it has led to awkward destinations, quite on this side of the Styx.

Resuming the central theme, we may turn to the relation between morality and happiness, between the pursuit of conduct sanctioned as good and the pleasure-value resulting from such a course of action. The saying, "Be good and you will be happy," is familiar, and is accepted with reservations. In one aspect the question as to how far actions beneficial to one's self are normally pleasur-

able was touched upon in the first chapter. That there may be conflict between personal pleasure and social benefit is plain. Yet goodness and happiness may be brought into amicable relations. Those who take comfort in actions advantageous to their fellows stand a better chance of survival than those who take comfort in the reverse. A nation of "dogs and murderers" is a contradiction in terms. The good man, that is, the man who enjoys action in conformity with his group standards, has an undeniably better chance of both happiness and survival. It has survival value to be happy by being thus good. Just how far specific goodness is a specific source of happiness, of the same order as work and love, is another question. Outside the fundamental instincts, the sources of pleasure vary indefinitely from time to time, from place to place, from person to person. What passes for right in the community and in the single conscience varies not less. In general they go together, for the above reasons, but not always. The specific source of comfort inherent in moral life is a "good conscience." The source of pain is a "guilty conscience." The status of these processes as mental pleasures and pains is hardly an open question. The difficulty begins when one asks how far do moral actions

carry with them the comfort of a good conscience and the reverse.

The essence of the matter seems to lie in the *sensitiveness* of the conscience rather than in its good or evil quality. It is a general fact of mental life that its pains are more intense than its pleasures. A part of this fact is that sensitive consciences mean more pain than pleasure to their possessor. Now a conscience is not sensitive in proportion to the immorality of its owner. Extremes of guilty feelings are frequently attached to actions whose moral aspect is trivial. In mental disease, the most painfully guilty feelings are attached to what in reality are mere illusions. It is true that the assigned causes of these sufferings are not always the real ones. The personality has a way of compounding for greater sins by damning itself for lesser ones. But the underlying offense may be quite trivial, much more so than the acknowledged one. This aspect must be left for more advanced study. The main point at present is the great disproportion between the sufferings of "conscience" and the actual harm in the actions that originate them.

Similarly, persons do very harmful actions with little resulting moral inconvenience. Material successes reached in dubious ways are a common

theme. The claim that such persons suffer from secret pangs of conscience is as little recognized among students of ethics as among people of practical affairs. Such cases fit aptly into Kant's criterion of right and wrong, "How would it be if every one acted like that?" Then, of course, there would be no society on whom malefactors could prey. If people were not generally reliable, there would be no railroads to plunder, no banks to wreck, no payrolls to rob. These by-products of morality increase the inducements for a few to break through it.

The conclusion is, then, that morality is not as such, a basic source of pleasure, or immorality of pain. The fundamental sources remain in the life of the instincts. These become invested with moral qualities secondarily. Their normal living out acquires a moral aspect. But it is the living out that is pleasurable, not the morality of it. Serious transgression of morality does not involve loss of pleasure-values. On the pain side, much mental suffering is attributed to previous wrongdoing. But the relation is most obscure, and the amount of suffering is out of all proportion to the actual harm done.

CHAPTER VII

THE MAJOR EMOTIONS

A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume.—GEORGE WASHINGTON, *Farewell Address* (1796).

WHEN a hungry man sits down to a good dinner, he is likely to smile, smack his lips and have his "mouth water." His entire frame thrills with the enjoyment before him. Many, perhaps all, of these processes continue during the early attack on the food. Between these processes and the attack on the food itself, there is this difference. Smiling and smacking the lips begin and end in the man's body. The attack on the food concerns something, in the beginning at least, outside the man's body. It is a reaction upon the environment. This is a distinction generally made between instincts and emotions. The instinct of love is to seek, caress and embrace—reactions toward an outside object. The smile, the quicker heart-beat and other activities restricted to the body are looked upon rather as signifying the emotion of love.

No hard-and-fast line between instinct and emotion is drawn by this means or by any other. The decision as to whether or not a process goes on "outside the body" is sometimes a mere quibble. Whether parts of one's own body are considered within or outside the self, may be a question of opinion or circumstance. Masturbation has an instinctive as well as an emotional phase, yet it is not clearly a reaction on something outside the body. Instinct and emotion are names for two phases at once present in many mental processes. One generally denotes external, the other internal, processes. The distinction between internal and external is valid and convenient.

Pleasure and pain are internal processes, intimately bound up with instincts. They may be looked on as the simplest of processes that are in line with the emotions. Psychology generally classifies them as feelings. Popular speech uses "feelings" and emotion in much the same way. Some words, as hunger and love, can be used interchangeably for emotion or instinct. One writer may classify jealousy and fear among the instincts, and another consider them as emotions. In this sense emotions denote feelings of pleasure or pain, with something added to describe their character and source. In the emotions of shame

and grief the feeling factor is generally unpleasant. They are both caused, as unpleasant feelings generally are, by the thwarting of some mental process. But the processes thwarted are different. The resulting shame and grief do not seem alike. The names given to emotions specify more particularly the kind of pleasure or pain that results from realizing or thwarting one's impulses. This gives them a central position in the study of pleasure and pain.

To say that the embrace "expresses" the instinct of love is something of a figure of speech. The instinct rather *is* the embrace. One can more literally say that the smile is a token of emotion. The smile is not regarded as an emotion itself. Emotion, like feeling, is a mental process. On this perhaps every one can agree.

But on the nature of this mental process a question has been raised. It has been put forward that the smile is not an "expression" of gladness. The gladness is rather a result of the smile. In general, these various bodily processes ordinarily thought of as the expressions of emotion, are thus really the causes of it. That is, one is afraid because he flees, angry because he strikes, jealous because some other special bodily activity is going

on. This is, in substance, the classical "James-Lange" theory of emotions.

In support of this theory the great American genius whose name it bears brought forward many skillful observations. These views became an accepted teaching in psychology. They appeared to be the best interpretation of the facts then known. Of late years the objections have rather grown in force. The bodily "expressions" of the emotions have been studied by refined methods. The main reliance of the theory has been upon the expressive movements controlled by the vegetative nervous system. Investigators aimed to determine whether different kinds of emotions produced different effects in bodily processes controlled by the vegetative nervous system. These are activities chiefly of the blood vessels and glands. In general, effects of emotion upon these processes have not been difficult to demonstrate. But to show that specifically different emotions will have correspondingly specific and distinctive expressions in terms of these processes is far more of a task, and has not been accomplished. Fear increases sugar in the blood; so does anger. The pulse beats faster with joy or hate but does not indicate the source of the acceleration. These various bodily processes can show when an emo-

tion is aroused. To some extent they can show how strong an emotion is aroused. They do not show what kind of emotion is aroused. This is the first point made against considering these processes outside the brain as essential factors in emotion (Cannon).

As has been noted, these bodily processes are actuated mainly by the vegetative nervous system, and their muscles are smooth muscles. Now, so far as known, bodily processes of this kind take rather long to get into action—two seconds or more. If emotion depends on them, emotion cannot be perceived for some two seconds after the "critical event," that causes it. The best and the worst news, the vilest or sweetest smell may be understood but seems not to arouse vegetative reaction for two seconds or more. So the crucial question becomes, May simple emotions be established in less time than this after the stimulus that arouses them? This is a delicate point, not as yet adequately considered. It depends on viewing the emotion as a reaction to some stimuli or event; many writers consider them rather as conditions or states.

To determine the matter, one must take an event whose occurrence can be accurately timed and which will cause perceptible emotion. To the ex-

perimental psychologist there is nothing impossible about this. Then one must establish the point at which the emotion is perceived. This is more difficult. Emotion is an inner thing. How is one to know when it occurs? One can "say when," but this kind of evidence by itself is not widely accepted. It is better when the *kind* of emotion is also indicated. It is perhaps best when there is also a grimace or some other movement generally accepted as an "expression" of emotion. It follows that an emotion, whose cause is given all at once, must be a quite simple one, with a simple cause. A symbolic painting which must be examined to sense its beauty, or a letter which must be read to get its startling news, would not answer. One would be some time "taking it in," and the emotion would be a compound one that would take long to "build up." Thus the emotions which can be studied in this way do not go much beyond simple "feelings" of pleasantness or unpleasantness. Agreeable and disgusting smells are among the most satisfactory stimulus to use. The subject reports whether the smell is good or bad, but often indicates it by involuntary grimace beforehand. Various other kinds of experiments have been tried with uniform results. To establish the simplest emotional processes

takes less than one second, scarcely ever as long as two. You can say whether you like a picture as quickly as you can say whether you recognize it, that is, less time than it takes the bodily "organs of emotion" to get going. This is the second objection to regarding the emotions as originating in movements controlled by the vegetative nervous system.

A third type of evidence is obtained through abnormal channels. Some years ago the famous English physiologist, Sherrington, observed a young dog whose nerve connections to the body were cut. This dog still showed the ordinary signs of emotion, such as barking in anger. Disease has been observed in which a similar situation was brought about in man. Here, too, the emotional life is reported as essentially unchanged. On the whole the view that emotions originate outside the nervous system has lost rather than gained ground as experience has accumulated. Emotion is referred more specifically to the brain, and particularly to the part of the brain known as the optic thalamus. The bodily processes are another effect of the same process that has set up the emotion in the brain. These bodily processes, like the palpitating heart or the "gone feeling" in the stomach, have emotional

values of their own, and thus have a real share in sustaining or heightening the original emotion.

How these bodily processes get their emotional values is another question. They may have these emotional values inherently, as such. The James-Lange type of theory so regards them. But there is another important possibility. Suppose a young child to experience an emotional shock, say of surprise. One effect of the shock is the emotion of surprise. At the same time the shock sets up a number of bodily processes, such as a more rapid heart. The emotional and bodily processes are always experienced together in response to the shock. Under these circumstances, the bodily processes become able to arouse the emotion by a principle called *conditioning,* further explained in Chapter X. The bodily processes, being continually experienced in company with a certain emotion, take on such emotion for themselves. A great part of the evidence adduced for the James-Lange type of theory is subject to this interpretation.

Pleasantness and unpleasantness are the simplest emotional processes. They are factors in the more compound reactions, like jealousy, etc. These compound emotions are associated with special desires and impulses. Realizing a desire

contributes an agreeable factor to the emotion. The thwarting of desire contributes a disagreeable factor. The more powerful emotions are always compound, and arise from realizing or thwarting major impulses. The pleasure in the aroma of a good cup of coffee after dinner is a very simple emotion, a "primary" pleasure. It has little or no instinctive appeal; it is agreeable, but not a great joy. Definite instinctive appeals, on the other hand, are made by the returned warrior's sight of his sweetheart, or the sight of a pot of beans by a hungry lumberjack. Their emotional values are stronger than many cups of coffee.

It remains to consider how the major emotions are related to special instinctive desires; how people differ in their emotional natures. If one sets out to catalogue emotions, one soon finds that a dominant part is played by names with unpleasant associations. Fear, grief, anger, jealousy illustrate what is meant. Love (including its parental component) is almost the only name denoting a major pleasant emotion, though there are more minor ones, like amusement or curiosity. This seems to represent a rather general fact of human life. "The world is a comedy to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel." The emotions

that stand out are disagreeable ones. There are so-called "affective" mental diseases in which emotional disturbance is in the foreground. Sometimes the disturbance is an over-happy mood, sometimes an over-depressed one; but the latter is much more common. This does not denote a preponderance of evil or sorrow as such, but that evil and pain and tragedy have retained the property of making themselves more felt. The pain departure from mentality is more arresting, more assertive. It is when your stomach aches, that you become aware of it. In love there are still crises of maximal enjoyment. Primitive man perhaps had similar crises of enjoyment in feeding and in combat. Compare the cat's ecstasy over the mouse it has caught; also Jack London's description of the dog Cherokee's mental processes in his battle with White Fang. But man has conquered the environment. The price paid for civilized comfort is the joy of primal victory. An instinct that runs smoothly on three meals a day is comfortable, but no vehicle of great thrills or crises of enjoyment. Only the course of true love, which never runs smooth, continues to carry them.

The emotion of love, therefore (including the parental phase, Chapter IV), is the sole major

emotion that has a name associated with self-realization. It is agreeable as long as the impulses, wherever they tend, are progressing. It is disagreeable (broken heart, etc.) when these impulses are thwarted. Indeed, it is not inapt to turn these sentences around, and say that whatever in it is agreeable represents the realization of an impulse. Whoever readily "takes *no* for an answer" is not wholly displeased with it. The only other emotion that might rank in this class is mystical ecstasy. It denotes the living out of impulses yet to be considered.

Among the most frequent words used to advertise a work of fiction or drama, is *thrilling*. This means that it gives an agreeable stir to the emotions. But the direction in which it stirs them is not implied. It may stir to wonder, to sympathy, to horror, to joy; so long as it stirs and stirs agreeably it can be called thrilling. Thrill denotes essentially the arousal of any emotion to a pleasant degree. Practically all emotions have *some* degree to which stirring them is pleasant. Fear, horror, and pity can be only moderately stirred before they become unpleasant. Joy can stand more. Shame can stand little or none, but, in general, mild stirrings of the emotions are more

likely to be pleasant than otherwise. Hence the advertising value of the "thrill."

The emotion is an emergency-meeting device; it is aroused by the unusual, which, though in part feared, is also welcomed for its stimulation value. It breaks through the monotony of a weak or too-familiar stimulation of a dull world.

But most major emotions are unpleasant and are serviceable frames in which to discuss the psychology of mental pain. As is now familiar, this arises from a special thwarting of impulses. This thwarting may be from without, as the annoyance of missing a train, or may be from counter-impulses within oneself, as the tense bashfulness of the young lover. A little consideration may be devoted to the thwarting of impulses in such major emotions as hatred, fear, anger, grief, jealousy.

It has been found that the first stimulus that will cause anger in the newborn infant is to restrict his freedom of movement, as by holding the arms to the sides. (Watson). When seen in a healthy child of five, it is traceable to some prohibition by a parent, the interference of a playmate with his toys, the bumping of his head against a door—in all cases interference with something he is doing. As he grows he has more

impulses, the thwarting of which may result in anger. The thwarting of one's self-esteem by insult, of a business deal by competition, of a love passage by a rival, are typical causes of episodes of anger.

The unpleasant tension of anger seeks relief in struggling against the object causing it. If it is overcome, anger, as such, ceases. In the typical anger of children, the obstacle is not, in a well-regulated household, overcome. But the thwarted impulse is by nature transitory, and when it ceases the child recovers his good humor. In these two ways anger is brought to a solution. A third outcome is hatred.

Hatred conveniently designates anger as a chronic process. It implies, first, a persistent desire which is as persistently thwarted. In view of this it often implies a greater power, which cannot be overcome. It may thus denote the inferiority of the hater to the hated. In this sense it means the thwarting not simply of original desire but of the hater's self-esteem. This is particularly true when the inferiority is felt as an essential trait of the hater's personality, as a deficiency of courage. "Hatred," remarks Bernard Shaw, "is the coward's revenge for being intimidated." The amount of mental disorganization

from hatred is not readily limited. It does not seem that all enmity to which the term hatred is applied fits the above conception. It may be that the difficulty is superficial, the object being merely out of one's reach for the time. Under such conditions the "good hater" logically makes a good friend when the quarrel has been resolved.

Many persons, contemplating a fine house, automobile, or dress belonging to another, feel unpleasant emotions which have been named envy or jealousy. It is allied to anger; but specifically involves the response caused by the sight of another enjoying something out of reach; the "other" is an essential factor in the emotion. The sight of his possession stimulates desire; and its unfulfillment brings the emotion of envy. It occurs most acutely in the erotic sphere. One who loves another may be greatly upset that a third person should share the least of the love-object. Failure of jealousy under some conditions raises some question as to the nature and depth of the affection. A common device to stimulate a lover is to pretend interest in some one else. One may observe how frequently jealousy appears in dogs, and how rarely among cats. The former are affectionate, the latter self-centered. The circumstances that bring forth the extremes of jealous

emotion are not common. Of all the emotions it furnishes the best motives for tragedy, of which "Othello" is perhaps the best known literary expression.

The emotions just considered might be classed as the "anger-group" of emotions, that is, they are directed against an external object, felt as thwarting a desire. The most direct reaction is attack on the thwarting object. Contrasted with these are emotions that may be classed as the "sorrow" group, comprising such states as remorse and shame, as well as grief. Remorse generally designates a chronic grief in response to an injury inflicted upon another. A normal man who blew off a friend's hand with a carelessly handled shotgun might be expected to feel deep and lasting remorse. Remorse implies regret plus a sense of responsibility for the act. Where this latter is not present, sorrow is the descriptive term rather than remorse.

The typical cause of great sorrow is the deprivation of some object of affection, that is, the thwarting of the impulse whose accustomed outlet was this object. Normally a bereavement does not cause anger, there being no object of anger. When this is present, as when the person loved has been murdered, enmity to the point of blood-

feud is not impossible. But a death from natural causes carries no normal object of anger, and the normal reaction is that termed sorrow or grief. What emotion will ensue in a given case depends very much on the person who feels it. A betrayal of affection that makes one nature jealous may throw a less aggressive nature into grief. The one recognizes a disturbing object and attacks it; the other fails to recognize it and "feels" it as a deprivation only—the act of the gods. The natural or supernatural powers at work in bereavement are not commonly considered objects of anger. Exceptional natures may feel anger more than grief at such times. The general causes of emotion here cited are normal causes only. The same event may, however, arouse quite different emotions in different natures.

For the emotion called shame there are two factors. One is the sense of a certain status or standard of conduct that one is obliged to maintain; the second is a sense that one fails to maintain it. The second of these two gives the thwarting of the normal mental process implied in the first. A person with no morals does not feel shame, any more than a person with no inner ear feels dizziness. So the word shameless is used to designate a person lacking in morals. The

things which will cause shame depend on one's standard of conduct. Incidents that embarrass the Mohammedan leave the Christian unblushing, and *vice versa.* The stricter a moral code, the greater its potential sources of shame. A strict code may to a sensitive nature bring such shame that the personality must either discard it or collapse. Shame is honor with a minus sign, and as such its social implications were discussed in a previous chapter. A liberal code or an under-sensitive conscience admits of looser morals through absence or lowering of the restraints of shame. To act in accordance with the standards one accepts, preserves honor and avoids shame. An emotion of shame that is chronic is called an "inferiority complex." To mitigate this shame recourse is had to one or another means to increase self-esteem. Such efforts are called "compensations." A man feeling physically inferior works hard in the gymnasium and takes boxing lessons. This is a compensation which really increases his capacity. Or he may take it out in mere boasting of accomplishments he does not possess, and experiences he has never had. This makes one less and less suited to face the world. Such factitious kinds of compensations play an important part in nervous and mental breakdowns.

If one is confronted with a danger which one has no resources to meet, the usual emotion is that called fear. Fear is the center of a third group of mainly unpleasant emotions, with such derivatives as anxiety and worry. Among the earliest incitements to fear in a young infant is to remove its support, and allow it to fall harmlessly a few inches. The causes of all fear are variations of this menace; the danger thwarts the impulse of self-preservation. Not everything that does this causes fear. People differ greatly in their sensitiveness to fear. But everything that causes normal fear is something seeming to threaten one's security of body or mind. No such factors need be present in emotions of the anger or grief type, though they may enter.

Practically speaking, all emotions are built up from a combination of factors such as anger, fear, joy or grief. The emotion takes its name from the one that happens to be in the foreground. An artist painting a landscape is chased by a bull. Fear may be the dominant emotion. Both reasonable and probable are admixtures of anger at the interruption, regret at the loss of his work, perhaps a dash of the gambler's joy in his fighting chance of escape. The expressions "joy of grief" and "sweet sorrow" are ancient tes-

timony to the complex character of the emotions seen in nature. The pleasantness or unpleasantness of the emotion is not absolutely fixed by its name. One can indicate the usual result. To contemplate with "mingled emotions" is not simply a euphemism; it is accurate self-analysis. Pure emotions are as rare in nature as pure colors. A color called red may contain yellow, blue, purple, brown, violet, anything—only red predominates so much that it gives it its name. An actual emotion called jealousy is quite likely to be blended with regret, love, and shame. The name simply means that jealousy predominates.

It was mentioned previously that, under emotion, substances are often produced in the body that increase one's muscular power. In primitive times to strike hard or run fast was very important. Anything which increased such power had marked "survival value." There was, then, survival value in the emotional processes through which this was accomplished. With the advance of civilization the premium on muscular power has decreased, and with it this element in the survival value of emotions.

The main factor that emotion contributes is to increase the strength of rather coarse muscular

movements. To-day efficiency depends less on the strength of a movement and more on its precision and nice direction. If the energizing effects of emotion ended here, its value in modern life would be small. Emotion, however, seems capable of energizing mental as well as muscular processes. "Nothing great was ever achieved without enthusiasm." There is a mental disease characterized, in mild form, by a happy overactivity, without intellectual impairment. In this stage one may be able to accomplish more than in normal health. "The face with the smile wins," partly because it inspires a more favorable attitude in others; but also because the smile is evidence of good adjustment to life, of impulses finding their outlets freely, of more energy disposable for the work in hand, of not being tied up with oneself in an inner entanglement.

Another way in which emotion serves to release energy, is by "putting the fear of God" into one. Some individuals, insusceptible to hope of reward, will work under fear of punishment. This type of motive has fewer applications than the other, and it may have the opposite of the desired effect. It may serve to mitigate inferiority but hardly to release superior energies.[1]

[1] Compare torture, Chapter II.

Increased effectiveness, combined with heightened emotion, is regularly confined to emotions of moderate degree only. As the intensity of emotional reaction increases, there is a "critical point" at which it begins to disorganize one's activity. All very intense emotion does this. Hence the common terms: "blind with rage," "paralyzed with fear," "distraught with grief," "beside himself with joy." The phrase "to get his goat" means to arouse a degree of emotional reaction that upsets one's powers of right thinking and conduct. A slur on the opponent's wife, uttered in a clinch; a disquieting telegram timed for delivery just before the fight begins, are devices mentioned in prize-ring gossip. The pleader that loses his temper loses his cause. Optimism may disastrously cloud judgment in the stock market. The wooing of the love-sick swain is ineffective by definition. There are those whose "hearts" turn to dust in the very crisis of first and passionate love. Disorganization from anger is popularly called a tantrum. Disorganized behavior is a uniform result of great emotion.

Common observation shows that people differ largely in emotional susceptibility—that is, in the extent to which common affairs of life arouse in them emotional response. One speaks of emo-

tional (or sentimental, temperamental) people and unemotional people; "butter would not melt in his mouth," is sometimes said of the latter. As a class, women are regarded as more emotional than men. This furnished one of the chief considerations against extending the vote to women. Racial differences in emotion are also recognized. The Latin races appear more temperamental than the Nordic stocks. Expressions of the emotions are at least freer in a Gallic than in an English group. Displays of feeling that would mean serious loss of control to an Englishman are to the Frenchman affairs of daily life. If the latter shows more evidence of emotional flurries, he is also less upset by them.

This concerns only the commonly accepted expressions of emotion. It does not compare the inner life of Gaul and Briton. In measuring emotional sensibility, only the veriest beginnings have been made. The standard of measurement takes its cue from the disorganizing effect of pronounced emotion. One tries to present an emotion and measure how much it upsets conduct and adjustment. One of the best known of such methods is the "association test." Words are spoken to the subject, one by one. He answers with a related word as soon as he can. Ordinarily

the response runs off smoothly and quickly, in not much over two seconds. But if he hears a word that arouses emotional response, the processes of answering will be disorganized, and often lengthened. There is also difference in the kinds of answers that are given. A person hesitatingly speaking such answers as *spider—horrible* is probably more emotional, at least about spiders, than one promptly answering *spider—bug*.

One can also measure how much one's bodily processes are disturbed by an event, and take this as an indication of the intensity of the emotion aroused. An emotional person would show more such disturbance. Changes in the circulation of the blood and in the resistance of the body to an electric current have been used as indices in this connection.

These methods have as yet found little application in comparing the emotionality of different persons. One difficulty is that different persons display enthusiasms and aversions about different things. There has been more progress in studying the incitements to which a given person is emotionally sensitive. Ardent lovers have their chief emotional sensibilities centered in each other. Other likely topics of special emotion are money, social position, relation to parents, religion. If

one is emotionally sensitive in regard to a certain topic, one is said to have a "complex" concerning that topic. A person has few or many, superficial or deep, complexes, according to his emotional nature. The study of any one's emotional nature is the study of the stimulations or interests by which emotions are aroused. In such ways methods such as those above described have been of definite service.

One type of emotional complex is through fear of detection or feeling of guilt in wrongdoing. If an otherwise normal person has committed a serious crime, he is likely to be emotionally sensitive to ideas connected with it. In the laboratory it is possible to see whether such ideas arouse special emotional reaction. If they do, it indicates that the subject is conscious of the source. Whether his knowledge is innocent or guilty can scarcely be told by such means alone, though it may be learned indirectly.

The essential source of mental pleasure is the realization of urges. The essential source of mental pain is the thwarting of urges. This is true whether one considers the elementary pleasures and pains as emotions, or by some other name. With the compound emotions also, pleasant emotion goes with the realization of impulses or prog-

ress toward its realization, unpleasant emotion with the marked thwarting of impulses. Some details of these processes have been presented. In conclusion the relation between emotion and impulse may be briefly discussed on a more fundamental basis.

It is a common military observation that the recruit's fear before the battle disappears when he has commenced to take part in it. A distinguished military expert writes of "the shaken morale of troops held in reserve and receiving fire to which they cannot reply. The soldier's fear may leave him when he is ordered to advance. . . ." It is similar with the emotion of worry. As Woodworth observes, one worries less over things when one is doing something about them. Worry is over things one can do nothing about, and because nothing can be done about them. Again, he accounts for the motive of weeping as *helplessness;* the familiar thwarting of an impulse, intensifies the emotional reaction. When the impulse is liberated, the emotional reaction lessens or disappears. This process is embodied in the familiar idea of "getting it out of your system."

Extremes of pleasant emotion, also with diminished activity, occur in religious ecstasy, as well as in the allied contemplation of natural wonders.

In these cases pleasant extremes arise, where urges to outward action are slight or absent. In the cases of the preceding paragraph unpleasant extremes arise from thwarted urges. In some kinds of religious ecstasy, as that of the "camp-meeting" type, there is a good deal of physical activity along with emotional excitement. But this activity is unorganized. It is not the living out of normal or definite impulses. Indeed it is questionable whether such excitements are not more nearly related to a thwarting of normal urges. It is in accord with this principle that unpleasant factors seem to predominate in such emotions (the "mourners' bench").

Up to a critical point the agreeable emotions of the ardent lover thrive on the free pursuit of his object. When exaggerated beyond this, there is an oversentimentality that denotes ineffective love-sickness. Similarly in mental disease the appearance of fullest happiness is the portion of those with relatively mild excitement. When the excitement becomes extreme, the whole mental state seems emotionally more empty, with irritability a dominant note. The free living out of urges seems as such unfavorable to emotional extremes. This is a basic reason why pleasant emotions are less pronounced than unpleasant

ones. They depend on relatively unthwarted urges, but the realization of these urges breaks the emotions down. They are "self-limiting." Ardent lovers become conventional mates. Other and less attained objects may, likewise, be the instruments of pleasurable ardor renewed.

A man with pronounced emotional reactions is called, in common speech, a sentimentalist. A man whose urges assert themselves strongly, and whose instinctive life is vigorously pursued is said to have a strong will or a virile personality. Nobody has measured the strength of urges, or compared them with the measured emotional life, in a group of persons. Psychological method is still a long way from attaining this end. But so far as life can be observed in nature, sentimentalism and executive vigor are not commonly seen in the same person. The effect of pronounced emotion is to disorganize the life of action. Moreover, lives of vigorous normal urges are, almost by definition, less thwarted, and do not provide the conditions under which emotional life flourishes. The man of strong urges often finds "no room for sentiment." His emotions are the simple ones of joy in getting, and of anger that makes him strive harder to get. Sentimentalism is a reflex of thwarted strivings, and its emotions further

disorganize the life of the urges in their turn. Thus the person of pronounced emotions (as distinct from vigorous urges) has difficulties with the ordinary paths of self-realization through love, business, or politics. That is just what makes the real world a "tragedy to those who feel." Such a person has but restricted capacity for satisfactions in the normal life of the instincts. The main self he can hope to realize is not instinctive but emotional. The "artistic temperament" is a common phrase denoting pronounced emotional life. For its living out one depends on the resources of dreams (both day-dreams and night-dreams), of poetry, and other essentially mental creations of imagination and art.

CHAPTER VIII

INTELLECTUAL PROCESSES

When I wish to fare delicately I do not buy dainties in the market, for they are too costly, but I draw on the resources of the mind. . . . ANTISTHENES in *Xenophon's "Symposium."*

GEORGE KENNAN tells of a punishment in use in a Russian political prison in reactionary days which consisted of depriving the prisoner of every opportunity to use his mind, such as might be afforded by a book, or even by a pack of cards. Such punishment would be effective and the more so for the more active minds. Havelock Ellis mentions a convict who scratched on the walls of his cell the number of red tiles it contained, the number of black tiles, the number of times (21,000) he had walked around it in a week. Such assumed tasks testify to the pain-value of blocking one's intellectual activity. The tendency of the mind to think, the intellectual impulse rightly so called, is subject to the same rules of pleasure and pain as govern in the economic, the erotic, or the social spheres. Exercise of function means pleasure; blocking means pain.

As the satisfaction in the exercise of a fine game of football is open only to those of proper physique, so likewise the levels of mental activity or thinking in which one will find pleasure depend on one's mental powers. Psychology has recently determined the grade of mental processes one can readily handle, by means of the so-called intelligence tests. They measure particularly one's ability to manage ideas; they have less to do with one's ability to manage concrete objects, to deal with things; only slightly do they concern ability to deal with other persons. Yet intelligence is equally concerned with all three of these contents or objects of thought.

Many intelligence tests are now available. Some are *individual* tests, given to one person at a time. Others are *group* tests, of which the "Army Alpha" has been the most extensively used; they may be given to groups up to fifty or more. Individual tests are used in clinical and special educational investigations, in which a general appreciation of the subject's abilities as well as his "intelligence" rating is essential. Group tests are frequently used in industrial (personnel) work and in general educational surveys. They are most useful when the examiner's time is limited or many persons must be tested at once. In general

reliability of the rating, the individual tests and group tests, when equally well administered, give comparable results. It so happens that for the upper levels of capacity, there are group tests which are more serviceable than the individual ones; in the lower levels, the individual tests are the more useful. The so-called "performance" tests measure ability to make combinations or perform special operations with actual objects, such as solving puzzle pictures, placing blocks together to form a given pattern, etc. They developed mainly as substitutes for tests of the original Binet type which were awkward to use with the unschooled or with foreigners, or for tests in which verbal material was for like reasons to be avoided. They are generally organized as individual tests. The results are sometimes quite different from those of the "intelligence" tests; the two usefully supplement one another.

What the intelligence tests measure is essentially the ability to manage ideas. In ordinary speech, intelligence means something wider than this. It means something not far from one's general ability to get along, to adjust conduct to the ordinary run of situations. The intelligence tests measure this indirectly, somewhat in the same sense in which a man's height is an index to his

weight, for the taller man will probably be heavier. Other things being equal the man with the higher intelligence-test rating will get along better, and be a more useful member of society, capable of more complex and refined adjustments.

But other things are sometimes quite unequal. The "educated fool" may make an excellent showing in a test, and be a quite impossible individual in society. Some persons with pronounced delusions and other evidences of grave mental disease show quite superior, even perfect, scores in intelligence tests. High intelligence-test ratings are not, therefore, a valid index of mental stability. That would be something like judging a man's eyesight by measuring just one eye; while the chances are that the other eye is about as good, now and then a great mistake would be made. Practically speaking, intelligence-ratings by themselves are serviceable in comparing the efficiency of groups; their use for comparing individuals is hazardous.

The Army data throw a sidelight on the relation between intelligence and ordinary accomplishment or success. When soldiers of different ranks were compared according to intelligence-test ratings, corporals proved to score higher than privates, sergeants higher than corporals,

lieutenants higher than sergeants and—but here the reverse of the old reveille jingle, familiar to soldiers, breaks down. By negligible margins, second lieutenants scored above first; and these, in turn, above captains. There are no significant differences in the commissioned ranks. That is, "intelligence" thus determined seems helpful up to a commissioned rank; but it does not indicate the mental difference between the general officer and his aide. Intelligence is to achievement somewhat as vacuum pressure in a pump; it will raise one only to a moderate height. Beyond this a force pump—the added pressures of strivings, native urge and ambition—is needed.

Under normal conditions, the average intelligence-rating of adults would be difficult to determine. One might find the average rating of college students; but that would be above the average of the population at large; as that of day-laborers would be below this general average. Whether the average for selected occupations, such as policemen and firemen, would represent the general average, would be uncertain. The data accumulated in the war referred to all sorts and conditions of men, whose ratings could be obtained and compared. The average rating on the "Alpha" scale is about sixty points. This

corresponds nearly to the so-called "fourteen-year" test of the Stanford-Binet scale. This is the chief basis for the statement that people have on an average a "fourteen-year intelligence."

Neither intelligence, nor even the limited portion of it reached by these tests, is a unitary thing. There are different kinds of such abilities, which present different courses of development.[1] Many types of test seem to be stable with increasing adult age, at least up to forty-five years. One test concerned with immediate memory has shown a decreasing ability beginning at about twenty years. It seems, however, that average adults do not do better in a general intelligence-test than average fourteen-year-old school pupils. The natural inference is that the mentality reached by the test usually attains its maximum at about fourteen years of age. The brain seems to reach complete development somewhat sooner.

It is clear that, as the child grows, his intelligence increases; he becomes able to carry on more elaborate mental processes. A seven-year-old child of average intelligence is said to have a

[1] In regard to these tests and conclusions from them, see Hollingworth, H. L., *The Psychology of Functional Neuroses* (1920), Appleton, pp. 191-3.

"mental age" of seven; an average child of nine years a mental age of nine, etc. The simplest way of giving a psychometric rating is to state the mental age. But a mental age means nothing unless one also knows how old the child is in years. A boy of eleven years with a mental age of nine is rather below par. A boy of seven with the mental age of nine is quite bright. The really significant rating must embody both mental age and life age. It is generally obtained by dividing the mental age by the life age. The quotient is called the "Intelligence Quotient" (I.Q.). An average child has an Intelligence Quotient of 100. The higher the Intelligence Quotient, the brighter the child, the lower the Intelligence Quotient, the duller. Now and then young children show prodigious intelligence Quotients, of 180 or more. In a child, an Intelligence Quotient below 80 raises the question of feeble-mindedness. The relation of age in years or "life age" to mental age tends to remain similar. When an Intelligence Quotient has been reliably established, it is a reasonable basis for forecasting the child's intellectual future.

For children it seems fair to derive the I.Q. by dividing mental age by life age; for adults such a rating would soon become absurd. A perfect

score in Stanford-Binet at sixteen years means an I.Q. of 122; the same perfect score at forty years would give the meager result of 49. It seems logical to keep the divisor constant from the age at which the abilities measured remain constant. Before the Army results were obtained, this point was presumed to be at sixteen years; to divide by sixteen to get the I.Q. of adults became the established practice. It appears now, however, that fourteen would be more nearly correct; the practical result is to make the average adult Stanford-Binet I.Q. 87 instead of 100.

In its normal relation to pleasure-values, the intellectual impulse is comparable to other urges such as the economic, erotic, or social. The pleasure-values lie in the range of mental exercises which are not so difficult as to overload the mind, and not so vacuous as to "race" it, that is, give it too little to work upon. It is now known that definite degrees of intellect as measured by standard tests, are appropriate to many different kinds of occupation. Persons not "good" enough for their jobs make blunders; persons too "good" for their jobs are apt to be discontented.

The varieties of mental activity which bring pleasure can hardly be enumerated. For present application a two-fold classification may be serv-

iceable. A small group of persons, something like the Athenians of the Bible, have special satisfaction in finding out new things, investigating new relations. Theirs is the spirit of scientific investigation. Such keen mental pleasure in the discovery of new facts as such dominates in such minds, even when the facts themselves seem trivial and by some standards are so; this very circumstance may throw their pleasure-value into stronger relief. The zest or value lies in the *search* for truth—not in its applications. Woven into most applications of science are discoveries whose authors received and asked no other satisfaction than that of discovery. To those people who love research for its own sake, humanity owes much of the knowledge on which the fabric of civilization rests.

"Scientific" thinking and "common sense" constitute "realistic thinking." Thinking is in this sense realistic in so far as it squares with the rest of experience, or "works." It may do for the savage to think that the earth is flat; it "worked" many hundreds of years for the civilized world to think that the sun went around the earth. The satisfactions of the scientific investigator belonged to those who made the calculations by which this seemed to be proved. For most

people it still works quite well to regard a straight line as the shortest distance between two points, Einstein to the contrary notwithstanding. The proposition that two and two make four will square with all tests that are known.

Scientific research is for new knowledge by which previous knowledge can be checked and squared. Scientific thinking and that of common sense are as such subject to every possible test of experience. If the ideas will not work, the scientific impulse is thwarted. Just as with other impulses, there is spur to renewed effort, or disappointment and discouragement. The pleasure-values of realistic thinking are, however, to most people, relatively small. They are obtained in important measure only by people of rather special personality. The main pleasure-values of thought for the mass of mankind are ideas not of a "realistic" nature. Some ideas are by their nature little subject to tests of experience; this is the case with religious beliefs sincerely held. "A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign." Ideas like those found in fiction or poetry are used for pleasure without a thought of putting their contents to a complete test of experience. The play and the moving picture are in this class. It is not necessary to their pleasure-value that the

scenes portrayed really happened or ever could happen. The ordinary day-dream of wished-for things does not carry with it action, as though the things imagined were real. These ideas are exempt from such tests. Last, perhaps also least, the amusement of wit is put to only the most verbalistic of tests. There would be no joke if during a thunderstorm all the passengers really crowded about the motorman "because he is a non-conductor."

The pleasures of thought lie mainly in that type of thinking which is exempt from tests of experience or reality, and lie only to a limited extent in that which adheres to it. Common-sense thinking is almost without pleasure-value in itself. It remains a useful medium through which one's behavior must pass in order to reach many satisfactions of economic, erotic, and social life. But it is only a means to these ends; its main function is service or use, not pleasure.

Truth may be stranger than fiction, but few find it more attractive. In psychology itself, the viewpoints now of most popular interest, are not a little tinged with speculation and romance. In lists of best sellers, non-fiction that is mainly recitals of fact are not in the same class with fiction. Imaginative thinking, stimulated and guided by

the novelist, carries many times the pleasure-value of books on science, travel, or history. As an exception to the last of these classes H. G. Wells' famous *Outline* might occur to the reader, on which the following comment is apposite:

> Had H. G. Wells been a historian he would certainly never have written the *Outline of History*. He would have had a reputation to lose. He would have had academic colleagues to think about. He would have had to worry so hard about the danger of making a mistake that prudence would have reduced him to silence. . . . And if the details are wrong and the judgment hasty and the style often slipshod and the prejudices blatant, Mr. Wells has still done an incalculable service to modern education. . . . After they have made sure that every detail of every epoch is accurate beyond a criticism, men who are not historians "at all" are needed who can take mankind to some high place and show it the panorama of life.[2]

The popular mind clings to the stories of Washington and the cherry tree, of John Smith and Pocahontas, and resents evidence that these episodes are not historical. The pleasure-value of myths and legends has always exceeded that of "old barren reason." Whatever the judgment of Heaven, there is more joy on earth over one poet than over ninety-nine men of science, however just or repentant.

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[2] New York *World*.

Primitive minds are much more dependent on imaginative thinking than even we moderns. Their lives are full of ideas about how the world is run, that "work" only quite narrowly. It is a magic ceremony that makes the sun come back in the Spring; to them this is "realistic." If you can steal a shirt belonging to your enemy and destroy it, harm will come to your enemy. Beliefs of this kind without number survive to the present day, though they do not fill life as they did. They are called superstitions. Apparently they mean more to women than to men: more women entertain them. "Men make gods, women worship them." Superstitions are not uncommon even in educated walks of life. Conklin reports them in 40 per cent of young men and 66 per cent of young women of collegiate rank. Superstitions are often strongly held in the face of contrary experience. They are sometimes held as beliefs without allowing them to upset one's essential tasks. "They may observe elaborate rituals regarding the growing and cooking of rice, but they cook and eat it just the same." In the same class are astronomers who can predict eclipses yet believe that eclipses are caused by a dragon swallowing the sun.

An incident may be cited to introduce a useful

phrase. Some years ago an ocean liner struck an iceberg and sank with great loss of life. A legislator was reported to have inquired why the passengers did not take refuge in the water-tight compartments; his psychology was better than his marine architecture. The mind keeps just such "logic-tight" compartments: from them cold reality is kept out. They are filled with faiths and hopes which supply the buoyancy necessary to sustain the vessel in the rough waters of experience. The captain of a ship would view with alarm any tampering with the mechanism of his water-tight compartments. Of the same order is the feeling aroused when attack is made on one's cherished prejudices, attitudes, and beliefs. At a "Victorian" dinner table, politics and religion were the two subjects placed under *tabu.* The importance of these processes to one's mental comfort is attested by the resentment or pain aroused when they are disturbed.

Beliefs of this type are necessary for the healthy functioning of the average mind. The scientifically knowable is small in topics of fundamental concern, and this concern is met with beliefs and faiths. Faiths are very often invested with intense emotion, and in ordinary society they can seldom be discussed calmly. The extremes of

emotion that invest religion are among the most powerful known. As such they disorganize the remaining life of the personality. Classical examples are the ceremonies of the Russian "Khlysts" or "Skoptzy." Such ecstasy may reach limits in which all but the most immediate bodily functions are suspended; the whole personality is wrapt in intense and blissful contemplation of the object of worship.

The Boston mother asked her conventional six-year-old whether he believed in Santa Claus. "I believe in him as an institution, Mother, but not as an entity." This illustrates a means by which the mind squares the pleasure-value of a belief with the facts of experience. Santa Claus is a symbol, a symbol of Christmas. Hamlet without the melancholy Dane would be enthralling, in comparison with Christmas without Santa Claus. Nothing of Christmas cheer is lost through failure to believe in Santa Claus as an entity, if only one preserves lively faith in him as an institution. The point is that one can hold fast to a symbol, with full insight into its value as a symbol, at the same time preserving the pleasure-value that invests it as a reality. Thus it becomes worth while or at least harmless to believe that a dragon causes eclipses, so long as one can still predict them; to

worship rice as a ritual object so long as one still cooks and eats it. Thus nations find it worth while to preserve a monarchy as the symbol that they are still "members of one body"; it helps to keep them so. In these ways symbols, recognized as such, prove themselves most serviceable in sustaining the pleasure-values of many kinds of behavior. Other illustrations are the value of flags, insignia, and slogans as spurs to action. In the war the symbolic poster was found more effective with soldiers in camp "than any other form of mental approach" (Munson).

Ideas with pleasure-value that "fire the imagination" develop symbols for themselves, Cupid for example. Ideas are invested with added pleasure-value through providing them with effective symbols—such as Cupid's darts, hearts, shamrock, four-leafed clover, and the names of states, like Keystone, Empire, Badger, Sunflower, etc. The question arises whether in some classes of ideas there are not latent pleasure-values unutilized for lack of effective tokens. It would be difficult to find two more significant processes in human experience than two with which Christmas is closely interwoven: the return of the sun and the fact of maternity. The symbol which carries these two things has the world of emotion at

its feet. The second of them has its symbol in the Madonna, yet Santa Claus and not the Madonna is at the center of popular Christmas observance. The turning of the sun is practically unregarded. Historically, the time of Easter is associated with the sun's "crossing the line," but this meaning of the festival is now lost. Easter eggs and rabbits do not fire the popular imagination with the return of Spring. Even as a religious festival, it has no symbol comparable to those of Christmas, and its hold on the imagination is correspondingly modified. It may be that the appeal of these cosmic processes is intrinsically slight, or it may be potentially great but unavailable because not expressed in symbols that "get across."

The limited class of intellectual (scientific) minds whose chief mental satisfaction depends on thought that checks with worldly experience, lead a more complex intellectual life than the average; their source of comfort in other types of thinking appears to be less. Leuba [3] found that mental development specialized in this direction is unfavorable to such foundation-stones of religious faith as belief in God and immortality. In a group of college students the percentage affirming belief in immortality tended to decrease as the later years

[3] *The Belief in God and Immortality.* Sherman French & Co., 1916.

were reached. The extremes were 80.3 per cent and 60 per cent. The per cent of college men reporting belief in a personal God was 56, of women 82. The full significance of this result would appear only if data for the general or average population were obtainable. Biological interests appeared less favorable to beliefs of this type than occupation with the physical sciences. Psychologists were especially unfavorable to such beliefs. More or less distinguished groups in different intellectual pursuits were compared. The less distinguished uniformly furnished a greater percentage of believers than the more distinguished.

Whether such replies indicate the opinion that the data of scientific experience justify or do not justify the belief in question, or that the religious belief is held as something inherently apart from control by scientific or objective data, is an important distinction. The situation is not dissimilar to belief regarding life on other worlds. A clear statement of common-sense attitude on this matter is contained in a letter to *Science* from Professor Ellen Hayes of Wellesley which, as it bears on such beliefs in general, is pertinent:

> In discussing the highly speculative subject of intelligent life in other worlds it is well to keep in mind two

serviceable precepts of scientific reasoning: First, failure to prove that A is B is not a proof that A is not B. Thus failure to furnish evidence that other worlds are inhabited by intelligent creatures is not to be construed as proof that such extramundane life does not exist. Second, of two discordant propositions: A is B; A is C; one of which must be true and for neither of which any evidence is forthcoming, we are intellectually bound to accord hospitality—not adoption but hospitality—to the one which is marked by the greater likelihood. Viewed without anthropocentric bias this earth is, as we know, one of the less important members of the system to which it belongs—a system dominated by a single undersized yellow star. . . . We might express quantitatively the fact that the human race is relatively a mere episode in the history of the planet itself; while our increasing knowledge of the Milky Way and its encircled disk of stars must convince us that our solar system is, in turn, only an incident in the history of the stellar system to which it belongs. Which is more probable, that this one insignificant planet is the only world in which creatures capable of feeling and knowing have originated and developed, or that multitudes of other worlds have afforded both conditions and cause for life, including intelligent life, and are the homes of beings of both physical and mental parts? The latter supposition seems to be invested with incomparably greater likelihood.

The evidence at the present time is that intellectual, particularly scientific, specialization is unfavorable to some types of religious belief. It is not clear that the same is true for the life of action. In theory one might expect a more favorable situation for religious beliefs to exist among men of action. Religion is one of the chief mo-

tives by which masses of men are swayed. To this extent it is easier for a religious person to be a leader than for an irreligious one. There is, however, no comparable information. Devoutness among military leaders has been often observed; Stonewall Jackson is a conspicuous figure. But a rule to this effect must meet exceptions headed by Napoleon. A passage from the writings of Sir Ernest Shackleton runs as follows:[4]

> When I look back at those days I have no doubt that Providence guided us, not only across those snowfields, but across the storm-white sea that separated Elephant Island from our landing-place on South Georgia. I know that during the long and racking marches of thirty-six hours over the unnamed mountains of South Georgia it seemed to me often that we were four, not three. I said nothing to my companions on the point, but afterwards Worsley said to me, "Boss, I had a curious feeling on the march that there was another person with us." Crean confessed to the same idea. One feels the "dearth of human words, the roughness of mortal speech" in trying to describe things intangible, but a record of our journeys would be incomplete without a reference to something very near to our hearts.

In the letters written by Captain Robert Scott as he lay dying with his spent comrades in the Antarctic snowfields there is also frequent reference to other-worldly things.

[4] *South*, p. 211.

The general supposition seems to be that fatalism is a common type of belief among men of action. It is striking that this is also a means of comfort among some relatively inactive peoples of the Orient. The one says in effect: "Till my time comes nothing can touch me; I can take all chances." The other says, "What will be will; I need do nothing." These are examples of what is called *rationalization*. If impelled to do so, one can clothe practically any conduct in the colors of any principle.[5]

Attitudes toward religion range from active devotion, through indifference, to active antagonism. It is more nearly represented by a circle than by a line from one extreme to the other. The upper half would represent concern for religion, the lower half indifference; the right half acceptance, the left half rejection. A person who violently rejects religion is still deeply concerned about it. The passionate atheist makes, in effect, a religion of his atheism. His faith is the denial of some one else's faith. He is by no means a man without faith; indeed, he is rather dependent upon it. Only he does not, as is customary, refer it to a source outside himself.

[5] It may be compared with casuistry mentioned in Chapter VI.

An accomplished man of science previously agnostic affirmed faith in immortality after severe bereavement. The wave of spiritualistic and allied interest that followed in the wake of the war is still fresh in memory. Personal difficulties and trials often operate thus, as energizers of quasi-religious feeling. In the absence or deprivation of material pleasures, comfort is sought in other-worldly interests. Such types of imaginative thinking are a frequent adjustment to various upsetting experiences. If one by nature or training draws a large share of comfort from religious sources, one is more immune to the slings and arrows of outrageous material fortune. Fervent religion may thus be turned to a twofold conservative tendency. On the one hand, it protects against loss of pleasure-values in material misfortune. On the other, it makes one less dependent on, and less urged to seek his fortune in, "the pomps and vanities of this wicked world and all the sinful lusts of the flesh."

Finally, fanciful thinking makes a special contribution to pleasure through the emotion of the comic. Measured in money value, a talent for the comic is to-day among the quickest ways to gain ten talents. First the world belongs to him who can make men fight; then it belongs to

him who can make them pray; then it belongs to him who can make them laugh. High pleasure-value for the comic may come in two quite different ways. People in a cheerful mood respond well to the comic. Their mood makes them more sensitive to comic incidents, just as in a mood of "grouch" one is more easily angered. Amusing things are thus more amusing if one is cheerful in the first place. But it is equally true that in times of difficulty people seek out the comic to get relief, just as a drunkard may drink to drown his troubles, as well as to celebrate. This opens the question, to which of these factors is the present pleasure-value of the comic mainly due. The phrase *to make people laugh* points somewhat in the latter direction. People of themselves cheerful hardly need to be *made* to laugh. They can find amusement without going much out of their way for it. Practically speaking, dependence upon artificial and strained comic effects is more characteristic of a spirit "wandering about in dry places, seeking rest and finding none." Such a situation has been a common heritage of mankind in recent years. In this light, the main increase in the pleasure-value of the comic (jazz, etc.) appears as a reflex of unrest rather than a spontaneous overflowing of mirthful moods.

CHAPTER IX

FRUSTRATED URGES

And the grinders cease because they are few.—Ecclesiastes xii : 3.

Two men sit down to a game of chess. They start with equal resources and the game proceeds absorbingly for a while. But one plays a better game than the other, and the odds become gradually more uneven. For the better player the game may still retain the interest of forcing the conclusion in the fewest possible moves. Theoretically the less favorably situated player has a similar satisfaction in postponing checkmate as long as possible. Practically, the losing player does not, as a rule, continue the game to checkmate, but resigns when he deems the situation hopeless. As the odds become too great, the interest of the game decreases until it becomes negative, and the game is discontinued. Such is an example of the principle to be discussed in this chapter. The game is cut short, which is what *frustrate* especially means.

It is familiar that realizing urges tends towards

pleasure, and thwarting them tends towards pain. Nearly every psychological process embodies some thwarting of an urge. Urges are not simply realized and pleasant, or thwarted and unpleasant. The essence of pleasure-value is the *relation* between the realized and thwarted elements of an urge. The example just given is meant to illustrate two points: First, that when thwarting becomes too great in proportion to urge, the process loses its pleasure-value; second, that one form of response to this loss is to *withdraw* or frustrate the urge; for example, to resign the game. This chapter is concerned particularly with these withdrawal or frustration types of human behavior. The reason for such withdrawal is supposed to be that the urge was not strong enough in proportion to other conditions that life imposes, to yield pleasure in following it to its full expression.

In common speech, the words *thwarted* and *frustrated* are so nearly alike that some explanation of the distinction here made between them is in order. Suppose I try to push through a door and you push on the other side to stop me. I may be able to push you aside, or to get around through another door, or only to keep hammering away on it. There you are thwarting my endeavor more or less successfully. If I *stop trying*

to get through, then my endeavor is frustrated in the sense just indicated. By a thwarted urge is meant one which still beats against an obstacle, trying, perhaps with a certain success, to overcome it. A frustrated urge denotes one that is withdrawn from the struggle. In this chapter, thwarting means being *prevented,* frustration means *giving up.*

A small boy was asked the reason for his little brother's tantrum. "He wants to come downstairs, and he won't let himself." Here one urge thwarts another, with the resulting unpleasantness. An urge may be *thwarted* either by something outside or by another urge of one's own. But in the present sense, only you yourself can *frustrate,* withdraw, an urge. No one but you yourself can determine when it is time to "quit." It is like the old teaching of the catechism that none of the devil's arts can harm you without your consent. The rainbow trout, caught on the flycast, has its life urge seriously thwarted, but it is frustrated only in death.

A distinguished foreign psychologist has made a suggestion that might be put into a formula like this:

$$\text{Pleasure-value} = \frac{\text{strength of urge}}{\text{obstruction or thwarting}}$$

This does not hold universally. Most tennis experts get little satisfaction out of playing against a novice. The pleasure of fervent love is not heightened by too easy yielding of its object. The great satisfactions are found in the overcoming of difficulties rather than in the absence of them, as the formula would demand. The formula holds for the kinds of behavior now under discussion. These are cases in which the process becomes unpleasant through thwarting that is too great in proportion to the urge. The chief reason for these disproportions, however, is not the greatness of obstacles, but diminished urge. The frustrusted behavior here discussed is not seen in reaction to vigorous urges, beating against external difficulties too great for them. It is seen rather with diminished urges, in the face of difficulties not themselves extraordinary.

In normal strivings, reverses are apt to arouse fighting blood, thus increasing the strength of the urge and the pleasure-value, according to formula. But as odds become greater, these reserves of energy are in most men depleted. If a team is overwhelmed by a superior adversary, it is not unnatural for both to miss the maximum zest for the struggle. Neither team is likely to perform so spiritedly as against a more equal opponent.

To keep its morale under these circumstances counts to the losing team's credit.

When the gap between obstruction and strength of urge is so great that interest changes into boredom or pleasure into pain, there are two possibilities. One, which is the normal course, mentioned in Chapter II, is to transfer the energy to some new and more or less similar striving; the lost chess game is resigned and a new one begun; the hopeless love is abandoned and a fresh one taken up. The second is, typically, to resign the lost game and refuse to play again. To abandon the hopeless love in the flesh and still pursue it in dreams. An urge too seriously thwarted is unpleasant. The normal response is to turn to a striving not so thwarted. The other possibility is to withdraw or frustrate the urge altogether. Behavior of the withdrawal type may dominate the personality. A person so constituted has diminished or abnormal urges, even to a degree that may be regarded as mental disease. Thus the human race has very generally considered that there are states of mind in which responsibility ceases. The primitive mind often looks upon such states as possessions by supernatural powers. Under some conditions these states enjoy prestige, and people might even seek to induce them in various ways

at their command; as is recounted of the priestesses in the ancient oracle at Delphi. Conflict of motives gets some modern minds into difficulties that they cannot tolerate. Suicide is none too rare a solution; but a considerable group of mental diseases are coming to be regarded as somewhat similar flights of the mind into regions where it is not held to account. Such withdrawals from the real world may be temporary. Then they are like a rest for the mind to cope with the world anew. If after such times one can get an understanding of how the conflicting urges brought about the breakdown, it is serviceable in dealing with future difficulties. Sometimes the withdrawal is permanent. The new and irresponsible life, even under the restrictions of an institution, is found more agreeable than facing the world for one's self.

In the proportions that this type of behavior shows in everyday life, it is little more than another name for rest. Every time one tires in the evening, one's disposable energy becomes less in proportion to demands on it. Effort becomes more unpleasant. One accordingly withdraws from reality into the world of sleep and dreams, which brings recuperation. After a hard week, one would like to withdraw from reality to a golf

course or a fishing trip. Nowhere have people been able to endure the world without end. People of all nations dream, play games, and on occasion drug themselves. The practical question is how the means one uses for relief affect the rest of the personality. Bodily exercises represent generally favorable types of relief, while drunkenness or masturbation represent disorganizing ones. Types of relief generally favorable to normal urges, such as recreations, were discussed, in the second chapter. The present chapter concerns more dominant types of conduct which represent the frustration of normal urges.

The topic has a rather special emotional value. The average mind is intolerant of perversions in normal urge. It reacts unfavorably to the miser and acutely against the homosexual. It also looks askance at insufficiencies of normal urge. "God Almighty hates a quitter." It comes about that in daily life these insufficiencies seldom present themselves as such. The ass of timidity puts on the lion's skin of self-control. The most respected human qualities and institutions are called upon to furnish such disguises. Among the settings in which the present topic must be developed are religion, comradeship, wealth, and love. It is no disparagement of their value, rather the reverse,

that they are sought as cloaks for some less admired types of human conduct.

A person whose urges are insufficient to give him pleasure in ordinary work is called lazy. This is a simple type of withdrawal, from which few indeed are wholly free. "It's nice to get up in the mor-rning but it's nicer to lie in your bed," as the comedian remarks. The same process pervades life in many and subtle forms. It enters into all the normal urges. Each of them has its types of withdrawal conduct, which are more or less characteristic.

There are types of behavior that lend themselves variously to an avoidance of normal urges. One is that called day-dreaming. The mind has some power to imagine the fulfillment of such desires as of wealth or love. To some minds this kind of imagination is exceedingly tempting and agreeable. Some minds find in it better satisfactions than the world can give, because greater perfections can be imagined than the real world grants. Imagination strips the rose of the thorns it bears in fact. Satisfactions of imagination are more facile than those of love, business, or society. There is less contentiousness in them; their expressions are less likely to be blocked. It is a tempting abode for the too "artistic" tempera-

ment, with exaggerated emotions blocking the paths to self-realization followed by the average man.

Day-dreaming meets the normal urges by imaging their realization. It is as if the fox, unable to reach the grapes, had been content with imagining himself eating them. In the fable, he gets square with the insufficiency of his powers in another way. He says the grapes are sour. In life there are those who find the fruits of love, wealth, and comradeship sour. The common interpretation of finding fruits of life "sour" is that one has been unable to assimilate them. The not unnatural result is to attach special value to keeping away from them. The normal sources of pleasure being inaccessible, one contrives to get comfort out of letting them alone. Thus arises the phrase "to make a virtue of necessity"; and a somewhat similar process may be operative in some of the renunciatory attitudes, such as lead to asceticism or puritanism.

A conclusive escape from all urges of life is suicide. In the life of animals this is a negligible factor. In Western civilization, suicide is usually looked on as an escape reaction, whether or not under difficulties accentuated through mental disease. There are circumstances in which this view

is more questionable. General Nogi, mentioned in Chapter VI, one of the strongest and most respected men in the Japanese Empire, committed suicide on the death of his emperor. To suppose that he found existence insupportable on personal grounds seems rather absurd. His action was in observance of a patriotic devotion, by which he followed his chief wherever he went. Other circumstances might similarly demand suicide, as failure in assigned missions. The so-called *seppuku* was a ritual, the carrying out of which called for extreme self-control. The typical Western suicide, on the other hand, seeks the least painful means available, in conformity with the idea of readiest escape. Any other-worldly motive is pretty well excluded. Persons who believe in heaven are not commonly taught that suicides go there. The increasing frequency of suicide is a reflection of the increased complications of life within recent years.

Mankind recognizes more or less definite standards in the meeting of normal urges. From the economic standpoint, the standard is "self-support." Practically this means that one must himself administer his money, earned or unearned. Some persons find it wiser to withdraw from this responsibility, especially to devote themselves

more fully to some other aspect of life. One may join an organization which undertakes to support its members and meet for them many irksome details of life which otherwise they must meet for themselves. In return, the member is expected to surrender his property and give the organization considerable control over his movements. Monastic orders belong to this class. Monks have done as arduous things as any other mortals. But in order to do them they gave up certain urges on which most men place too much value. In America there have arisen religious sects dominated by some powerful personality to whom followers surrendered a good measure of normal liberty. The question arises how this happens in a free country whose institutions are designed to foster initiative and self-dependence. Probably it is because our premium on initiative puts people with diminished urges at a special disadvantage. They find it advantageous to unite their resources, material and mental, under the vigorous leadership of a "prophet"; such movements would appeal to persons of handicapped or lowered urges.

Quite similar considerations apply in the field of comradeship. The average man makes his friendships through everyday contacts, or through

societies that give chance for closer touch but do not force it. It is possible to withdraw in varying degrees from the give-and-take of social life. One escape is to institutions that provide regulated lives and restricted contacts with the outer world. An extreme solution is found in the life of the ascetic hermit, who dispenses with both material and social comforts to the last degree. Such an existence takes its pleasure-value from the energy it releases to other ends, as those of intellectual development or religious contemplation. Fancies of superiority may also be built up. To most persons these values would not compensate for giving up the normal urges. In the ascetic they more than do so.

The general principle of frustration applies to the erotic life in many and various ways. The development of erotic urges was briefly sketched in Chapter IV. Its maturity is represented in the household which rears a number of children necessary to sustain the race. Short of this there are many levels, such as masturbation, promiscuity, celibacy. If a person's erotic urge is not so developed as to enable him to find satisfaction at a mature level, it is apt to have a development frustrated at one of the levels preceding it. As was seen in Chapter IV, the conditions of modern

life bring about in many people a frustrated erotic development. It is the rule in stocks whose birth-rate is not sufficient to maintain them. Frustration that goes deeper may lead to the celibacy observed in religious settings. Here the urge of the religious life is such that there is not enough energy left over to carry the erotic urge very far. It is reasonable to claim that the demands of priestly life are such that it is inconsistent with undertaking the responsibilities of normal marriage. One cannot say whether a celibate or a non-celibate priesthood as such gets more from life.

In such deep frustrations of erotic development the religious urge is conspicuous. Economic interest induces the average person to postpone marriage and have fewer children. In some persons special intellectual development accompanies a much frustrated love-life. The philosophers Kant and Newton are conspicuous examples. Beethoven and Charles XII are other distinguished men who may have never established relations of the primary level.

Another level of frustrated eroticism is represented by adult masturbation. It brings up a rather common feature of frustrated urges. Masturbation is a normal early stage in the develop-

ment of love-life. When a principal urge is thwarted in adult life, it sometimes "throws back" to a former level. A famous novelist, greatly disappointed in love, failed to seek another love-object, as most men would do, but had recourse to a long period of masturbation—a reversion to a practice typical of adolescence. Some psychologists believe that all frustrations of urge represent "throw-backs" to childish behavior. Undoubtedly it is often the case. It is common enough to say of a disorganized personality that he "acts like a ten-year-old." Some persons love to recount, Munchausen-like, grandiose and unbelievable tales of their accomplishments and experiences. Such behavior reverts to romancing, which is a childish trait. Lies of children result typically because fact and fancy have not as yet reached distinct meanings for them. Every one knows, too, how full of excuses is the typical child. The adult is expected to "take his medicine," though it be given him by mistake. The reversion to childhood is seen in many excuses presented without much insight into their relevance.

During childhood, profound attachments are ordinarily formed towards the parents. In later years, these regularly give place to desire for a

home of one's own. If the early attachments are specially cultivated or overstressed by the parents, they are apt to persist and more or less frustrate the urges of adult life. A man so affected looks for a wife who will "mother" him, or for some business superior in whom he can make his childhood's father live again. Similarly, a girl may set greater value upon age and experience in her choice among men. Abnormal relations to parents, frustrating later urges, are much emphasized in psychoanalysis. They are known as "fixations," and their emotional results by such names as "Œdipus" and "Electra" complexes.

In the social tendencies, there are no such definite standards as self-support or marriage. The urge which yields pleasure in social relations has already been said to characterize the "outward" personality taken up in Chapter V. In the inward personality, this urge is frustrated to make room for satisfactions in the development of the self. In some persons both types of urge seem frustrated, and neither gets very far. There is an "overmodest" sort of person who takes pleasure neither as a member of company nor as a leader of it. If one has diminished social urge, one can avoid it in somewhat the same way as one

avoids the economic struggle. A monastic existence, as provided by some religious and other institutions, limits one to tempered social contacts. Recluses and hermits avoid them even more extremely.

The most general test of social urge is that provided in a war such as America recently passed through. This demands the frustration of personal urges, such as the economic and erotic, to preserve the integrity of the nation. A social urge that extends beyond the nation (internationalism) is at present atypical. It means diminished urge for the nation. Such diminished social urge occurs in persons with strong personal urges (self-preservation, ties of home or business), and in those whose self-expression is spread widely (internationalism). A social urge so diminished means no satisfaction in the customary demands of the nation in arms. Soldiers whose urge was so slight as to make them resist these demands were called "conscientious objectors." Sometimes this did not imply avoidance of military danger, only an unwillingness to bear arms. A modern military establishment can utilize such men and their presence in small numbers is not disturbing. A majority of the con-

scientious objector group appeared so lacking in national urge as to resist all military duty.

The attitude of the conscientious objector is at bottom an expression of abnormal social urge. In practice, the objector puts forward ideas to justify his course in reason. These are generally presented in religious forms. Ninety per cent of those observed by Dr. M. A. May utilized religious grounds. In accord with diminution of nationalistic urge, it was found that "the majority seemed uninterested in social organizations or enterprises." Also in the intelligence tests made, the group of conscientious objectors studied graded higher than the army as a whole. It appears that a more complicated inner mental life was unfavorable to the ready following of the outward urges which are necessary to sustain war.

In the eight-year tests of the Stanford-Binet scale is a question, "What ought you to do if you have broken something that belongs to some one else?" Occasionally one meets, in adults, with replies limited to "Tell them about it," "Go and acknowledge it." This represents another type of frustrated social urge. The prevailing social standards require a making good of the loss—indirectly, if the injured party will not accept it otherwise. To be satisfied with something less

than this implies a frustration of "moral" impulse. To discuss this more fully it is necessary to go back to Chapter VI and recall that to many peoples distinctions of right and wrong are quite fanciful. Savage customs are full of conventional offense whose real harm is trivial. Correspondingly, there develop ways of warding off the harm so threatened. If one believes that it is bad luck to upset the salt-cellar, one may recall that it may be warded off by throwing some of the salt over one's left shoulder. Similarly in a certain primitive community a stalk of fern would be tied to a man; a ceremony would then be performed over him, which would transfer all the people's sins to him; whereupon he would jump into the river, untie the stalk, which would bear the sins away with it. In other usages, a dead person can be relieved of his previous sins. Some bread, drink, and money would be handed over the corpse to a "sin-eater," who would assume the guilt of the dead; or a portion of the deceased's body might be mingled with food and eaten by some one hired to bear his sins. Sometimes a human sacrifice would be invested with the frailties of the people. Prior to his death he might have a period of exceptional opportunity to accumulate a load of sin on his own account. One of the early Chris-

tian martyrs, St. Dasius, suffered for refusing to take part in an affair of this kind.[1]

It is a considerable advance from these magical atonements, to the acknowledgment of responsibility as expiation of offense. It is an essential step towards actual repair of the harm done. From a material standpoint it does not, of course, repair the harm or constitute improvement of one's future conduct. It does not pay a debt to acknowledge it. It simply opens the way, which is closed as long as responsibility is unacknowledged. This is the reason for regarding moral attitudes of mind, as such, in the light of incomplete or frustrated processes. A society advances pretty much as its members can trust each other. From an other-worldly standpoint also, it is perhaps reasonable to consider repentance as unlocking the celestial gates, rather than as permission to enter.

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[1] Frazer, *The Scapegoat.*

CHAPTER X

FACTORS OF SUCCESS

We are of a people who take what they want—like you whites.—Joseph Conrad, *The Lagoon.*

Another man, as wise as Æsop, rewrote the fable of the grasshopper and the ant. The cold of winter came and both were about to perish. Then the ant was sorry because she had wasted the summer in toil, and envied the wisdom of the grasshopper in living while he lived. From a moralizing standpoint both these versions may be effective; as psychology they are equally unsound. Both grasshopper and ant lived out their own natures. The ant's life would have been intolerable for the grasshopper; to live like the grasshopper no less difficult for the ant. In all life there is no force more destructive of pleasure-values than that which tries to make ants of grasshoppers and grasshoppers of ants. It is most human to say, "What I enjoy you must enjoy too; and above all, what I cannot enjoy you must not be allowed to." Admittedly in human relationships, many grasshoppers cannot live unless the

ants feed them in return for being heartened at their labors. Grasshoppers not thus provided for may find their position embarrassing long before the winter of age.

The point is that the two cannot live each other's lives and expect the virtue of so doing to be its own reward; for it does not follow—as to obtain its full meaning we turn the familiar phrase around—that everything that is its own reward is virtuous. The moral consequences of such doctrine are disconcerting.

The grasshopper and ant were each successful in the lives they were born to live. Our world has not only human grasshoppers and ants, but bees, wasps, beetles, spiders, flies—not to mention more humble creatures; the life of each, and in human terms, "successful life," is differently conditioned. But all live in the same world; and it is obvious that to enjoy life one must like things that are reasonably accessible in that world. If the sole cost of not getting what you like, were liking what you get, every one could be happy. To expect the impoverished, the thwarted, the bereaved, to like what they get, is asking too much. Enjoyment is not so elastic as conscience. But within limits every one must enjoy what he gets, or lose the value of life. You cannot other-

wise play the game of life against those who do enjoy it; your kind disappears and gives place to more adaptable stock.

We may now consider how such adaptations come about.[1] A dog is given a sour substance to taste, so that his salivary glands begin to act and his mouth waters. This action of the salivary glands is an ordinary "reflex" response. Then the dog is repeatedly given such sour substances to taste, and every time this is done is scratched on some particular spot. After a time the dog's mouth will water when he is scratched, even though he tastes nothing. At first the scratch had no effect; it has acquired this effect by being constantly presented in association with the taste. The acquired response to the scratch is an example of a "conditioned" response. A conditioned response is thus aroused by a given stimulus in virtue of special experience.

This principle is far-reaching; it applies not simply to reflexes of glands, but to movements of the voluntary muscles. Thus, a mild electric shock can be applied so as to make one withdraw the foot. If at the same time a color stimulus is given, after repeated trials, the color alone will elicit the foot movement. Indeed, a refinement is

[1] See also Chapter II.

possible so that only a special color will induce the movement. Some reader may recall the tales told of street-car horses retired into private life when the trolley superseded them, that no power on earth could get them to move until a bell had been rung twice behind them. The bell was a "conditioned" stimulus.

Many interesting observations have been made on "conditioned" responses. They are as truly a part of normal human life as of subnormal or animal behavior. The general principle is this: a kind of behavior naturally aroused by one situation becomes attached to another situation which has been intimately associated with the first.

Now, pleasure and its opposite are such factors of behavior. When a child is a few months old, there are certain things for which he shows liking, others for which he shows aversion. He likes to be fondled and to suck. He dislikes to have his limbs tightly held. Of such stuff are the simple sources of pleasure with which he starts. His capacity to enjoy is concentrated mainly on them. By and by his enjoyment diffuses more widely, over his own body, and extends to mother, to toys, to games, to playmates. As a young man, a lion's share of it may be concentrated upon a love-object. "I find no warmth in sunlight that does

not shine upon her." Later, his children, or his business, or his intellectual interests may displace the earlier preoccupation. In sources of pleasure, as in all nature, nothing is constant except change. Mental growth is growth in the types of behavior that satisfy or yield pleasure.

Upon the direction of these changes depends one's enjoyment in life. There are objections to regarding enjoyment as quite one with success; though obviously they have much in common. Indeed, the elementary meaning of "success" is, like pleasure, the accomplishment of what one is trying to do. The personality is a bundle of strivings and urges, and by this definition is successful in so far as it realizes them. In realizing them it realizes itself; hence the name "self-realization," denoting success of this elemental sort. No two persons have quite the same group of urges, and in detail the expression of the urges differs widely. Thus there are as many kinds of success as there are purposes and persons. Self-realization means as many different programs as there are selves to realize.

The realizing of urges is pleasure, and, from the standpoint of self-realization, success is what one gets from life in terms of pleasure-value. The urges yielding the major pleasure-values of

this world are the economic, the erotic, and the social. In many realizations of these, one may also give pleasure to others. How much one thus *gives* to life may become a measure of success of another kind. As such it is comparable with what one *gets* from life; and the immediate topic is success in the enjoyment one obtains from life.

The essence of enjoyment is the spending of energy in the realizing of urges. The physicist distinguishes two kinds of energy; the one, such as the reservoir of water backed up behind a dam, is called *potential* or stored energy; the other is the released water driving a turbine and is active or *kinetic* energy. The distinction may be transferred to psychology. It is this second kind, the spending of energy, that creates enjoyment. While stored behind the dam, as it were, it is unavailable for enjoyment; indeed, it is likely to be wasted and seep away.

The first condition of enjoyment is a good store of energy, to direct along the avenues of pleasure. In this respect it is probable that the native equipment of individuals differs greatly. Let us consider a few types. Z is naturally languid; in other words, life has little zest for him. Y is reduced by bodily disease; while his energies are deficient his enjoyments are limited; his urges

are "frustrated." X has a fair or good amount of energy, but his assets are not liquid enough—to use a business term. He has not sufficient aptitude at liking what he gets: his employer must be a Chesterfield or he cannot get along with him; his food must conform to most refined standards or it is uneatable; his house is unlivable because it is not a model of domestic architecture N is a person of high intelligence, ability and energy; of secure economic position, with all material comforts and some luxuries. On the other hand, his domestic urges are thwarted. Normal impulses to comradeship are not well lived out. Intellectual impulses, potentially great, receive only moderate play. The result is a dominant mood verging on moroseness, with transitory episodes of marked enjoyment. Q is a man who has made a great deal of money, and is regarded as a most valuable public servant. Yet the energies expended in these directions have not brought enjoyment of life above, or perhaps equal to, that of the average man. At most they may have served as balancing factors against difficulties in other fields.

These citations are meant to illustrate that the conditions of major enjoyment are, first, endowment with a great store of vital energy; second,

the spending of energy in urges mainly of the instinctive life; third, the spending of it in directions that have pleasure-value for the individual. The somewhat mixed expression "working like a dog" is ample testimony that one may spend a great deal of energy to little pleasure purpose. The mere spending of energy does not guarantee enjoyment; if spent on an urge unfitted to receive it, it is called drudgery. Whitewashing the fence was to Tom Sawyer an irksome chore. By his comrades it was accepted as a coveted pleasure.

The simplest path to self-realization is found in the voluptuary. This means one whose strivings are realized through urges of bodily pleasure. No doubt there are persons who can get more from life through processes of eating, drinking, and crude eroticism ("wine, women, and song") than in any other way. Such a mode of life hardly qualifies one to attain distinction, so that satisfactory illustrations are therefore not readily cited; nor does this method guarantee satisfaction to every one who attempts it. It has already been emphasized that organic satisfactions are transitory and dependent on special bodily conditions. Prolonged indulgence at this level often leaves a craving without the power to satisfy, or sets up new cravings extremely difficult to satisfy. Per-

sons living for bodily pleasure are never typical in a vigorous society which has attained to some degree of civilization. The social attitude towards them is generally unfavorable, which further limits the opportunity of self-realization at this level. Marked pursuit of such pleasure as the chief purpose and the greater toleration by society of voluptuaries is a regular symptom of social old age and decline.

Ordinarily, a man called successful is one who has made plenty of money. This is because money is a common factor by which many kinds of success may be measured. The great lawyer, physician, or industrialist usually has a healthy bank balance as a part of his greatness. In the success of a teacher or religious leader, money is not a conspicuous factor. Money is evidence of success in certain fields, such as business, a means to success in others, such as love. It is a figure of speech to identify it with success.

That money itself does not guarantee enjoyment is commonplace. There must be activities actually enjoyed, and the rich must know how to use their money so as to attain the enjoyment. The typical man of business, not to mention the man of science or letters, finds the more positive joy in his work. The money it brings is rather

a safeguard against discomforts of physical want and a means to other ends, such as the home. One who enjoys money for its own sake is called a miser. This propensity suggests an abnormal personality, and is unfavorably regarded.

The idea of "getting" from life implies by definition an egoistic attitude. One form of such enjoyment is afforded by bodily pleasure; another in getting and spending money. A third and more conspicuous is through the will to social power. But, as in the other cases, the attainment of power is no guarantee of its enjoyment. On the contrary, the crowned head is said to lie uneasy. The mighty ones of the earth are scarcely more distinguished for the capacity for enjoyment than are its Crœsuses or its Neroes and Heliogabaluses. In terms of power one thinks of Alexander the Great; his joy of achievement seems to have much surpassed that of other great conquerors, though comforts of a bodily nature had their place in his psychic economy.

Some twelve years ago there was published an autobiography illustrating in extreme measure one avenue of self-realization. The following quotations will serve to indicate the type of personality in question:

Excitement is as essential to my existence as air or food. . . . Love of adventure has been a driving force in all my encounters with good men and bad, with the latter much in the majority. . . . I have served all told under eighteen flags and to each I gave the best that was in me even though some of them were disappointing in their failure to produce a pleasing amount of excitement. . . . The lovers of liberty and of lucre who command insurrections are out chiefly for what there is in it for themselves, while the simple soldiers of fortune like myself are in the game mainly for the excitement and amusement of conflict. . . . Spent the next year or more in enjoying myself and squandering money, which in those days was my favorite pastime after a series of adventures. I knew I had only to go to sea to coin more money, so the spending of it produced nothing but pleasure. . . . —— was anxious to put me in the way of making a fortune to take the place of the ones I had lost in speculation and in trying to outdo the King of —— in riotous living to which I have ever been prone. . . . If I am ever to become afflicted with religious beliefs I hope they will be those taught by Mahomet. . . . I have no disappointments and no regrets except that this existence is too short. If I had my life to live over again it would be lived in the same way, though I hope with a still greater share of excitement. . . . I hope that in some land or opportunity for wider activity I will be reincarnated as a filibuster and a buccaneer and that I will so continue until my identity is merged into a composite mass of kindred souls.[2]

The traits of this personality are abounding physical energy and mental alertness, with a vigorous life of the personal instincts. One thing that makes such a life impossible for most men

[2] *The War Maker.* A. C. McClurg, 1911.

is a limited endowment of energy. The greater importance of social tendencies has a similar effect, raising moral barriers to self-expression through control of others. The interest taken in fellow-beings by the voluptuary, the miser, or the soldier of fortune is restricted, and their pursuit of personal ends is accordingly freer. But the cost of "this freedom" in terms of injury to or risk from others is one that normal civilized man will not pay. Where it is paid, civilization is soon spent with it, as a large part of Europe shows to-day.

It appears that some individuals are capable of an existence highly satisfactory to themselves, based on the pursuit of essential personal ends. At least equal pleasure-values attach to a type of success in which the individual's contribution to life is an important factor in his pleasure status.

As the personification of success realized in material well-being, achievement against obstacles, domestic realizations, political influence and popular acclaim, there is a contemporary name that fairly leaps to mind. There are others who gave as much to American life as Theodore Roosevelt; few would deny such places to Washington and Lincoln. Those who got as much from

life as he are perhaps more numerous; but it is difficult to find anywhere in history a figure that so combined the positive contribution to life with the enjoyment of it. By these tokens the twenty-sixth president of the United States must, despite the thwartings of his later years, rank among the most successful human beings that ever lived. There is another contemporary figure who showed no less a joy in existence and might well have given to it in equal measure had he been longer spared—Carleton Parker. It is difficult to name historical figures like these.

Occasionally there is a comparable achievement in the field of art. The pleasure-value of artistic self-expression runs high. In fact, it is part of the nature of an artist to get joy through art. The "true" artist often needs all he can get from his art to balance his lack of material means. But there are some whose art strikes a popular chord and gives to the life of others pleasures to which they respond. For such pleasures the world makes a liberal material return. It also exempts the artist from conventional restrictions that it imposes on less pleasure-giving members of society. The man or woman whose artistic self-realization meets with the world's approval, is not far from the most favored of earth. Practi-

cally, a condition of this kind is exceptional. Often there must be some sacrifice of art to popularity and of popularity to one's sense of art. The life of the popular artist is a complicated one. Press reports are eloquent of personalities that do not "stand up" under the temptations of popularity. Few contemporary "successes" seem of the same order as those previously named.

In general, success in art means producing art that meets approval. It makes no implication as to the personality that produced it, but indicates the ability of the artist to contribute to the life of others. Thus one awards the palm of success to the personal obscurity of Shakespeare, the turbulence of Burns, and the tragedy which Chatterton, Poe, and Chopin share in company with a hundred others. In poetry and music particularly, celebrity has gone hand in hand with suffering. This is in line with the emotional significance of poetry and music, and with the preponderant rôle of the unpleasant in emotional life. Distinguished names in these fields are witness that as one may get from life without giving, one must often give without getting. In these terms as in nature generally, the supreme reward is to a few, and a doubtful and limited one to the many.

The voluptuary in pleasures of sense or the

Without raising theological issues, one may maintain that the great prophets of other-worldly things have without doubt been the most influential figures in history. And if one takes the wide view of pleasure-values here developed, the Christian religion has been the most successful in furthering them. Yet also in the name of religion has there been much destruction of pleasure-values as well as advancement. In this direction also the Christian religion has borne a considerable part. The contributions to human happiness from such sources as Mohammed or Buddha, not to mention primitive faith, form a more debatable matter.

This raises the question of general influence on life as a factor of success, coördinate with what one has obtained from it or given to it in terms of pleasure-value. This factor is most conspicuous in military conquerors. It enters essentially into the success recognized in Alexander, Julius Cæsar, Jenghiz Khan, Napoleon. In biography, Alexander got much from life and gave but moderately. Napoleon got something, and could have given much if he had been permitted to do so. Their recognized success is for neither of these things, but for their mastery over men. To ordinary speech, both religious prophets and military

conquerors are *great* men rather than *successful* men. One can be successful, from a personal standpoint, without being great; one can be great and be in several ways unsuccessful. One's influence on human life, or greatness, is a factor of success that may be very prominent as in Napoleon, or insignificant, as in many happy but obscure personalities.

In the advance of civilization the military conqueror gives place to the industrial colossus. Amassing of wealth has been cited as a common denominator of success. It is so, not only as the means of personal pleasure but because it denotes influence over the lives of others. Mastery over men, formerly expressed in military conquests, is now attained mainly in economic supremacy. Naturally men of great wealth differ widely in their influence on life. There are personalities known for little save that they have made a great deal of money. On the other hand, a notable contemporary figure, Henry Ford, accumulated his vast fortune because he had the chief part in bringing to the public the most important of modern means of pleasure. Some are conspicuous for trying to use their wealth to increase the value of life to others in benefactions (Carnegie).

"Dead men's shoes soon wear out." The influ-

ence of wealth passes into other hands on the death of its possessor. That of the military conqueror is perhaps less transitory. Dead men's brains, on the other hand, appear to have more lasting quality. The influence of a man of great ideas, though less at any one time than that of Alexander or Crœsus, is likely to be more enduring. This is particularly the case when the idea leads to a technical achievement that finds its way readily into the general life of man. From the standpoint of social value this type of success is as great as any to be recorded. Such are the contributions of Pasteur and of Edison. A far-reaching, though hardly so wide an influence, is also attained in more abstract scientific contributions. The achievements of Aristotle, Copernicus, Newton, Descartes, and in our own day of Einstein, are essentially of this mental type.

Pure science carries an extreme degree of enjoyment for a few persons only. One may go back to Archimedes, absorbed in his diagrams while his city was being stormed by the enemy, and add the case of a scholar for whom mathematical calculations had such fascination, as to capture his attention in the midst of utmost erotic crises. All this is exceptional.

It was brought out in Chapter VIII that the

personal pleasure-value of achievement in the career of science is not so wide-spread or generally so great, as in the practice of the arts. But similar degrees of self-realization may occur in all careers. As in the arts, so in science. If one's achievements are such as to add to life's value for others, there are possibilities of great material return as well. Westinghouse and Steinmetz are notable examples.

Self-realization in art or science does not make such direct appeals to the fundamental sources of pleasure as are involved in following the instinctive urges. Art and science derive their pleasure-value from these sources secondarily, by a process of refinement and transfer. Psychoanalysis has given close attention to this process, and calls it "sublimation." It is like the energy of a waterfall which in its crude state can be little used, but when harnessed to a dynamo can be turned to many purposes. In the practical life as to-day, many cannot live out all the energy of their primitive urges as such. Especially are they limited in the expression of their erotic urges. In healthy persons this energy "sublimates" into other fields such as industrial, scientific, or artistic achievements. New urges in these directions

are developed, with corresponding pleasures in living them out.

It is only reasonable to suppose that in this process of conversion, a certain amount of energy is lost. Less energy is derived from the dynamo than there actually is in the falling water. If one further changes the current into heat, still more is lost. Similarly, more people can enjoy love than Shakespeare, and few people can enjoy Shakespeare as much as love. "We can only sublimate a part of it," as Freud puts the matter. The further away one drifts or evolves from the fundamental urges, the more uncertain is the pleasure-value of one's activities.

Thus it comes about that intellectual and artistic enjoyments do not have for the mass of mankind the same pleasure-value as friends, wealth, and love. And this fact explains why the cultured are not necessarily, perhaps not generally, more happy than the "children of nature." The child of nature gets his satisfaction direct from the instincts; the man of culture gets them at second or third hand through a series of sublimations. He lives a life of derivative, even artificial pleasures mainly. It also explains why the general level of happiness among the rich is little if at all above that of persons in more moderate cir-

cumstances. It partly explains why childhood's happy hour is so designated. Those who can get their satisfactions nearest the original sources are likely to get the fuller measure. It needs a long tow-rope to hitch your chariot to a star.

Save where one observes directly, the enjoyment that others get from life can be but roughly gauged. The effect one has had on life can be dealt with at least more concretely. There have been several attempts to secure such a measure of greatness. One may accept as a criterion of greatness the amount of space that is given to different celebrities in standard works of reference. By this method Dr. Cattell found the ten most eminent of men to be the following:

Napoleon	Aristole
Shakespeare	Goethe
Mohammed	Julius Cæsar
Voltaire	Luther
Bacon	Plato

This list contains only two men of action—Napoleon and Julius Cæsar; the others are distinguished rather for their intellectual powers. Yet men of action predominate in the lower rankings of the series, which contains in all a thousand names. One may note the subordinate rôle played by the factor of personal pleasure. Nero is the

most eminent of men distinguished in this way, ranking forty-fourth in the list. In their degree of life enjoyment it is impossible to say that the average of the ten greatest celebrities differs from the average of humanity at large. In but three cases, Napoleon, Cæsar, and Mohammed, is there a marked self-realization based on fundamental urges. As regards *contribution* to the general pleasure-values of life, a significant claim can hardly be made for every one on the list, though as a whole they undoubtedly gave more than they got. Bacon, Aristotle, and Plato are hardly more than names outside the intellectual group to which the editors of reference books belong.

There is a more direct approach to the question, and one that yields, on the whole, more consistent results. It is well known that man is a hero-worshiping animal. In early childhood the hero is regularly the father. As experience widens, a broader range of choice is utilized, for example, the doctor or the locomotive engineer. In adult life it seems generally possible to get a definite answer to a question as to what historical personage one most admires or would like to resemble. With the information now available, a possible mode of inquiry is to take the more typical heroes cited and have them rated in order of admiration.

The form of the question is important. The type you most admire, and the type whose life you would most like to lead, are not necessarily the same. The reader may test it out on the following great names. Compare them in terms of your admiration for them and in terms of your own desire to be such as they.

Julius Cæsar	Mohammed
Benjamin Franklin	Robert Lee
Andrew Carnegie	Shakespeare
William E. Gladstone	Pasteur

(If one intends to make the arrangement, it will avoid errors of suggestion if done before reading further.)

An extensive inquiry is reported by A. A. Brill, based upon questions to his patients. He asked: "What personage from history or legend do you admire most, or whom would you consider your ideal?" He is not dealing with average persons, and this no doubt affects his results. Five hundred and eighty-six male adults made answers as follows:

Napoleon	396
Lincoln	101
Cæsar	38
Washington	26
Frederick the Great	16
Scattering	9

The dominant feature of this selection is will to power. Napoleon represents this as such, Lincoln represents it in a refined or "sublimated" form. The majority of the ten most eminent personages in Cattell's list are unrepresented in this list, or in other material similarly derived. It is found that women nearly always name men, but that for them Napoleon's place as first is taken by Lincoln and Washington. The principle throughout is that heroes are selected for their direct personal influence, not for the enjoyment obtained from life or for depth of thought.

These findings may be compared with two other sets of data of somewhat more limited extent. They are based on replies from normal young men of rather superior endowment, most of them nearing, and some already beyond, the threshold of independence. In the first group,[3] personages named as desired and admired exemplars are as follows:

Lincoln	42
Roosevelt	12
Washington	10
Napoleon	7
Christ	5

This list differs from Brill's in its greater refinement; that is, the conquering type tends to

[3] From research by Freyd.

be replaced by the civilizing and socializing type. It is more comparable with the results obtained by Brill in replies from women. In Brill's studies, the name of Christ appeared twice in a group of 350 Christians. Educational and racial differences may affect the results. One suspects that it was mainly due to the nature of Brill's inquiry. His subjects, living somewhat obstructed lives, idealize violence by way of "compensation." As is true of Brill's results, men of authority are chosen as against men of ideas, who stand out in the literary method of selection. In the eighty-nine selections of Freyd's subjects, there are only nine persons who never commanded fighting men.

A second inquiry,[4] based upon the reports of nearly two hundred persons, attempted to select desired or admired qualities, mostly abstract ones; specific persons as embodiments of such traits were named 35 times as follows:

Roosevelt	23
Lincoln	8
Lloyd George	3
Wilson	1

So again it is men of authority and action, rather than men of ideas with whom these sub-

[4] Personality Studies by the Department of Hygiene, Harvard University.

jects prefer to identify themselves. Quite naturally it is chiefly men of ideas who are favored in the literature, which is itself an expression of men's ideational impulses.

Briefly there are three phases of expression in which success is shown: (1) the enjoyment derived from life; (2) the enjoyment derived from contributions to life; (3) the enjoyment derived from the influence contributed by the force of one's personality. The limitation of the first channel of expression is that intense personal enjoyments may be derived in ways that are socially impossible or undesirable; the limitations of the second are that their pursuit may lower or run counter to unconquerable impulses of the first order; the limitation of the third is the possible injury done to others who come under its influence.

Yet, despite these complications, there are concrete standards by which to judge the measure of success from an everyday point of view. From a plain, practical aspect, the more successful man is the man who has more friends, more money, more children; who is more cheerful, has more authority, and uses more powers for the well-being of others.

In closing, it may not be out of place briefly to

extend these considerations from individuals to social groups. As scientific history develops, it grows beyond a chronicle of events to a study of their relationships. It becomes the foundation of social psychology and of the science of human behavior on a large scale. As success is hard to define for the individual, so is it difficult to define the "progress" of civilization in a universal way. Just as there are individuals at once happy and obscure, so there are small and prosperous nations. Great nations, like great men, become involved in responsibilities that vastly complicate their lives. A man may be successful in getting from life, by giving to life, or for his power over life. Among the things that make a nation great are numbers, endurance, prosperity, conquest, good government and intellectual achievement. Happy, says the historian, is the nation whose annals are uninteresting. By this token, the highest pleasure-values may well be looked for outside the great peoples of the earth.

Human beings and others of the animal kingdom go through readily recognized periods of growth, maturity and decline. The nations of history show similar phases, though marked in different ways. The forerunners of a great civilization are people who "take what they want."

They are men of strong urges, often of a primitive level. They band together because more spoil is obtained by coöperation. The marauding Tartars of the Middle Ages, as well as certain peoples of our own day, attained this level and failed to get beyond it. In a further stage the great nation develops social tendencies. It becomes a more efficient administrative unit. It ceases merely to kill and plunder, begins to enslave and ends by colonizing, spreading its people over the world. Then comes the period of maturity, with a secure place established among its neighbors on earth. There are either no more worlds to conquer, or no desires left to conquer them. Personal instincts begin to reassert themselves. Luxury and license develop among the rich. They filter down through the middle classes so far as economic conditions allow. The birth rate is likely to go down. People grow more concerned with living out their personal selves along instinctive or mental lines. Violation of accepted custom is more tolerated, and even applauded. If at this stage a nation is attacked by a younger people with developing or maturing vigor, it perishes—like Babylon before the Persians, like Persia before the Greeks, like Rome before the Germans. "This has ever been the fate of energy

and security; it takes to art and to eroticism, and then come languor and decay."[5]

In the lessons of history, there seems about the same likelihood of a vigorous society's avoiding this course as of a human individual's escaping death. Death, as has been said, is the price one pays for great life. A person achieves a degree of immortality by leaving offspring. The youth of great nations is renewed in the lands won by their pioneers. The overseas dominions have this function for England and, in a sense, Western America for the older East.

The main interest that such developments have for the present theme is their effect upon the distribution of pleasure among mankind. The general tendency of advanced civilization seems to be towards concentrating the resources of pleasure among relatively few persons. In the later stages of a society's life, the moralist contrasts the luxury and extravagance of the rich with the misery of the poor. Uneven distribution of pleasure means social tension; and this sufficiently increased means explosion, spontaneous or otherwise. Ancient kingdoms were mostly shattered from without. Pre-revolutionary France and Russia broke under their own internal strain.

[5] H. G. Wells, *The Time Machine.*

The one thing which is practically as sure as that the world endures, is that science will advance and make life more complicated. The historical result of this change is increased inequality in pleasure distribution. This means more unstable societies and shortening cycles in the life of nations. These are indicated in times already past. The Neanderthal cycle was thousands of years longer than the Cro-Magnon which displaced it. China lives long, but on a simple level. Among dominant nations, Egypt lasted longer than Rome, Rome lasted longer than the leadership of France or Spain. Great Britain to-day owes her life to her children. The destructiveness of modern warfare is portentous in these respects. The intensity of life, on the other hand, and the maximum to be obtained from it, is proportionately increased.

About twelve years ago a French clergyman's doctrine of the "simple life" had considerable popularity. To-day there is a similar interest in the simple life set forth in the civilization of the South Seas. This interest is based on the unevenness of pleasure-distribution in modern societies. As the picture is painted, Polynesian civilization gives more equally to each of its members. There are no such contrasts as that of our own slum

dwellers and multi-millionaires. No one has as much as our most favored, but no one has as little as our people of the abyss. The general level of happiness under South Sea conditions is thought by Dunlap to be higher.

There is one distinctive effect of the growing complexity and intensity of modern life. A tremendous number of special niches are to be filled. Individuals have to be more and more specialized in order to fill them. In nature generally, the better fitness for one place means a lesser fitness for most other places in life. The parasite *Antennophorus* is most efficiently adapted for living on the bodies of certain ants, but it is rather helpless outside these surroundings. Thus to the biologist specialization has a meaning not far removed from what he calls degeneration. The question is raised how far the growing specialization of modern human life carries with it a similar import. It seems to have done so for the government clerk who is the central figure of Gogol's *The Cloak:*

> One director being a kindly man, and desirous of rewarding him for his long service, ordered him to be given something more important than mere copying; namely, he was ordered to make a report of an already concluded affair, to another court; the matter consisted simply in changing the heading, and altering a few

words from the first to the third person. This caused him so much toil, that he was all in a perspiration, rubbed his forehead, and finally said, "No, give me rather something to copy." After that they let him copy on forever. . . .[6]

In industry, it has been found more productive to put the worker on some special task, like setting a bolt, and let him do that one thing continually instead of assembling a whole machine, ("straightline" methods.) Objection appeared on the ground of deadly monotony for the worker. It was thought to impair the pleasure-value of his work. But adaptation is soon accomplished, and the simpler task is preferred. A singular instance was reported to the writer in which a group of superior workers had had some special experience in adjusting each a single part of a machine. One day they were called upon to put together each a complete machine, as they knew well how to do. They all but went on strike; just as the government clerk above mentioned insisted on having something to copy.

"When our houses were of willow," remarked an Englishman of earlier days, "then we had oaken men"; but now that our houses are of oak, he goes on, men are not only of willow, "but many

[6] Translation by Isabel F. Hapgood.

are altogether of straw, which is a sad sight." It is fortunate for his peace of mind that he did not live in an age of steel. The offset of such pessimism is that while men of straw may live in oaken houses, it takes men of more than oak to build them. If the age of steel shelters men of paper, it also breeds men who are above steel. The more of nature is mastered, the greater masters of nature there must be.

The master of nature and of life is one who has great and real longings with strength and will to follow them to the end. An equal mastery has never attached even to the highest developments of the inner life. "All the world loves a lover" is but one phase of the world's admiration for every great and outward striving. The world's martyrs have the courage of great conviction; its heroes, of great desire.

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